TOGETHER FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE 1.5 TO STAY ALIVE

31st CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

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ARTICULATING CSOs POSITION TOGETHER



Center for Participatory Research & Development
CPRD

CLIMATE JUSTICE ALLIANCE BANGLADESH

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DECLARATION

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ACRONYMS

AC	Adaptation Committee
ACE	Action for Climate Empowerment
AF	Adaptation Fund
BAM	Belém-Antalya Mechanism
BAR	Baku Adaptation Roadmap
BIM	Barbados Implementation Modalities
BTR	Biennial Transparency Report
CBDR-RC	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
ExCom	Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism
FGCR	UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience
FPIC	Free, Prior and Informed Consent
FRLD	Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GIA	Global Implementation Accelerator
GST	Global Stocktake
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITC	International Trade Centre
JTM	Just Transition Mechanism
JTWP	UAE Just Transition Work Programme
LLA	Locally Led Adaptation
LT-LEDS	Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategy
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MoI	Means of Implementation
MWP	Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NELD	Non-Economic Loss and Damage
NMA	Non-Market Approach
RE	Renewable Energy
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SeSD	Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SNAB	Santiago Network Advisory Board
SNLD	Santiago Network for Loss and Damage
TAFF	Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TFD	Task Force on Displacement
TFFF	Tropical Forests Forever Facility
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UTM	Unilateral Trade Measure
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts

1.5°C

Fossil Fuel Phaseout
1.5°C-Aligned NDCs
Stronger MWP
Finance for NAP and GGA
Article 9.1 Implementation
Adequate L&D Finance
GST1 Implementation
Rights-Based Just Transition

CLIMATE JUSTICE

31st CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

ARTICULATING CSOs POSITION TOGETHER

HIGHLIGHTS

MITIGATION

- Ensure third-cycle NDCs close the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gaps and move from NDC submission to NDC implementation.
- Continue the MWP and move it from dialogue to a delivery vehicle.
- Translate the report under the Belém Mission to 1.5 into actionable implementation pathways.
- Define the institutional structure of the GIA and move it from concept to an operational implementation mechanism.
- Ensure the proposed electrification target does not involve fossil fuel-generated electricity.

ADAPTATION

- Define modalities of the Belém–Addis Vision and deliver a work plan.
- Shift NAPs from planning to funded implementation.
- Operationalize the decision on ensuring access to MoI for adaptation under BAR.
- Institutionalize LLA; ensure direct access for the local entities to implement LLA efforts.
- Ensure inclusion of transboundary issues in the implementation approach of adaptation.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

- Establish a permanent agenda item on Loss and Damage.
- Ensure the first Loss and Damage Report present a comprehensive, ambitious, evidence-based, and inclusive assessment of loss and damage that reflects the context-specific realities, needs, and priorities of developing countries and frontline communities.

- Ensure stronger collaboration of SNLD with the ExCom and FRLD.
- Ensure balanced and equitable access to first tranche of FRLD resources under BIM and urgently provide grant-based FRLD resources at the scale needed.

CLIMATE FINANCE

- Strengthen the mandate of the Standing Committee on Finance.
- Ensure that the two-year work program operationalizes NCQG and Article 9 by effectively advancing needs-based, implementation-focused, public-source dominant finance and promoting quality.
- Make the adaptation finance commensurate with the needs and establish a roadmap for delivering on the existing commitment.
- Make the Veredas Dialogue action-oriented, equity-centered, and complementary to Article 9.
- Strengthen Article 9.5 ex-ante communications to improve predictability, transparency and accountability of climate finance.

ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

- Ensure Article 6 supplements, rather than substitutes for domestic mitigation.
- Adopt a stable funding arrangement for the Article 6.2 infrastructure, review system, and capacity-building and address capacity gaps in LDCs and SIDS.
- Strengthen host-country readiness, stakeholder safeguards and accountability under Article 6.4.
- Deliver a practical post-2026 implementation model for the Article 6.8 mechanism.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

- Track implementation of GST1 outcomes and address the growing gaps between increasing climate impacts and support available to implement the GST1.
- Ensure UAE-GST dialogue focuses on aligning policies and implementation tools with 1.5°C trajectory and adequate adaptation implementation in developing countries.
- Launch a balanced GST2 across mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and ensure visibility of LDC circumstances.

JUST TRANSITION

- Operationalize the Just Transition Mechanism as a rights-based, inclusive and holistic framework supported by adequate, predictable and measurable finance and other MoI.
- Establish a robust MEL system for tracking progress.
- Continue the UAE Just Transition Work Programme beyond 2026.

CLIMATE AND TRADE

- Prevent climate-related trade measures from shifting decarbonization costs to developing countries and assess the cross-border impacts of UTMs.

- Align global trade governance with UNFCCC climate objectives and finance processes.

GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

- Turn the Belém Gender Action Plan into funded implementation
- Mainstream gender across NDCs, NAPs, finance, and sectoral implementation.
- Strengthen gender-responsive climate finance governance.

CLIMATE AND HEALTH

- Move the BHAP from endorsement to national implementation.
- Integrate health into NAP, NDC implementation and adaptation investment.

HUMAN RIGHTS

- Establish a legal institutional framework under the UNFCCC to protect human rights against climate change impacts.
- Implement UPR recommendations under climate change theme.
- Launch global research to understand climate change implications for human rights violations.

CLIMATE-RELATED HUMAN MOBILITY

- Establish a clear and actionable definition of climate change-induced migration and displacement and recognize human mobility as systemic climate risk and adaptation.
- Make human mobility an implementation priority across the WIM, SNLD, and FRLD.
- Include human mobility in loss and damage reporting as a priority area.

YOUTH, CHILDREN, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

- Address distinct vulnerabilities of the youth, children, and persons with disabilities and ensure their inclusion in the national planning processes.
- Recognize persons with disabilities as a formal constituency within UNFCCC.
- Complete the ACE midterm review with a stronger implementation plan and provide dedicated support for ACE implementation in developing countries.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

- Ensure direct access to finance and community-level implementation resources.
- Embed meaningful participation across NDCs, NAPs, and GST-related processes.

FOREST AND BIODIVERSITY

- Incorporate forest-based emissions reduction and food systems transformation as central strategies to effectively halt and reverse deforestation.
- Establish synergy of UNFCCC negotiations with CBD negotiations.
- Scale ecosystem-based adaptation and restoration with integrity.
- Establish the 2030 Forest Roadmap as a time-bound, rights-based, inclusive, and accountable implementation framework.

OCEAN AND CLIMATE

- Integrate ocean priorities into NDCs and NAPs with adequate MoI support.
- Strengthen ocean observation, data sharing and early warning.
- Develop a multi-year implementation roadmap for the Ocean Dialogue.

SUPPORT FOR REPORTING AND REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE 13

- Move from report-by-report project support to predictable, multi-year support for permanent national transparency systems for the implementation of full Article 13.
- Simplify and accelerate access to GEF transparency resources.

UNFCCC

THE FRAMEWORK WHICH THE NEGOTIATION BUILDS ON

The political discussion for addressing human-induced climate change began in 1988 at the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted a resolution 43/53 calling on the Member States to take necessary and timely actions to deal with climate change within a global framework (UNGA, 1988). The same year, the United Nations (UN) established an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the magnitude, estimate impacts, and propose strategies for responding to climate change. The IPCC's first assessment report in 1990 confirmed 'human activities' as fundamental causes of the unprecedented rise in global average temperature, compared to the pre-industrial levels, and recommended global political directives to address and revert from the crisis (IPCC, 1990). In the same year, the UN General Assembly noted the IPCC's findings as a serious concern and established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) (UNGA, 1990). The INC's framework convention came to be known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and gained wider political acceptance with an endorsement by 158 countries at the UN's Rio Conference in Brazil in 1992. The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994 and currently with 197 Parties, it is near universal.

The Convention sets its ultimate objective (Article 2) "to achieve, ...

stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [originating in human activity] interference with the climate system".

BOX 1: UNFCCC Principles for Addressing Climate Change

- Protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of the Parties. This requires the developed country Parties to take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof;
- Provide full consideration to the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden;
- Take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures;
- Integrate required measures to protect the climate system into national development programmes while also promoting sustainable development and not compromising economic development, which is essential for adopting measures to address climate change; and
- Cooperate and promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them to better address the problems of climate change.

Note: Adapted from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992)

The Convention emphasizes achieving emission-cap limits within a time-frame, which would allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, ensure that food production is not threatened, and enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. The Convention notes that the largest share of historical and current global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originated in the developed countries and provides an incremental space in the share of future emission scenarios for the developing countries to continue economic growth and to meet their social and development needs.


To achieve its objective, the Convention sets five principles (Box 1) to guide the Parties in deciding and implementing climate actions, requiring the developed countries to take the lead on both fronts, e.g., limiting and reversing global emissions and the consequent impacts. The Convention requires the country Parties on a category basis to act in conformity with an overarching principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC)" while addressing the climate crisis.

Working out this commitment's extent, modalities, and dimensions, the Convention established a supreme authority of the country Parties under 'Conference of the Parties (COP)' to make decisions on implementing activities aligned with its ultimate goal and in accordance with its principles. To date, the Conference of the Parties has succeeded in yielding two agreements, namely the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

The Kyoto Protocol, adopted at COP 3 in 1997, made the industrialized countries and the countries in transition (known as Annex I parties under the UNFCCC) legally bound to reduce economy-wide GHG emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels in 2008-2012, with specific targets varying from country to country based on both nationally originated and a market-based mechanisms (UNFCCC, 1998).

On the other hand, the Paris Agreement, adopted at COP 21 in 2015, required all the Parties to contribute to the emission reduction with progressively scaled-up targets communicated by their nationally determined contributions – NDCs, coherent with limiting the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C, preferably to 1.5°C, compared to the pre-industrial level. The agreement also provided a framework for financial, technical, and capacity-building support from the developed countries to the developing ones to implement activities towards mitigation, adaptation, and addressing losses and damages (L&Ds) (UNFCCC, 2016).

The agreement was hailed for its inclusiveness and setting a legally binding target of limiting global average temperature rise, while also being criticized for the flexibility it provided to the country Parties to determine their emission reduction 'contributions' (in lieu of 'commitments') voluntarily and considering the national circumstances (in lieu of 'respective capabilities'). Such flexibility, arguably, is helping the historical emitters and the major contemporary emitters to evade one of the key principles of addressing climate change: equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.



THE PARIS AGREEMENT

KEY ELEMENTS

The Paris Agreement charts a new course, comprising three basic elements, namely, mitigation, adaptation, and Loss and Damage (L&D) to address climate change. Yet, the key aspect of addressing climate change, as emphasized by Article 2 of the Agreement, is limiting global average warming to well below 2° Celsius above the preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5° Celsius by the end of this century.

Article 3 requires the Parties to undertake and communicate ambitious mitigation efforts as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the global response to climate change, recognizing that the developing country Parties need support for the effective implementation of the Agreement.

Article 4 of the PA requires the countries to reach the 'global peaking' of GHGs as soon as possible and achieve 'GHG neutrality' in the second half of this century through: i) deeper cuts in anthropogenic emissions and ii) removing/trapping GHGs by sinks and reservoirs.

On anthropogenic emission reduction, Article 4 establishes binding commitments by all the Parties to domestically undertake progressive mitigation actions communicated by their NDCs every five years. Aligning with the Convention's CBDR-RC principle, the Agreement directs the developed countries to take the lead in mitigation efforts by undertaking absolute economy-wide emission reduction targets and the developing countries to continue enhancing their mitigation efforts. Parties are also encouraged to conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs, e.g., forests, wetlands, etc., to complement the mitigation efforts.

To encourage higher mitigation efforts through voluntary cooperation among/between the Parties, the PA introduces two different measures, namely: i) market-based mechanisms and ii) non-market approaches, and sets out the principles for environmental integrity under Article 6.

On adaptation actions, the Paris Agreement establishes a 'Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)', under Article 7, that aims to significantly strengthen national adaptation efforts. It also requires all countries to develop country-specific National Adaptation Plans (NAP) and periodically update their implementation through adaptation communications.

The Agreement includes a standalone article – Article 8 – that emphasizes averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage (L&D) resulting from extreme and slow onset events and requires the Parties to enhance understanding, action, and support, usually through the WIM, to address climate-induced L&Ds in developing countries.

On finance, Article 9 of the Agreement requires the developed countries to provide financial resources to support the developing countries' mitigation and adaptation efforts in a balanced manner. It also decides that the existing financial mechanisms under the Convention shall serve the Agreement in this regard.

On technology issues, Article 10 of the Paris Agreement establishes a technology framework to strengthen international cooperation for the development and

transfer of climate-safe technology, along with capacity-building, in developing countries.

On capacity building, Article 11 emphasizes establishing an appropriate institutional arrangement and requires the developed countries to provide enhanced support for capacity-building actions in the developing countries.

In the implementation of all actions, measures, and commitments, the Agreement, by its Article 13, requires Parties to follow a robust transparency and accounting system when reporting on their actions and support.

With a view to assessing the progress towards its purpose and long-term goals, the Agreement introduces a 'Global Stocktake (GST)' process under Article 14, with each round to take place every 5 years starting from 2023.

The Agreement also establishes a mechanism under Article 15 to facilitate implementation and promote compliance in a non-adversarial and non-punitive manner (UNFCCC, 2016).

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS

Parties at COP 21 launched 'The Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP)' and established a separate negotiating body called 'the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)' (UNFCCC, 2016). The CMA was tasked to finalize a detailed guideline for implementation of the PA through negotiation on PAWP at COP 24. However, countries' divergent positions on Articles 6.2 and 6.4 delayed the outcome. Eventually, the outcomes of COP 26 in 2021–the 'Glasgow Climate Pact'–concluded the PAWP and finalized the 'Paris Rulebook', making the Paris Agreement fully operational.

COP 26 resolved the key debated issues under PAWP, which include: a) common cycle and framework for NDCs submission, its implementation and reporting; b) transparency of market mechanisms and non-market approaches under Article 6, and c) roadmap for aligning NDCs with the Global Stocktake (GST). More importantly, COP 26 succeeded in mobilizing political will to scale up mitigation targets under the NDCs and, for the first time, called for phase-down of coal (UNFCCC, 2022).

Ironically, the political momentum[1] generated at COP 26 to limit global average warming to 1.5°C and the related side deals did not progress much, as the commitments were ambitious without any specific plan to achieve them. Such a non-committal political stance made the outcome of COP 27 a clear backslide from the earlier momentum, allowing continuation of fossil fuel production and use, particularly gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), branding them as "transitional clean fuels" alongside the renewables (UNFCCC, 2023, decision 1/CP.27 paragraph 13).

While COP 27 did manage to break the deadlock by establishing 'new funding arrangements' for responding to and addressing L&Ds with a decision on making the fund operational by 2024 (UNFCCC, 2023, decision 2/CP.27, paragraph 2), it failed to meet the aspiration of Article 8 by deviating from the Convention's key principles CBDR-RC, equity, and historical responsibility, which 'exempted' developed countries from their historical liability of causing loss and damages[2].

On the systemic change in addressing climate change, COP 27 called on the shareholders of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to align their funding to the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal with scaled-up finances from various sources and simplified access for the developing countries (UNFCCC, 2023c, paragraph 40).

Widely touted as the "Loss and Damage COP", COP 28 started with a historic decision to adopt institutional and operational modalities of the "Loss and Damage Fund" and managed to mobilize USD 792 million funding pledges (UNFCCC, 2024a). While the decision on the operational modalities of the Fund marked a strategic win for climate-vulnerable countries, this was maligned by another win for the fossil fuel imperialists, who forcibly erased any mention of fossil fuel "phaseout" from the decision text, yielding a non-binding promise that reads:

1. COP 27 was marked by the influence and dominance of the fossil-fuel lobbyists who reportedly protected the interest of a few countries to further explore and expand the fossil-fuel market instead of transiting away. The overwhelming presence of 636 lobbyists at COP 27, a more than 25 percent increase from the figure at the Glasgow COP in 2021 and outnumbered by a single country in the following year (e.g., United Arab Emirates, hosts of COP 28 had 1,070 registered delegates with many from the oil and gas companies), and their orchestrated favoritism towards the so-called 'clean fuel' already appeared as one of the key challenges to meaningfully scale-up emission reduction coherent to 1.5° C Goal.
2. Referring to paragraph 51 of Decision 1/CP.2.1 (Outcome decision of COP 21 in 2015), the COP 27 president read out 'it is understood that the outcomes of this agenda item are based on cooperation and facilitation and do not involve liability or compensation.'

"transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner… so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science."

Hence, the call for 'transitioning away from fossil fuels' is not supported by any binding legal statute, and may not be able to restrict countries from expanding fossil fuel production and use (UNFCCC, 2024b, decision 1/CP.28).

COP 28 also failed to advance adaptation finance commitment. Instead of adopting a concrete roadmap for doubling adaptation finance and fulfilling the cumulative delivery gap of USD 600 billion (up to 2025), the COP took a procedural decision to defer the discussion until the reporting by the Standing Committee on Finance on technical progress at COP 29 (UNFCCC, 2024c, decision 4/CP.28 paragraph 19).

On the positive side, COP 28 published the first ever Global Stocktake report that assessed the action as 'insufficient' for achieving the 1.5°C goal and urged nations to triple renewable energy capacity and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030. It also stressed the need for significantly scaling up efforts for adaptation and addressing climate-induced loss and damage (UNFCCC, 2024b).

Like COP 27, COP 28 was also marked by the influence and dominance of fossil-fuel lobbyists, who reportedly protected the interests of certain countries, enabling further exploration and expansion of the fossil-fuel market instead of transiting away from it. The overwhelming presence of 2456 fossil-fuel lobbyists and their orchestrated favoritism towards fossil fuels production and use have been a key challenge to meaningfully scaling up emissions reduction consistent with the 1.5°C goal.

Parties at COP 29 adopted a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance– at least USD 300 billion annually by 2035, while also calling collective efforts to mobilize and scale up financing at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2025a, decision 1/CMA.6). Despite being hailed by many stakeholders, the NCQG was deemed insufficient by many developing states to close gaps in climate efforts. The Baku COP also advanced the operationalization of carbon trading mechanisms under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 by finalizing the rules, albeit with serious concerns about quality and accountability, extended the Work Programme on gender, provided guidance on GGA indicators, and adopted arrangements for the Fund responding to Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2025, decision 3/CMA.6; decision 4/CMA.6; decision 5/CMA.6; UNFCCC, 2025b).

Dubbed the "Implementation COP", "COP of Truth," COP 30 in Belém marked a shift toward implementation, yet with uneven progress. The central Global Mutirao decision reaffirmed the 1.5°C goal, launched the voluntary Global Implementation Accelerator and Belém Mission to 1.5, established a two-year climate finance work program, and called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2026c, decision 1/CMA.7). Parties also agreed to develop a Just Transition Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2026c, decision 2/CMA.7) and adopted 59 indicators for measuring the progress towards achieving the GGA and launched the Belém-Addis Vision for advancing technical work for their operationalization (UNFCCC, 2026d).

However, the decisions are accompanied by several loopholes and setbacks. The new adaptation finance target lacks a clear baseline and remains insufficient, the GGA indicators lack methodological clarity, and most importantly, the mitigation outcome failed to incorporate roadmaps for transitioning away from fossil fuels and halting deforestation. Together these gaps and compromises made the "Belém package" fall far short of what the PA implementation demanded, leaving the global community awaiting a stronger "Implementation COP".

THIRTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (COP 31) AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR FORMAL AGENDA ITEMS

The multilateral climate negotiations under the UNFCCC at Antalya will, as a rule, follow three parallel governing-body tracks, i.e., Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP), Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), and Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). They are respectively COP 31, CMA 8 and CMP 21. The following boxes list the major agenda items at the Antalya COP.

31st Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 31)

- Matters relating to adaptation: a) Report of the AC; b) Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the AC;
- Warsaw International Mechanism
- Matters relating to finance: a) Long-term climate finance; b) Matters relating to the SCF; c) Report of the GCF to the COP and guidance to the GCF; d) Report of the GEF to the COP and guidance to the GEF; e) Report of the FRLD and guidance to the FRLD;
- Matters relating to technology development and transfer
- Matters relating to capacity-building.
- Matters relating to the LDCs.
- Gender and climate change.

Source: (UNFCCC, 2026e)

8th Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA8)

- Matters relating to the GST: report on the annual GST dialogue referred to in paragraph 187 of decision 1/CMA.5.
- United Arab Emirates just transition work programme.
- Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme.
- Further guidance on features of NDC, referred to in paragraph 26, decision 1/CP.21.
- Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for reporting and capacity-building.
- Matters relating to adaptation: a) GGA; b) Report of the AC; c) Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the AC.
- Warsaw International Mechanism
- Matters relating to finance: a) Matters relating to the SCF; b) Guidance to the GCF; c) Guidance to the GEF; d) Report of the FRLD and guidance to the FRLD; e) Matters relating to the AF; f) Matters relating to the implementation of Article 2.1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement; g) Work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.
- Matters relating to technology development and transfer
- Matters relating to capacity-building.
- Matters relating to the LDCs
- Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement:

  a) Implementation of the guidance on Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement; b) Report of the Supervisory Body and guidance for the mechanism established by Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement; c) Work programme under the framework for NMA referred to in Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement and in decision 4/CMA.3.

Source: (UNFCCC, 2026g)

21st Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP21)

- Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I: national communications.
- Matters relating to the CDM.
- Matters relating to the AF.
- Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.

Source: (UNFCCC, 2026f)

CSO POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES AT COP 31

Eleven years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the 31st Conference of the Parties (COP 31) in Antalya comes at a decisive point for global climate cooperation. The central challenge is no longer the absence of political commitments, but the persistent gap between agreed commitments and their implementation. COP 28 concluded the first Global Stocktake and, for the first time, called on Parties to contribute to transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, while tripling global renewable energy capacity and doubling the rate of energy-efficiency improvement by 2030 (Decision 1/CMA.5 paragraph 28). COP 29 subsequently adopted the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG), setting a goal of at least USD 300 billion annually for developing countries by 2035 and calling for efforts to scale finance from all sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion annually (UNFCCC, 2025a). Yet this outcome fell far short of the expectations and estimated needs of developing countries, particularly vulnerable countries facing mounting adaptation costs and escalating loss and damage.

Widely dubbed the "Implementation COP", COP 30 in Belém took several important steps towards implementing the decisions. Parties adopted 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators, called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, advanced National Adaptation Plans, and agreed to develop a new just transition mechanism (UNFCCC, 2026d, decision 12/CMA.7). However, Belém again exposed the limits of consensus-based climate diplomacy. The final negotiated outcome failed to establish a formal roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels or reversing deforestation, while significant questions remained over the scale, quality, accessibility and predictability of climate finance and over closing the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gap.

Meanwhile, the climate crisis continues to intensify. The year 2024 was the warmest on record at approximately 1.55°C above the 1850 to 1900 average, while 2025 remained among the three warmest years ever recorded. The eleven years from 2015 to 2025 were collectively the warmest eleven years on record (WMO, 2026). Against this looming reality, COP 31 cannot merely reiterate earlier commitments. It must become a COP of implementation, accountability and climate justice, translating the outcomes of Dubai, Baku and Belém into measurable action, backed by adequate means of implementation.

The CSOs of Bangladesh, representing the perspectives and lived realities of one of the world's most climate-vulnerable countries, therefore urge Parties at COP 31 to restore confidence in multilateral climate cooperation through ambitious, equitable and science-based decisions. The Antalya outcomes must safeguard the 1.5°C goal, uphold equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, substantially scale up public and grant-based finance, strengthen adaptation and loss and damage responses, and ensure that the transition towards a climate-resilient and low-emission future protects the rights, dignity and development aspirations of vulnerable countries, peoples and communities.

MITIGATION

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 (Decision 1/CMA.7, the Global Mutirão) reaffirmed the 1.5°C

temperature goal of the Paris Agreement and the need for deep, rapid and sustained emission reductions and launched the Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA) and the Belém Mission to 1.5 to strengthen implementation of NDCs and NAPs and address the ambition and implementation gap.

- The Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP) continued through COP 31/CMA8, with COP 30 taking note of the 2025 Global Dialogues on forests, waste and circular economy, including the importance of MoI (UNFCCC, 2026d, decision 13/CMA.7).
- COP 30 emphasized the need for accelerated implementation of domestic mitigation measures in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement, noted the importance of aligning NDCs with LT-LEDSs and encouraged Parties to align their NDCs towards global net zero by or around mid-century.
- During the closing plenary, the COP 30 Presidency announced that it would pursue Presidency-led roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels and halting and reversing deforestation, with outcomes to be reported towards COP31 (UNFCCC, 2026i).

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- COP 30 failed to incorporate fossil fuel transition-away and deforestation roadmaps into the negotiated outcome, representing the central mitigation compromise of Belém. The declaration of the development of the two roadmaps outside the formal UNFCCC mandate prevented the collapse of the issues but failed to meet the urgency indicated by the GST-1 and does not guarantee alignment with the Paris goal.
- The two processes GIA and Belém Mission to 1.5 were de facto, launched to serve respectively as political mobilization and implementation coordination tools. As non-negotiated initiatives, they are not linked to national reporting cycles and do not establish binding mitigation targets, sectoral milestones, enforcement provisions or a quantified pathway for closing the emissions gap. Their capacity to translate GST outcomes into measurable mitigation efforts remains undefined.
- The MWP remains principally a dialogue and cooperation platform, rather than a mechanism capable of requiring stronger implementation or directly linking mitigation gaps with finance, technology and accountability.
- COP 30 merely urged Parties that had not communicated the NDC3.0 to do so as soon as possible, without any strong directive on scaling up their mitigation targets in the "initial" or revised NDC3.0.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Ensure third-cycle NDCs close the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gaps. According to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2025, global GHG emissions reached 57.7 GtCO2e in 2024, implying a 2.3 per cent growth from 2023 levels. It further states that 2030 emissions need to be reduced by 40 per cent and 2035 emissions need to be reduced by 55 per cent compared to the 2019 levels to be on the track of 1.5°C warming. However, full implementation of unconditional and conditional NDCs submitted by the end of 2025 would reduce expected emissions in 2030 by only 4 per cent and 7 per cent respectively, and in 2035 by 12 percent and 15 percent respectively, compared with 2019 levels (UNEP, 2025b). The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) in its November 2025 update revealed that full implementation of the NDCs submitted by then would leave the world on a track of 2.6°C warming by 2100 with 50% possibility of being higher or lower lower (CAT, 2026). As of 17 September 2026, 149 countries submitted their NDCs 3.0, of which, alarmingly, only 3 aligned with a 1.5° C trajectory. This critical scenario renders the implementation of the Paris Agreement highly uncertain. Therefore, COP 31/CMA8 must generate a strong political mandate for Parties to strengthen and fully implement their NDCs 3.0 so that they collectively put global emissions on a pathway consistent with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal. Parties at COP 31 should strengthen inadequate NDCs and ensure that their 2035 targets represent progression and the highest possible ambition, with economy-wide targets covering all GHGs, sectors and categories, consistent with national circumstances and equity. NDCs 3.0 should incorporate the mitigation-related outcomes of the GST1, including tripling global renewable-energy capacity, doubling the rate of energy-efficiency improvement by 2030, transitioning away from fossil fuels, phasing down unabated coal power, and substantially reducing non-CO_2 emissions, particularly methane.

NDCs must also provide transparent baselines, assumptions, sectoral pathways, accounting methodologies and indicators that enable progress to be tracked through the ETF and BTRs. They

should strengthen synergies with LT-LEDS, NAPs, NBSAPs and ecosystem protection; uphold human rights, gender equality and meaningful participation of the most vulnerable groups; and specify implementation needs. NDCs of the major emitters—historical and present-day—must include ambitious targets of domestic mitigation. Developed countries must include concrete information of financial, technological and capacity-building support they will provide to developing countries in accordance with the Paris Agreement, while developing-country NDCs should clearly identify their domestic and international support requirements for implementing the NDCs.

Move from NDC submission to NDC implementation. The majority of the countries have submitted their updated NDCs, while another around one-quarter of the countries have yet to submit. However, an NDC does not reduce emissions unless policies, investment, technology and institutional capacity follow. On this ground, we strongly demand that COP 31 requires the developed countries to provide finance, technology, and other means of implementation in line with their obligation under the Convention and Paris Agreement at a scale adequate for translating the NDCs into renewable energy, efficiency, transport, industry, land-use and other real-economy measures.

Continue the MWP and move it from dialogue to a delivery vehicle. The MWP is the only mechanism under COP/CMA dedicated specifically to boosting mitigation ambition and implementation. However, the MWP has been confined to dialogues, with no agreement on its core mandates till COP 30. COP 31 must therefore strengthen the MWP, enabling key messages from the MWP Global Dialogues to feed into COP outcomes, so it moves from dialogue to delivery, with sector-specific outcomes for hard-to-abate industries, clear linkages between MWP, NDCs, GST implementation, and just transition through national actions and policies, investment pipelines, and international cooperation. The MWP must be responsive to LDC needs, including by strengthening investment-focused events to connect LDCs' NDC priorities with finance, technology and investment opportunities. COP 31 must also decide to continue the MWP beyond 2026, with a focus on closing the mitigation gap and a just transition to a net zero and fossil-fuel-free world.

Translate the report under the Belém Mission to 1.5 into actionable implementation pathways. The Belém Mission to 1.5 is expected to be concluded at CMA8, with a report setting out opportunities, barriers and actionable solutions. COP 31 must ensure that gaps, opportunities and solutions identified in the Mission report are efficiently translated into actionable sectoral implementation pathways for the NDCs and NAPs, aligned with the 1.5°C goal. Within this scope, COP 31 should decide to specify which barriers can be addressed domestically and which require international support and set a follow-up mechanism to ensure access to finance, technology transfer, institutional strengthening and investment mobilization.

Clarify how the Mission relates to existing UNFCCC implementation processes and the future of the Mission. At SB64, the question of whether Mission outcomes should be formally linked to UNFCCC work programmes or the second GST remained politically unresolved. COP 31 must therefore clarify the relationship between the Belém Mission, the GST, the MWP, adaptation processes and the Global Climate Action Agenda to avoid duplication. COP 31 must also clarify whether useful elements will end with the report or continue through another process.

Clearly define the institutional structure of the GIA and move it from concept to an operational implementation mechanism. By COP 31, the

Accelerator should no longer remain only a Presidency concept. Parties at COP 31 must mark the transition by defining its governance, operating model, procedures for selecting high-impact solutions, implementation partners and support arrangements. We demand that COP 31 operationalize the GIA as a practical delivery platform that selects a limited number of equitable and rights-based high-impact NDC and NAP solutions and connects them with finance, technology, technical expertise and implementation partners, supported by transparent selection criteria, equitable access and measurable delivery plans.

Maintain balance across mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, anchor GST-1 outcomes, and ensure geographical and vulnerability balance. The formal mandate of the GIA covers both NDCs and NAPs. However, implementation of the Paris Agreement also concerns addressing loss and damage, alongside mitigation and adaptation. We strongly urge Parties at COP 31 to clarify that the GIA will also include addressing loss and damage in its scope and its implementation portfolio will give a balanced focus across mitigation, adaptation, and addressing loss and damage. COP 31 must also clarify how implementation of GST-1 outcomes, including TAFF, halting and reversing deforestation, tripling RE capacity, etc., will be anchored within the GIA scope. High-impact solutions should not be interpreted only as ones capable of producing the largest aggregate emission reductions or attracting the largest private investments. We expect COP 31 to address how LDCs, SIDS and other vulnerable developing countries can participate, particularly where adaptation interventions may be highly important locally but less commercially scalable.

Clarify that the proposed electrification target should not involve fossil fuel-generated electricity. The COP 31 presidency launched its action agenda during the first week of SB64, including a crucial goal to increase the global share of final energy demand met by electricity to 35% by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2026a). We demand that COP 31 clarify that the goal of increasing electrification does not involve electricity generated from fossil fuels.

ADAPTATION

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 adopted the first global set of 59 indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation, covering the thematic and dimensional targets of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (FGCR).
- Parties established the Belém-Addis Vision, comprising a two-year policy alignment process by Parties intended for carrying out methodological refinement, improving metadata, and providing guidance for operationalizing the GGA Indicators. The Secretariat is requested to prepare a technical paper on the operationalization of the GGA indicators for consideration by the COP 31/CMA8.
- COP 30 also provided for reviewing the indicators after GST-2, with the Subsidiary Bodies developing terms of reference, and advanced implementation of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, including workshops and further technical work through the Belém–Addis Vision.
- COP 30 concluded the long-delayed assessment of National Adaptation Plans. The NAP decision recognized progress made by developing countries but also acknowledged persistent constraints relating to finance, climate information, institutional capacity and implementation. It further recognized the importance of Indigenous and traditional knowledge, gender-responsive approaches and ecosystem-based adaptation (UNFCCC, 2026h, decision 8/CP.30).

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- The respective COP 30 decisions describe indicators as voluntary, non-prescriptive, and non-punitive and explicitly avoided creating new financial obligations. This weakens the connection between measured adaptation gaps and obligations to provide MoI.
- The outcome on the GGA indicators is further flawed by methodological gaps, with several indicators lacking baselines and measurement methods and persistent lack of clarity of the alignment of the indicators with the existing national systems. Exclusion of politically sensitive yet crucial issues, such as transboundary and cascading risks, climate-induced displacement, further weakened the overall outcome.
- The NAP outcome identifies financing and implementation gaps, but does not itself provide any meaningful guidance on how to scale up support for developing countries' NAP development and implementation.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Define modalities of the Belém–Addis Vision and deliver a work plan. Parties at COP 31 must agree on a work plan for ensuring clear and actionable outcomes of the Belém–Addis Vision process. Specifically, we demand that Parties at COP 31 agree on a rights-based and inclusive composition and mandate of the Technical Taskforce under the Belém-Addis Vision for developing the metadata and methodology, and improving and streamlining Belém Adaptation Indicators for making the GGA operational. COP 31 must also provide clear guidance on data standards, measurement, and support requirements for operationalizing the agreed indicators, drawing on experience using indicators, science, future projection, Indigenous and local knowledge. We further demand that Parties at COP 31 establish explicit linkages between the GGA framework and the national adaptation planning and implementation, Adaptation Communications, BTRs, and funds and institutions providing support.

Shift NAPs from planning to funded implementation. NAP has been a major area with virtually zero progress for several sessions of the COP, including COP 30. As of 5 August 2026, 79 developing countries, including 28 LDCs, have developed their National Adaptation Plans (UNFCCC, n.d.). We demand that COP 31 decide to ensure predictable, accessible finance to support implementation of the measures contained in those NAPs, in accordance with the developed countries' obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.

Operationalize the decision on ensuring access to MoI for adaptation under BAR. Decision 12/CMA.7 in paragraph 28(d) states that the work under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap shall be guided by, among other matters, ensuring adequate, predictable, and accessible means of implementation for adaptation, in accordance with Articles 9.1, 10, and 11 of the Paris Agreement. Therefore, Parties at COP 31 must clarify how BAR will operationalize paragraph 28(d) of decision 12/CMA.7, especially through: linking the provision of adaptation finance to the new finance work programme, creating a delivery plan for the commitment of tripling annual adaptation finance by 2035, determining the modalities of international support for implementing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (FGCR) targets and putting the GGA indicators into practice, considering the articles 9.1 and 7.13 of the PA.

Decide the themes for the remaining workshops under BAR. The first workshop under the initial implementation activities phase of BAR took place at SB64 on "Coherence across the UNFCCC adaptation architecture, and MoI for adaptation". COP 31 must agree that the next workshops under BAR focus particularly on: scaling up predictable, accessible, and public grant-based adaptation finance; strengthening coherence across the adaptation architecture for the implementation of the FGCR targets; ensuring rights and justice in community-based and locally-led adaptation; and reviewing the FGCR and its linkage with GST2; while addressing MoI as a standalone issue, not in combination with other matters.

Institutionalize Locally Led Adaptation (LLA) and ensure direct access for the local entities to implement LLA efforts. We strongly urge Parties at COP 31 to agree upon integrating LLA principles, e.g., participation, transparency, local leadership, and access to finance into national policies, sectoral plans, and local government systems, through policy and budget reforms and providing dedicated finance and other MoI. COP 31 must also

ensure the local people and institutions have direct access to resources from the financing mechanisms under the UNFCCC to implement their LLA efforts.

Ensure inclusion of transboundary issues in the implementation approach of adaptation. COP 31 must substantively position transboundary priorities in the decision on adaptation issues. Specifically, COP 31 must ensure transboundary issues, such as shared river basins and flood risks, and water scarcity and competing water uses, are embedded within the implementation approach under the Belém-Addis vision and the BAR for building long-term resilience.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 marked the first practical movement of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) from institutional establishment towards project financing by welcoming the establishment of the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) and the initial grant window of USD 250 million for 2025-2026, the Fund's first call for funding requests, and reaffirmation of direct-access modalities (FRLD, n.d.).
- COP 30 completed important elements of the third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), directed the WIM Executive Committee (ExCom) to strengthen work on non-economic losses and compound risks and decided to develop a regular Loss and Damage Report covering critical issues, lessons learned, policy advice, risk scenarios, typologies and costs of loss and damage.
- Parties at COP 30 acknowledged continuing disagreement over the governance of the WIM and retained the existing practice under which the CMA adopts decisions and the COP endorses them, while agreeing to defer discussion.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- At COP 30, approximately USD 790 million had been pledged to the FRLD, of which only around USD 397 million had actually been paid, while the initial grant window is USD 250 million. These sums remain extremely small compared with loss and damage needs measured in hundreds of billions of dollars annually.
- The FRLD decision at COP 30 advanced direct access but did not establish any automatic, trigger-based or rapid-disbursement arrangement for responding to extreme events.
- Parties at COP 30 could not settle whether the mechanism should be governed by the COP and CMA jointly or by the CMA alone. It also stopped short of establishing a strong coordination mechanism across the WIM, Santiago Network and FRLD. The architecture is increasingly operational, but remains institutionally fragmented and financially undercapitalized.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Establish a permanent agenda item on Loss and Damage. With conclusion of the third review of the WIM at COP 30, there is currently no dedicated agenda item on Loss and Damage. Such an absence may lead the outcomes on the L&D issues to result through reports from the WIM, the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD), and the FRLD, without substantive negotiations. This may ultimately weaken coordination and constrain political space for issue demands and scaled-up action and support, amid the persistent funding gaps and escalating loss and damage. Therefore, Parties at COP 31 must agree to establish a permanent agenda item on loss and damage to preserve political space, and ensure enhanced coordination, policy advancement, and scaled-up finance to effectively respond to current and emerging loss and damage.

Clearly define Loss and Damage linking it with the GGA thresholds. While "Loss and Damage" is narrated as the residual impacts of climate change beyond the adaptation limits, UNFCCC is yet to develop a clear definition of Loss and Damage. With the framework on GGA including thematic targets and a first set of indicators in place, Parties should now focus on defining "Loss and Damage" linking it with adaptation. Therefore, we demand that Parties at COP 31 agree to develop a clear definition of "Loss and Damage" explicitly linking it with adaptation thresholds indicated by the thematic targets and indicators under the GGA framework. Such a definition must allow trigger-based activation of the funds for addressing L&Ds.

The first State of Loss and Damage Report must present a comprehensive, ambitious, evidence-based, and inclusive assessment of both economic and non-economic loss and damage (NELD) that reflects the context-specific realities, needs,

and priorities of developing countries and frontline communities. We demand that the first State of Loss and Damage Report provide an ambitious, evidence-based, and accessible assessment of loss and damage realities, needs, gaps, and responses. The report must center on the experiences of developing countries and of communities disproportionately affected by climate change, including the non-climate and developmental realities shaping their vulnerability. It must also identify implementation challenges, constraints, and fiscal pressures faced by developing countries and frontline communities in responding to loss and damage, including financial, technical, and institutional barriers. The report must clearly present the increasing gap between the extent of loss and damage faced by developing countries and vulnerable communities and the alarming lack of support from developed countries, despite their commitments and obligations under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. It must moreover present a comprehensive scientific assessment of current and projected loss and damage (both economic and non-economic) and corresponding needs of developing countries and frontline communities, disaggregated by geography, gender, age, ethnicity, and other vulnerability attributes as appropriate. The report is also expected to demonstrate how the NELDs could be incorporated in the policy narrative and addressed through practical measures. We also demand that the report meaningfully engage the stakeholders in an inclusive, transparent, and regionally balanced manner to ensure the realities of context-specific loss and damage and priorities of developing countries and frontline communities are reflected in the report.

Strengthen implementation of ExCom's mandates and continuation of its practical guidance and support to L&D responses. Parties at COP 31 must ask ExCom to ensure that the voluntary guidelines provided by the ExCom on reporting Loss and Damage in BTRs are practical, accessible, and responsive to the context, realities and capacities of developing countries and vulnerable communities.

Strengthen Santiago Network Advisory Board's (SNAB) efforts in catalyzing technical assistance requests. To increase the number of requests for technical assistance and strengthen context-specific technical assistance, local ownership, and community-level implementation, the SNAB must strengthen outreach and engagement of a broad range of actors, including developing countries, local and national organizations, bodies, networks and experts (OBNEs). Parties at COP 31 must urge the SNAB to clarify and strengthen communication of the types of available technical assistance to the developing countries, CSOs and community-based entities and continue encouraging submission of technical assistance requests from them. It must also ensure that support provided through these requests remains country-driven and responsive to locally identified needs and priorities in developing countries and frontline communities. Furthermore, Parties at COP 31 must require the SNAB to establish clear procedures for addressing requests timely.

Ensure stronger collaboration of SNLD with the ExCom and FRLD. COP 31 must encourage the SNLD Advisory Board to strengthen collaboration with the ExCom and the FRLD Board through concrete, action-oriented decisions. This collaboration must involve all relevant actors, including the Co-Chairs, members, and Secretariats of each body, as well as the FRLD Executive Director and the SNLD Director. With respect to the ExCom, cooperation must focus on the exchange of knowledge and technical guidance, while the SNLD should prioritize identifying ways to collaborate with the FRLD in delivering technical assistance.

Provide adequate financial support to the SNLD. COP 31 must urge the developed countries to take the lead in providing adequate, predictable and sustainable financial support to the SNLD to deliver on its mandate. It must also urge Parties to immediately fulfill their pledged contributions to support the SNLD in responding effectively to the growing needs of technical assistance and requests of developing countries and frontline communities.

Ensure balanced and equitable access to first tranche of FRLD resources under BIM. The FRLD has moved from establishment to operational funding pipeline through its initial starter package BIM. The first BIM call generated 176 requests from 119 developing countries seeking about US$2.8 billion- a figure 11.2 times the proposed BIM allocation (FRLD, n.d.). In response, the 9th meeting of the FRLD Board (B.9) increased the BIM allocation from US$250 million to US$342 million— less than one-fifth of the requested figure, with the first funding decision deferred to B.10 (FRLD, 2026c). Parties at COP 31 must strongly call upon the FRLD Board to ensure balanced and equitable access across regions and vulnerable country contexts for addressing both economic and non-economic L&Ds, while approving the first projects. COP 31 must also ask the Board to include support for both economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with both extreme weather events and slow-onset climatic processes.

Strengthen direct access arrangements and operationalize the Country Support System (CSS). The FRLD Board formally adopted the modalities and risk management framework for direct access through national government in B.8 in April 2026 2026 (FRLD, 2026b). However, practical implementation remains incomplete, as issues concerning fiduciary standards, functional equivalency, legal agreements, and the role of the World Bank as interim Trustee remained under discussion at B.9. The Board is also developing a Country Support System (CSS), intended to strengthen national systems and prepare funding requests. We strongly demand that the FRLD Board build on progress made by B.8 and advance direct access through direct budget support to national governments and through operationalizing the CSS. The Board must ensure that the CSS remains simplified and easily accessible to developing countries and communities at frontline. We further expect the COP 31 to strongly push the Board to continue advancing discussions on the rapid disbursement window and the small grants funding window.

Urgently provide grants-based FRLD resources at the scale needed, ensuring equitable and easy access. The current pledges to the FRLD amount only USD 822.19 million, of which only USD 413.57 million have actually been paid cash (World Bank Group, 2026). The pledges are only 0.2 percent of the figure that the FRLD needs to disburse each year against the current estimated annual needs around USD 400billion. COP 31 must strongly urge developed countries to urgently convert existing pledges into timely disbursements. The developed countries must also commit at COP 31 to provide public grants-based, new, additional, predictable, and long-term financial support to the FRLD at a currently needed annual scale. These resources should be disbursed through direct access mechanisms, including direct budget support, programmatic approaches, ensuring responsiveness to the diverse needs of affected communities, particularly marginalized groups, women and girls, children, persons with disabilities, migrants, and refugees, and indigenous peoples.

Develop metrics for non-economic loss and damages (NELDs). COP 31 must launch a work program to develop metrics for NELDs (violation of natural rights, loss of cultural heritage, health disruption, displacement, biodiversity loss, etc.) with valuation guidance and community consent protocols to enable addressing the NELDs in a focused and structured way. The work programme should combine quantitative indicators with qualitative and participatory methods, recognizing that many non-economic losses cannot be adequately expressed in monetary terms. Assessment and valuation guidance should reflect the meanings and priorities that affected communities attach to these losses, without making monetary valuation a prerequisite for receiving support. A meaningful role of communities must be ensured in defining indicators, interpreting findings and identifying appropriate responses, with particular attention to women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples and displaced populations.

CLIMATE FINANCE

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 reaffirmed the USD 300 billion annual NCQG by 2035 and the broader call to scale climate finance to at least USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035. Decision 1/CMA.7 formally "takes note" of the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap and

decides to urgently advance actions towards the USD 1.3 trillion goal.

- It established a two-year work programme on climate finance, giving Parties a space to continue discussion of implementation of Article 9.1 and in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole.
- It called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 and recalled the NCQG commitment to pursue efforts to triple annual outflows from the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism from 2022 levels by 2030.
- Parties at COP 30 established the Veredas Dialogue on implementation of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9, succeeding the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue (SeSD).

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- At COP 30, the much-anticipated Baku-to-Belém Roadmap to 1.3T did not become an enforceable financing plan. COP 30 merely "took note" of the Roadmap without agreeing quantified source-specific contributions, developed-country burden sharing, interim delivery milestones or accountability mechanisms.
- Developing countries' demand to establish Article 9.1 as a standalone finance agenda was only partially accommodated. Addressing it "in the context of Article 9 as a whole" under the two-year work programme may blur the distinction between developed countries' obligation to provide finance and the broader mobilization of finance from public and private sources.
- The adaptation-finance decision did not clearly specify a baseline, accounting rules, delivery roadmap, additionality safeguards, burden-sharing arrangement, or proportion to be delivered as public and grant-based resources.
- While COP 30 was expected to materialize a shift from dialogue to action under the Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, it only managed to replace the previous SeSD with the new Veredas Dialogue to continue deliberations on the Article 2.1(c).

COP 31 POSITIONS

Strengthen the mandate of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). Outcomes at COP 31 must result in a stronger and broader mandate of the SCF to assess climate finance gaps, strengthen transparency and accountability, and ensure climate finance meets the needs of the developing countries and frontline communities. SCF must be enabled to provide concrete guidance on optimum quality of finance flows for adaptation and addressing loss and damage and implementation of the NCQG commitments and the GGA framework, on the basis of equity and justice.

Establish a permanent standalone agenda item on Article 9.1. We strongly demand that COP 31 outcomes establish Article 9.1 implementation as a legal obligation of the developed countries, not voluntary, as underscored in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in July 2025 (ICJ, 2025). The future of the Article 9.1 should not hinge on the two-year work program established at COP 30. We demand that Parties at COP 31 establish matters relating to Article 9.1 as a permanent and stand-alone agenda item, to ensure it is directly and officially addressed, not hidden inside broader finance discussions and to keep developed countries obligated beyond the tenure of the work programme to financing climate actions in developing

countries until the Paris goal is achieved.

Ensure that the two-year work program operationalizes NCQG and Article 9 by effectively advancing needs-based, implementation-focused, public-source dominant finance and promoting quality. The two-year work program on climate finance should serve as an implementation-focused process to clarify and advance delivery of the NCQG, particularly the USD300 billion goal and its relationship with developed countries' obligations under Article 9.1. Specifically, the work programme must serve the following:

- Clarify the respective roles of public provision and mobilization within the USD 300 billion goal and examine how implementation of the NCQG can reflect developed countries' obligations under Article 9.1, while ensuring that mobilization of private finance does not substitute for developed countries' obligations under Article 9.1.
- Examine the scale, predictability and time horizons of bilateral and multilateral public finance required to implement the NCQG, and indicate a pathway for implementing commitment on tripling annual outflows from UNFCCC climate funds by 2030.
- Expedite real finance ambition aligned with the scale and urgency of developing countries' needs, national priorities and circumstances across mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage.
- Identify practical pathways for increased support, with greater use of grants and highly concessional finance, particularly for countries facing debt and fiscal constraints.
- Define practical measures for ensuring affordability, simplified access, country ownership, gender responsiveness, human rights, social and environmental safeguards, and consistency with equity and CBDR-RC in climate financing.
- Improve definitions, reporting and accounting, distinguish clearly between finance provided and mobilized, reduce over-reporting, and promote comparable reporting across bilateral, multilateral and private sources.
- Examine how creditor-driven finance, conditionalities and the financialization of public infrastructure can affect developing countries' debt burdens, fiscal and policy space, development priorities and human rights.
- Increase direct and simplified access to public finance for Indigenous Peoples, local communities and women-led initiatives.
- Maintain a Party-driven process with meaningful observer participation and coordination with Article 2.1(c), the SCF, the Just Transition Work Programme and adaptation processes.
- Conclude with practical recommendations and guidance for NCQG implementation and feed outcomes into the second Global Stocktake, the SCF, the Enhanced Transparency Framework and future climate finance decisions.

Make the adaptation finances commensurate with the needs and establish a roadmap for delivering on the existing commitment. COP 31 must clarify the baseline of the target of tripling adaptation finance and Parties must agree to establish a delivery plan including the trajectory of finances, the sources, instruments, and accessibility of the finances, so that the new commitment does not remain simply a numerical political statement. We strongly demand that the finances are predominantly public grant-based. We also demand that Parties at COP 31 further scale up their commitment on adaptation finance at a scale actually needed by the developing countries. Tripling the adaptation finance by 2035 indicates an annual figure of around US$60billion, whereas the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025 estimates the need at a scale between US$310billion and US$365billion (UNEP, 2025a). Therefore, Parties must agree on new commitments commensurate the estimated adaptation finance needs.

Make the Veredas Dialogue action-oriented, equity-centered, and complementary to Article 9. COP 31 outcome should ensure that the Veredas Dialogue develops a clear and actionable pathway for implementing Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement without weakening or substituting developed countries' obligations under the Article 9.1 to provide public climate finance. The dialogue must build on the principles of CBDR-RC and equity and examine and address structural barriers in the financial system, such as high debt burdens, high costs of capital, tax and trade inequities, and limited fiscal space which may make it difficult for many developing countries to align financial flows with climate-resilient and low-emissions development. The dialogue should also explore reforms needed across international financial institutions, MDBs, central banks, finance ministries, and relevant

UN processes. It must furthermore analyze links among conflict, military expenditure, and GHG emissions, and the consequences of diversion of public resources to military expenses and explore measures to address them. It must provide realistic assessments of the role and limitations of private and blended finance, particularly for adaptation and loss and damage. The outcome of the dialogue must include clear safeguards, measures to phaseout harmful fossil fuel subsidies while protecting vulnerable communities, and a transparent theory of change linking financial system reforms to equitable implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Strengthen Article 9.5 ex-ante communications to improve predictability, transparency and accountability of Climate Finance. COP 31 should ensure that developed country Parties use their Article 9.5 ex-ante biennial communications to provide clear, comparable and forward-looking information on the scale, sources and delivery of climate finance. Reporting should distinguish finance to be provided under Article 9.1 from finance expected to be mobilized under Article 9.3, and disaggregate public finance across mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Communications should specify intended delivery through the Financial Mechanism, demonstrate progress toward relevant NCQG and adaptation finance commitments, clarify approaches to "new and additional" finance, and explain measures to reduce barriers to access for capacity-constrained countries. Developed countries should also update or renew expiring climate finance commitments before COP 31. Stronger Article 9.5 reporting should improve predictability, enable tracking of implementation, and provide a credible evidence base for the 2030 NCQG review and the second Global Stocktake.

ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- On Article 6.2, Decision 19 of CMA7 took note of inconsistencies identified in the first round of the technical expert reviews and called for addressing them, requested faster completion of the Article 6.2 infrastructure, and mandated an SBI process on stable funding for the infrastructure, technical expert reviews, and capacity-building.
- On Article 6.4, Decision 20/CMA.7 moved the mechanism further into operation by welcoming the approved mechanism methodology and the standards needed for baselines, additionality, leakage, suppressed demand and non-permanence or reversals.
- On Article 6.8, Decision 21/CMA.7 provided inputs for the 2026 review of the Article 6.8 work programme, encouraged greater use of the NMA platform and called for continued capacity-building and information exchange.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Despite COP 30's explicitly linking significant inconsistencies to double-counting ricks, the centralized infrastructure and registry services remain incomplete, while the secretariat estimated substantial resource needs for 2026-2027.
- While a first methodology and core standards are in place, the methodology pipeline remains limited, host-country readiness is uneven, CDM transition is yet to be completed and the mechanism faces financing needs.
- The 2026 review of the Article 6.8 work programme is examining barriers to use, the effectiveness of the work programme and possible platform

improvements. However, the question around making non-market cooperation useful for NDC implementation, finance, technology and capacity-building without duplicating other UNFCCC bodies or turning Article 6.8 into a passive information portal is still unresolved.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Ensure Article 6 supplements, rather than substitutes for domestic mitigation. Parties at COP 31 must commit that participation in the Article 6 mechanisms shall support higher mitigation ambition and sustainable development, while retaining adequate mitigation potential to meet their own NDCs and to deliver on their historical responsibilities and match current capabilities.

Adopt a stable funding arrangement for the Article 6.2 infrastructure, review system, and capacity-building and address capacity gaps in LDCs and SIDS. We strongly urge CMA8 to act on the SBI mandate to secure sufficient and predictable funding for the international registry and related infrastructure, Article 6 technical expert reviews and stakeholder capacity building. These are essential for the accounting system to stand as a credible structure. Based on the recurring expert review findings, COP 31/CMA8 outcome must also ensure capacity-building, particularly for the LDCs and SIDS, so that stronger integrity requirements do not become a barrier to participation in the cooperative approaches.

Strengthen host-country readiness, stakeholder safeguards and accountability under Article 6.4. The outcome at COP 31 must focus on functioning designated national authorities, clear approval processes, sustainable development criteria, and capacity to evaluate proposed activities. The COP 31 outcome must operationalize stakeholder consultation, grievance mechanisms, and protections for affected communities, especially for the land and nature-based activities.

Deliver a practical post-2026 implementation model for Article 6.8 mechanism. CMA8 should agree how the Glasgow Committee on Non-market Approaches and the NMA Platform will support actual cooperation, including improved project recording, identification of support needs and available finance, technology and capacity-building and links to NDC implementation. The outcome at COP 31 must advance Article 6.8 as a genuine non-market cooperation channel rather than an underused information repository.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- Decision 3/CMA.7 finally defined the modalities of the UAE Dialogue on implementing the GST-1 outcomes, describing the dialogue as a facilitative and non-prescriptive process respecting nationally determined climate action and national circumstances.
- COP 30/CMA7 mandated the UAE Dialogue to address experiences, opportunities, challenges, barriers and needs in implementing GST outcomes, with particular attention to finance, capacity-building, technology development and transfer, and international cooperation as enabling conditions.
- COP 30 also decided to conclude the separate annual GST-NDC dialogue outcomes at SB64 and strengthened guidance for GST-2, including attention to loss and damage, social and economic impacts of response measures, inclusivity and scientific inputs from developing countries (UNFCCC, 2026c, decision 3/CMA.7).

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Making the UAE Dialogue explicitly "facilitative and non-prescriptive" limits the Dialogue's ability to function as a strong accountability mechanism for systematically assessing whether Parties are actually implementing GST-1 in line with 1.5°C goal.
- While the GST decision at COP 30 gave greater recognition to MoI, it mandates the Dialogue to become primarily an exchange of experiences rather than a mechanism for identifying and closing implementation gaps.
- COP 30 did not establish any formal mechanism to translate GST-1's landmark call to transition away from fossil fuels, triple renewable-energy capacity, double energy-efficiency improvements and phase down unabated coal into collective milestones, timelines or implementation requirements.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Address the growing gaps between increasing climate impacts and support available. COP 31 must ensure that implementation of the first GST outcomes addresses the widening gap between escalating climate impacts and the support available to developing countries and frontline communities.

The decision text must commit developed countries to urgently scale up grant-based finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building support, in line with equity and CBDR-RC, to enable effective implementation of GST outcomes in developing countries.

The UAE-GST dialogue must focus on aligning policies and implementation tools with 1.5°C trajectory and ensuring adequate adaptation implementation in developing countries. The UAE-GST dialogue should focus on aligning climate policies and implementation efforts with 1.5°C trajectory, strengthening efforts in transformative adaptation against growing climate impacts, and conserving critical carbon sinks, while addressing tipping point risks. The Dialogue must also examine the operationalization of the targets under the GGA Framework and challenges for transformative, community-led, rights-based, and ecosystem-based interventions and address the structural inadequacy of adaptation finance for implementation of the GGA Framework in developing countries.

Leverage the GST-NDC Dialogue outcomes as guidance for aligning the NDCs 3.0 with the 1.5°C goal. COP 31 must utilize the outcome from the GST-NDC Dialogue as guidance for Parties to align their NDCs 3.0 with the 1.5°C trajectory which requires 43 per cent emissions reductions by 2030 and 60 per cent by 2035, transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, the halting and reversal of deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, and the just transition pathways. The outcomes of the Dialogue must also be used to address the increased reliance on carbon markets and offsetting in submitted NDCs and the limitations facing Parties that have not yet communicated NDCs 3.0.

Launch a balanced GST2 across mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation. We demand that GST2 assess collective progress across the full scope of the Paris Agreement. It should avoid becoming primarily a mitigation exercise by giving comparable analytical attention to progress in adaptation, finance, technology, capacity-building and implementation barriers. Balance should be visible in the architecture of the stocktake, including the questions asked, data requested, expert inputs used and synthesis reports produced.

Ensure the evidence base captures LDC circumstances. Technical inputs in the GST 2 should make visible adaptation limits, vulnerability, loss and damage, support needs, capacity gaps, high cost of capital and the proportion of climate priorities that remain unfunded in LDCs. LDC-specific evidence should be sufficiently disaggregated to ensure its visibility within broad developing-country averages.

Recognize IPCC aprincipal source of scientific information for GST and align GST2 timeline with best available science: CMA8 (COP 31) must decide IPCC as the main source of scientific information for informing the stocktaking process. We strongly demand that Parties at COP 31 request IPCC to align the timing of its assessment reports with the GST process. COP31 should also ask IPCC to complete all three AR7 Working Group reports in 2028 so the GST2 can utilize the latest scientific evidence. COP31 must also request the IPCC for ensuring a diversity of scientific inputs including the local knowledge and developing country experiences to ensure the GST outcome reflects the best available science and represent real local contexts.

Track implementation of GST1 outcomes. GST2 should begin recognizing the fact that the GST1 outcome is yet to be translated into national plans

and actions. The information-collection phase should examine progress on implementation of GST1 outcomes, including energy, adaptation and support, and identify reasons for lagging delivery. It is a must for GST2 to assess whether agreed global signals on energy, adaptation, finance and other areas produced measurable action, which barriers persisted, and which implementation approaches were effective enough to scale.

JUST TRANSITION

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 agreed to establish a Just Transition Mechanism, widely referred to as the Belém-Antalya Mechanism (BAM), to strengthen international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing for equitable and inclusive transitions.
- Through Decision 2/CMA.7, Parties linked just transition explicitly with efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C, requested the JTWP to integrate the GST-1 outcome, recognized the importance of workers, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and other affected stakeholders, and stressed the relevance of finance, technology transfer, capacity-building and international cooperation.
- It also recognized the importance of new and additional grant-based finance, highly concessional finance and non-debt instruments for developing countries.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- The mechanism was established, but its operational architecture was left unfinished.
- The decision recognized the importance of additional grant-based and concessional finance, but did not establish a dedicated just-transition finance window or a link with the Article 9.1 financing obligation or quantified commitment on means of implementation.
- The final decision contains no explicit reference to fossil-fuel phase-out or a supply-side energy-transition pathway, despite the central relevance of fossil-fuel transition to workers, communities and economies affected by decarbonization. The mechanism therefore addresses the social dimensions of transition without formally establishing the energy-system pathway to which that transition should correspond.
- The final decision text made no reference to safeguards concerning transition-mineral extraction, including the social and environmental implications of rapidly expanding critical-mineral supply chains.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Operationalize the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) underpinned by adequate, predictable and measurable finance and other MoI. Parties at COP 31 must define the JTM's functions, governance structure, participation rules, scope and relationship with existing UNFCCC bodies. The operational structure and mandate of the mechanism should be rooted in the COP 30 Just Transition principles, consider differentiated socio-economic contexts of transition in LDCs and low-emitting developing countries, and high-emitting economies and be aligned with the GST1 outcomes on the transitioning away from fossil fuels, transforming industry and transport, and eliminating deforestation and restoring ecosystems and natural areas, and the 1.5°C temperature goal. Parties must ensure that the mechanism is able to provide adequate and predictable practical support and guidance, in the form of public grant-based finance, institutional coordination, capacity building, technical assistance, and technology transfer, for designing and implementing nationally determined just transition pathways and integrating the just transition strategies and efforts into the climate and development plans of the countries and sectors.

Make the JTM rights-based, inclusive and holistic in scope. Parties at COP 31 must ensure the JTM builds on rights-based approaches to just transition pathways that ensure universal access to clean, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy for all, including through the scaled-up deployment of renewable energy and access to clean cooking. The mechanism must facilitate and strengthen strategies to safeguard human rights, especially rights of the workers (re-skilling, decent job creation, livelihood diversification, etc.), women, children, youth, elderly people, persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants and internally displaced people, people of African descent, and people in vulnerable situations and ensure gender equality and women's empowerment, following a systematic and inclusive bottom-up approach starting from needs and risk assessment through implementation. The governance arrangements within the mechanism must guarantee adequate and meaningful participation of these rights holders

in development and implementation of JT strategies, while promoting social dialogue and giving a strong and meaningful role to the countries with low emissions and high development needs.

Establish a robust MEL system for tracking progress. Parties at COP 31 must agree to establish a robust MEL system under the scope of the Just Transition Mechanism for assessing whether just transitions are being effectively implemented or where adjustments are required. Such a mechanism should be grounded in the ILO's guidelines for a just transition, should be context-specific and responsive to different administrative levels, particularly the local level, where impacts will be most acutely experienced. The MEL system should be capable of capturing risks, responses, and outcomes associated with the transition of fossil fuel sectors. The MEL system should also ensure flexibility to reflect diverse national and local circumstances through context-appropriate indicators.

Continue the UAE Just Transition Work Programme beyond 2026. The JTWP should remain a standing forum for developing common understanding, sharing experience and addressing emergency policy issues. Therefore, Parties at COP 31 should agree to continue the JTWP as a forum for Parties to debate concepts, exchange national experience and develop policy understanding, and mandating the JTM to become the practical channel for implementation support, technical cooperation and connection to resources.

CLIMATE AND TRADE

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 brought climate-related trade measures explicitly into the central political outcome. The Mutirão decision reaffirmed Article 3.5 of the Convention, emphasizing that climate measures, including unilateral ones, should not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restrictions on international trade.
- Parties agreed to hold three dialogues on opportunities, challenges and barriers to international cooperation related to trade under the Subsidiary Bodies in 2026, 2027 and 2028, involving organizations such as the WTO, UNCTAD and International Trade Centre, followed by a high-level exchange in 2028.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- COP 30 created a forum for discussing the trade-related issues without establishing rules for resolving them. The dialogues have no mandate to set standards, recommend corrective measures or determine whether particular unilateral measures (UTMs) like Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) are equitable or compatible with the Convention.
- The Mutirão decision repeats Article 3.5 but does not define what constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or a "disguised restriction on international trade", leaving the central political dispute unresolved.
- References to UTMs did not survive the final texts on Just Transition and Technology Implementation Programme, leaving trade issue largely separated from other negotiating streams though its implications directly affect industrial transition, technology and development.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Prevent climate-related trade measures from shifting decarbonization costs to developing countries. COP 31 should recognize and address the structural inequities arising from trade-related climate measures that transfer the costs of industrial decarbonization to developing countries, constrain their development prospects, or reduce their fiscal and policy space. Climate-related trade measures must be consistent with equity, CBDR-RC, and the objectives of the Paris Agreement and also be accompanied by adequate finance, technology transfer, capacity-building and transition support to enable developing countries to decarbonize without bearing disproportionate economic and social costs.

Objectively assess the cross-border impacts of UTMs. The trade dialogue should develop an evidence base on how climate related trade measures, such as CBAM, affect developing country exports, imports, production costs, employment, competitiveness, and capacity to implement the Paris Agreement. The assessment should distinguish the intended climate outcome from unintended or disproportionate development impacts and be sufficiently granular to disaggregate effects by country, sector, and firm size.

Align global trade governance with UNFCCC climate objectives and finance processes. Parties at COP 31 must agree to promote stronger coherence between global trade governance and the objectives, principles and outcomes under the UNFCCC, especially the Paris Agreement and Global Stocktake. COP 31 must also urge the WTO, UNCTAD, ITC, and other relevant institutions to engage in a structured consultative process in which climate objectives guide the decision on the trade rules and measures. Parties should also ensure that the discussions on trade, through the Trade Dialogues and the high-level event and beyond these, are coordinated with relevant climate finance processes, particularly the Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c), to ensure coherence between trade, finance, and equitable low-carbon development.

GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 adopted the Belém Gender Action Plan for 2026-2034, providing a longer-term institutional basis for integrating gender equality across climate action. The nine-year Plan contains 27 activities and 98 deliverables, covering gender balance, participation and women's leadership; capacity-building and knowledge; coherence across climate institutions; gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation; and monitoring and reporting UNFCCC, 2026h, decision 7/CP.30).
- The GAP strengthens recognition of women and girls facing multiple and intersecting vulnerabilities, explicitly including Indigenous women, women and girls with disabilities, women and girls of African descent, migrant women, women smallholder farmers, and women in rural and remote communities.
- Parties agreed to strengthen sex- and age-disaggregated data, national gender analyses, country-driven indicators and integration of gender information into NDCs, NAPs, the GGA and transparency processes.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- The Plan recognizes intersectionality, participation and data needs but does not provide the resources necessary to operationalize them, particularly in LDCs and other vulnerable developing countries.
- COP 30 made no advancement in establishing a dedicated gender-finance window, quantified financing obligation or direct link to delivery under the NCQG, GCF or GEF.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Turn the Belém Gender Action Plan into funded implementation. COP 31 should recognize the lack of resources in developing countries in implementing gender-focused climate actions and call for urgent dedicated financial and other resources for national implementation. Finance must primarily focus on supporting national focal points, gender analysis, building data systems, capacity-building, and gender-responsive programs.

Mainstream gender across NDCs, NAPs, finance, and sectoral implementation. COP 31 must require countries to integrate gender considerations into the design, budgeting, implementation and monitoring of the climate measures, including adaptation, loss and damage, just transition, agriculture, health and climate finance.

Strengthen gender responsive climate finance governance. The COP 31 outcome must urge Parties to ensure gender institutions and national gender and climate focal points have a meaningful

role in project design, approval, monitoring and evaluation. It must recognize the barriers faced by local women's rights organizations and community-based organizations in accessing climate finance and require finance providers to track whether resources reach women and girls in vulnerable communities and whether funded activities reduce or reproduce existing inequalities.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- As part of the COP 30 Action Agenda, the Government of Brazil and WHO launched the Belém Health Action Plan (BHAP), intended to promote climate-resilient and low-carbon health systems, including integrated climate-health surveillance, early warning, resilient public-health infrastructure, and stronger responses to heatwaves and climate-sensitive diseases (WHO, 2025).
- The BHAP calls for integration of health co-benefits into national climate policies and gives attention to reproductive health, mental health, menstrual health and the differentiated health burdens experienced by women and other vulnerable groups.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- As the BHAP is not a negotiated UNFCCC decision, it has considerable political and technical value but does not create obligations for all Parties.
- The Plan has no dedicated UNFCCC financing window, making health only partially integrated into the major means-of-implementation architecture, including Article 9 finance and Loss and Damage. Hence, implementation of the BHAP hinges substantially on national resources, development finance and other external financing.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Move the Belém Health Action Plan (BHAP) from endorsement to national implementation. COP 31 should focus on expediting national delivery plans, institutional responsibilities, and measurable implementation backed by adequate financial and technical support. COP 31 must also establish a clear and actionable link of the BHAP activities to grant-based finance under the UNFCCC windows. Alongside, it must encourage countries to identify priority health risks, vulnerable populations, and the investment needed to build climate-resilient health systems.

Integrate health into NAP, NDC implementation and adaptation investment. COP 31 should urge Parties to include health adaptation in national climate change and health planning through heat action plans, surveillance, resilient hospitals, WASH systems, emergency preparedness, mental health support and climate-informed public health programs.

HUMAN RIGHTS

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- The Global Mutirão decision reaffirmed that Parties, when taking climate action, should respect, promote and consider their respective

human rights obligations, gender equality and intergenerational equity.

- The Just Transition text moved several rights principles beyond preambular recognition, particularly concerning labour rights, Indigenous Peoples, FPIC and participation.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Despite stronger rights language, COP 30 did not establish a dedicated human-rights work programme, institutional mechanism or accountability framework under the UNFCCC. Human rights therefore continue to operate largely as a cross-cutting normative principle rather than an independently actionable negotiation track.
- Much of the broad human-rights language remains in the preambular or normative part of the political outcome. The decision did not establish COP-wide procedures for human-rights due diligence, grievance, remedy or accountability across mitigation, adaptation, finance, loss and damage and carbon-market activities.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Establish a legal institutional framework under the UNFCCC to protect human rights against climate change impacts. We strongly urge COP 31 to establish a legal institutional framework under the UNFCCC to protect the rights of frontline communities, including the women, elderly people, youth and children, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs), gender-based minorities, etc. The framework must build on existing resolutions on climate change and human rights and align with the existing conventions and covenants on human rights protection and the principles under the UNFCCC and take lessons from the practical experiences of the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the UN.

Implement UPR recommendations relating to climate change. We demand that COP 31 strongly urge Parties to implement the recommendations from the latest Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Human Rights Council on addressing the human rights violations associated with climate change impacts. We further urge COP 31 to require Parties to integrate the UPR recommendations addressed to their respective countries in their climate-focused plans, actions, and finance interventions.

Launch global research to understand climate change implications for human rights violation. Parties at COP 31 must decide to commission systematic global research, under the guidance of the Subsidiary Bodies, to understand how climate change impacts catalyze the existing fault lines of inequality, social exclusions and marginalization of the already marginalized groups and communities, gender discrimination, socio-economic deprivation, etc. and causes human rights violations. The research must specifically include localized, community-specific studies to comprehensively understand differentiated and disproportionate vulnerabilities of climate change impacts on women, persons with disabilities, elderly persons, youth and children, Indigenous peoples, migrants and IDPs, and other marginalized communities.

CLIMATE-RELATED HUMAN MOBILITY

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- COP 30 concluded the review of the WIM, under which the SNLD is requested to enhance its efforts to catalyze the provision of technical assistance to vulnerable developing countries in their efforts for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage and consider the context of displacement.
- The Belém Adaptation Indicators adopted at COP 30 allow disaggregation by migrant status. They also include an indicator measuring people supported through planned relocation in response to water-related hazards, an indicator concerning climate-vulnerable human settlements relocated to safer locations, and an indicator on people protected through pre-emptive evacuation following early warning. The GGA decision at CMA7 also explicitly recognized migrants as a cross-cutting group in adaptation.
- The Just Transition decision at COP 30 recognized the importance of just transition pathways that respect, promote and fulfil all human rights, including migrants' rights.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- COP 30 strengthened technical work without establishing a regular high-level political process specifically addressing climate-related human mobility. Despite increasing recognition across the Paris architecture, human mobility remains

dispersed among the WIM, adaptation, GGA, NAP, GST and other processes. The Task Force on Displacement (TFD) itself operates in an advisory role under the WIM.

- The outcome on Belém Adaptation Indicators does not provide a comprehensive framework for measuring the wider mobility continuum, including disaster-displacement, climate-related migration, repeated displacement, return and reintegration, cross-border movement, trapped people, or the protection and human-security conditions of migrants and displaced people at destination.
- Recognition of migrants in the Global Mutirão remains principally normative rather than operational. The decision acknowledges migrants within its human-rights framing, but does not establish migrant-specific safeguards following displacement or migration.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Establish a clear and actionable definition of climate change-induced migration and displacement. COP 31 must task the SBSTA to develop a clear and actionable definition of climate change-induced migration and displacement and establish a set of usable operational criteria to differentiate between climate-induced migration and displacement and other types of human mobility.

Recognize human mobility as systemic climate risk and adaptation. Parties at COP 31 should recognize human mobility as a category of systemic climate risk. It should also recognize it as an adaptation strategy when it is safe and dignified. Such recognition must also be accompanied by prioritization of reducing displacement risk and scaling climate-resilient solutions for displaced persons, migrants and host communities and rights-based voluntary planned relocation.

Develop a mechanism on collecting data on climate-induced displacement and migration. A robust data collection system is essential for capturing comparable and longitudinal data of climate-related displacement and migration to better understand the nexus between climate change and human mobility and develop a scenario of current and future flows of mobility. COP 31 could initially entrust the TFD with this task, with technical support from the SBSTA.

Make human mobility an implementation priority across the WIM, SNLD, and FRLD. COP 31 should require existing L&D-focused institutions under UNFCCC to utilize the guidance of the TFD in technical assistance, knowledge products, and financial pathways, with explicit attention to migration, displacement and planned relocation. This will help ensure human mobility is consistently addressed across the existing L&D architecture under the UNFCCC.

Strengthen the Task Force on Displacement. COP 31 must require the WIM ExCom to advance the implementation of the TFD's 4th Plan of Action; finalize priority knowledge products on human mobility; and strengthen dissemination, capacity-building and knowledge sharing on safe, orderly and dignified migration and prevention of forced displacement.

Include human mobility in loss and damage reporting as a priority issue. The TORs of the regular report on loss and damage should ensure that the report includes information on human mobility, including migration, displacement and planned relocation, as a priority area. We strongly demand

that the report include a dedicated chapter on climate-related human mobility, presenting the lived experiences of affected populations using disaggregated qualitative and quantitative data on displacement, planned relocation, migration and immobility; estimates of economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with human mobility; gaps in finance, support, systematic observation, data collection and analysis, and governance.

YOUTH, CHILDREN, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- Decision 22/CMA.7 on the WIM explicitly recognized vulnerability associated with age, displacement and disability, and called for meaningful involvement of youth and children and displaced populations in loss-and-damage knowledge products. The GGA outcome and the wider adaptation framework also strengthened attention to disaggregated information and participation of groups in vulnerable situations.
- Through Decision 27/CMA.7, COP 30 made the 2026 ACE Dialogue an input to the midterm review of the Glasgow Work Programme and mandated a technical workshop on possible elements of a new action plan.
- The SBI was requested to organize an interactive technical workshop in 2026 on elements of a new ACE action plan, providing an entry point for education, public participation, intergenerational engagement and youth involvement.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- The COP 30 decision did not clarify how to make ACE implementation more measurable, adequately supported and better integrated into national climate delivery.
- The 2024 Expert Dialogue on Children and Climate Change generated practical recommendations, but COP 30 did not create a dedicated follow-up work programme. Child-related concerns therefore depend on being mainstreamed through ACE, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, health, NDCs and NAPs. Therefore, responsibilities to implement ACE remain dispersed and difficult to track.
- COP 30 delivered no progress establishing mandatory standards for meaningful representation of children and youth in national delegations, constituted bodies or climate-planning processes, nor dedicated arrangements for child- and youth-responsive climate finance.
- While disability has been increasingly referenced in rights, adaptation, loss-and-damage and conference-accessibility language, there is no stand-alone UNFCCC disability agenda, focal point or systematic requirement that national climate plans and finance demonstrate disability inclusion.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Address distinct vulnerabilities of the youth, children, and persons with disabilities and ensure their inclusion in the national planning processes. COP 31 decision text must strongly urge countries to systematically address the unique risks experienced by the youth, children, and persons with disabilities due to climate change across the entire cycle– assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation– of climate plans and policies and ensure their representation within this cycle. Parties should also be required to generate and use SADDD (Sex, Age, and Disability Disaggregated Data) in developing and implementing climate plans and policies. COP 31 must also commit Parties to provide measurable, predictable, and directly accessible grants-based financial support for implementing actions for avoiding and addressing the disproportionate impacts faced by the youth, children, and persons with disabilities, in line with Article 9.1 of the PA.

Recognize persons with disabilities as a formal constituency within UNFCCC. Absence of formal recognition of disability within COP has been a barrier for the OPDs (representing 1.3 billion people worldwide) to participate on an equal basis with others in climate negotiations. We urge Parties at COP 31 to agree on a formal constituency represented by persons with disabilities to ensure their full and effective participation in the UNFCCC processes. COP 31 must also ensure their physical access to all the areas at COP and guarantee sign language interpretation and captioning support at all the sessions including plenaries.

Complete the ACE mid-term review with a stronger implementation plan. At COP 31, the SBI65 should use the mid-term review of the Glasgow Work Programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) to identify which activities have delivered results, where implementation gaps

persist, and what should change in the next action plan. The review should produce priorities, responsibilities, and implementation support and result in implementable action plan with responsible actors, expected outputs and support needs.

Provide dedicated support for ACE implementation in developing countries. ACE implementation requires curricula reform, educator training, building public information systems, setting national focal points, establishing participation mechanisms, and building communication infrastructure, which require sustained budgets and technical capacity. COP 31 outcomes must recognize these as capacity and finance needs and strengthen support for country-driven implementation of ACE efforts.

Link climate education to green workforce development. Parties convening at COP 31 must agree to pair climate literacy with vocational, technical, and professional skills needed for energy transition, resilient agriculture, adaptation, waste management, green industry and other implementation sectors. This would link ACE more closely to just transition and climate policy.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- Decision 16/CP.30 took note of Presidency-led dialogues and a thematic workshop on ways to further engage local communities in the UNFCCC process, and requested further work to inform the 2027 review of the LCIPP Facilitative Working Group.
- The JTWP decision texts for the first time placed UNDRIP in an operative paragraph and recognized self-determination, FPIC and protections for Indigenous Peoples in voluntary isolation and initial contact.
- Mitigation discussions also recognized the important role of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in sustainable forest management, while the Mutirão decision explicitly referenced Indigenous Peoples' land rights and traditional knowledge.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Decision 16/CP.30 is primarily procedural and preparatory. It does not yet deliver a structural reform of representation and decision-making within the LCIPP, with key questions deferred to the 2027 review.
- Specific safeguards for mining and transition-mineral extraction were removed from the final just-transition text. Concerns also remain around whether the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF) launched outside the formal UNFCCC framework could maintain robust safeguards for Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Improve direct access to finance and community-level implementation resources. Protection Indigenous Peoples' right is often determined by the national policies and financing system designed primarily through a top-down processes rather than bottom-up. Large scale national or international projects can fail to channel benefits to communities managing ecosystems or

bearing implementation costs. Often application for large scale funds receive delayed approval, causing multi-layer issues. Therefore, COP 31 outcomes must support mechanisms under the UNFCCC windows that reduce transaction barriers and allow Indigenous Peoples, local communities and organizations to access finance directly through accountable national intermediaries to implement community-led priorities. We further demand that COP 31 agrees to prioritize grant-based finance for the indigenous and local communities, with provision of small grants.

Embed meaningful participation across NDCs, NAPs, transparency, and GST-related processes. COP 31 must define structured opportunities for Indigenous Peoples and local communities to contribute to national planning, monitoring, and implementation, especially where climate policies affect territories, resources, and livelihoods. The decision text must establish formal entry points in national processes during problem definition and option design, with adequate time, information, and support for communities to engage.

FOREST AND BIODIVERSITY

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- Forests received substantial attention through the MWP and wider COP 30 political agenda. The Global Mutirão text formally reaffirmed the importance of conserving, protecting and restoring ecosystems and halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, while also recognizing ecosystems, biodiversity and the need for social and environmental safeguards.
- The COP 30 Presidency announced development of a roadmap for halting and reversing deforestation by 2030, with progress intended to be carried forward towards COP 31.
- Outside the negotiated UNFCCC outcome, Brazil formally launched the TFFF, designed as a large-scale mechanism to mobilize long-term finance for tropical forest conservation. The initiative aims eventually to mobilize around USD 125 billion through sovereign and philanthropic capital combined with capital-market financing (COP 30 Presidency, 2026).

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Despite being widely presented as the "Forest COP", COP 30 did not adopt a formal, time-bound roadmap for implementing the GST-1 commitment to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030. The Presidency-led deforestation roadmap remains voluntary and outside the formal negotiated UNFCCC framework, weakening accountability and continuity across future COPs.
- Launched outside the formal UNFCCC architecture and built on a blended-finance model, the TFFF raises questions around capitalization, investment risk, governance, additionality and sustained protection of Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' rights.
- Despite explicit recognition of the interdependence of climate change, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation, COP 30 made no progress in establishing a formal mechanism under UNFCCC to ensure systematic coherence between Paris Agreement implementation and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KM-GBF).

COP 31 POSITIONS

Incorporate forest-based emissions reduction and food systems transformation as central strategies to effectively halt and reverse deforestation. Parties at COP 31 must commit to include forest-specific emissions reduction targets and highlight actions to implement deforestation- and conversion-free supply chains in their "initial" or revised NDCs 3.0, (except for the countries with very limited scope). Agricultural expansion and food system pressures are globally a potential cause for deforestation and conversion. COP 31 outcome must therefore urge Parties to better integrate policy measures and actions on food production, consumption and food loss and waste in their NDCs 3.0.

Establish synergy of UNFCCC negotiations with CBD negotiations. The discussions under the UNFCCC have stressed the significance of biodiversity both in terms of mitigation and adaptation and the risks thereon imposed by climate change and actions to address it. Therefore, considering the climate change-biodiversity nexus, COP 31 must establish a synergy between decisions on biodiversity under both UNFCCC and Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

Scale ecosystem-based adaptation and restoration with integrity. COP 31 must urge Parties to ground nature-based and ecosystem-based approaches in ecological science, additionality (where relevant),

long-term management and safeguards for communities. Restoration should prioritize ecosystem function and resilience rather than short-term tree planting or carbon accounting alone. Integrity requires attention to ecological condition, species composition, hydrology, permanence and long-term management. Therefore, COP 31 outcome must ensure that programs use ecological criteria and safeguards that are appropriate to the landscape.

Establish the 2030 Forest Roadmap as a time-bound, rights-based, inclusive, and accountable implementation framework. While not part of the formal agenda at COP 31, the COP 30 Presidency's Roadmap to Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030 constitutes a crucial political opportunity to overcome systemic challenges and expedite implementation of global forest goals.

We demand that COP 31 urge the COP 30 Presidency to establish the Roadmap as a time-bound, accountable and implementation-oriented framework for achieving the 2030 forest goal. The Roadmap should include clear milestones, monitoring and reporting arrangements, and structured participation of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and civil society. It should build on core principles, such as the respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights and the rights of Indigenous Peoples; the advancement of social and economic justice; the agency, leadership, and self-determination of Indigenous Peoples and local communities; equity; scientific and ecosystem integrity. It should prioritize protection of land and territorial rights, direct public finance for Indigenous Peoples and local communities, practical measures to address and report forest degradation, and just-transition support for workers and communities dependent on forest-destructing activities. It should also promote deforestation-free and ethical supply chains while safeguarding food security and food sovereignty. Importantly, it should align trade and fiscal policies with forest-positive investment, ecosystem integrity and equitable development and avoid shifting mitigation burdens onto forests through weak-offset approaches or unsustainable biomass pathways.

OCEAN AND CLIMATE

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- The annual Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue is the principal formal process around ocean, whose 2025 report was brought into the COP 30 process. The Dialogue focused on ocean-based measures in NDCs, the ocean under the GGA, and ocean-climate-biodiversity synergies (UNFCCC, 2026b).
- The Dialogue highlighted finance and science as cross-cutting enabling factors and identified opportunities to integrate marine and coastal ecosystems, blue-carbon measures and ocean resilience into NDCs and adaptation planning.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Primarily a facilitative knowledge and policy-coherence process, the Ocean Dialogue remains insufficiently anchored in the formal UNFCCC implementation architecture.
- No specific UNFCCC target or financing commitment was established for ocean adaptation, coastal resilience, marine ecosystem restoration or blue-carbon action.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Integrate ocean priorities into NDCs and NAPs underpinned by adequate implementation support. COP 31 must urge countries with material ocean and coastal risks to incorporate ocean-relevant mitigation and adaptation measures into national climate plans, including mangrove and seagrass restoration, fisheries resilience, coastal protection and marine ecosystem management where appropriate. Integration should identify concrete measures, responsible agencies, financing needs and indicators rather than merely mention the ocean in national plans. COP 31 must also ensure that ocean ambition is supported by grants and concessional finance, technology and capacity-building. Finance should cover both enabling conditions and investment.

Strengthen ocean observation, data sharing and early warning. COP 31 partnerships should expand ocean observation systems, open data, modelling and early-warning capacity for sea-level rise, marine heatwaves, storm surge, acidification and other risks. Data investments should prioritize regions with weak monitoring infrastructure.

Develop a multi-year implementation roadmap for the Ocean Dialogue. The 2026 Ocean Dialogue suggested stronger continuity across annual discussion. Parties at COP 31 must provide political support for development of a multi-year roadmap that specifies follow-up responsibilities, identifies recurring finance and data barriers and how dialogue outcomes inform relevant UNFCCC processes and national plans.

PROVISION OF FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR REPORTING AND REVIEW PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 13 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

COP 30 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION / OUTCOME

- Decision 15/CMA.7 moved this agenda from a series of isolated support discussions into a structured implementation cycle. Recalling Article 13.14 and Article 13.15, CMA7 agreed an annual set of activities for 2026-2028, which include Party submissions, a secretariat synthesis of experience and challenges, World Café workshops at the first SBI session, structured engagement with the GEF and other support providers, regional workshops, and feedback into the next annual cycle.
- SBI65 was requested to consider the submissions and reports arising from those activities and provide guidance on how to maximize their reach and effectiveness in subsequent annual cycles.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- COP 30 established an annual 2026–2028 cycle of activities, without a new quantified transparency-finance commitment or modality for permanent staff, institutional arrangements, data systems and continuous national reporting capacity.
- COP 30 acknowledged existing issues with access and created a dialogue to explore further simplification, but stopped short of agreeing concrete GEF access reforms.
- The COP 30 decisions focused strongly on BTR preparation but did not create a dedicated support arrangement covering technical expert review, FMCP participation, corrective follow-up and preparation of the next BTR.

COP 31 POSITIONS

Move from report-by-report project support to predictable, multi-year support for permanent national transparency systems for implementation of full Article 13. COP 31 must agree to ensure predictable and sustained financial and technical support to developing countries to maintain institutions, staff, data flows and technical systems across reporting cycles. Support should therefore cover preparation, review, follow-up and institutional learning as one continuous cycle rather than treating submission of an individual BTR as the end of the funded activity.

Simplify and accelerate access to GEF transparency resources. The first-cycle experience identified delays between project conception, approval and disbursement, as well as differing procedures among GEF implementing agencies. COP 31/SBI65 should encourage more standardized and transparent access pathways, faster processing, clearer eligibility guidance and continuity between reporting cycles. Simplification should reduce transaction costs while preserving fiduciary and quality safeguards, so that countries do not lose substantial reporting time navigating funding procedures.

PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THE POSITION PAPER

The position paper titled "31st Conference of the Parties: Articulating CSOs Position Together" represents the collective efforts of the Climate Justice Alliance—Bangladesh (CJA-B), a platform of 54 national and international civil society organizations (CSOs) advocating for climate justice at both national and international levels.

This paper offers a critical, evidence-based analysis of the key negotiation issues at COP31 and consolidated CSO perspectives on the matters of strategic importance for the COP31 negotiations and the future trajectory of global climate governance and action. It also provides a strategic overview of climate diplomacy for a diverse group of stakeholders, including policy-makers, CSOs, emerging climate leaders, and the media, thereby supporting framing of their expectations from COP31 grounded in human rights and climate justice principles. On a national scale, it is intended to informing the Government of Bangladesh's preparations for COP31. More broadly, the paper aspires to strengthen collective global advocacy efforts to advance the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming, while ensuring that climate justice remains central to all climate action.

Development of this position paper followed a participatory process and was informed by negotiation narratives, policy documents, and research findings involving:

1. A reflection meeting on COP30 outcomes:

   The process began with a CSO discussion on 6 December 2025 on the outcomes of COP 30, with emphasis on the progress made at Belém towards implementation of the Paris objectives and the unresolved gaps and compromises. Alliance members gave their critical reflections on pressing issues, including mitigation ambition, climate finance, adaptation indicators, and fossil fuel phase-out commitments, which laid the groundwork for articulating clear demands and expectations for SB64 and COP 31.

2. A side event discussion at SB64:

   CPRD co-hosted a side-event discussion at the 64th session of the meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) at Bonn on 15 June 2026 on the growing women-health concerns associated with climatic impacts and challenges to development of health systems resilience. Experts and the audience discussed national and global policy imperatives in the issues and presented their expectations for substantive decision on these issues under the adaptation, loss and damage, and finance agenda at Antalya conference.

3. CSO Strategy Workshop for formulating CSOs' stance on COP 31 and beyond:

   The Alliance members convened in a three-day workshop held from 1 to 3 September 2026 and facilitated discussions among CSOs on critical topics, encompassing climate science, policy, and politics. The workshop culminated in a strategy-framing discussion, where the members collaboratively articulated their expectations on key issues such as mitigation, adaptation, just transition, and climate finance from COP31 and beyond.



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31st CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

ARTICULATING CSOs POSITION TOGETHER

EDITOR'S PICK

The world is no longer short of commitments; it is short of implementation. Eleven years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the gap between agreed commitment and action continues to widen. COP 30 advanced several implementation processes, yet left critical issues unresolved, including the transitioning away from fossil fuels, reversing deforestation, closing the 1.5°C ambition gap, and ensuring adequate, predictable, and accessible finance for adaptation and addressing loss and damage. As climate impacts intensify, another cycle of political declarations without measurable delivery will further erode confidence in multilateral climate cooperation.

COP 31 must therefore become a decisive COP of implementation, accountability, and climate justice. Parties must translate the outcomes from Dubai, Baku, and Belém into measurable action by strengthening and implementing NDCs, moving NAPs into funded implementation, scaling up grants-based finance, and operationalizing just transition and other implementation mechanisms. The Antalya outcomes must keep 1.5°C within reach while upholding equity, CBDR-RC, human rights, and the development priorities of vulnerable countries and frontline communities.

Climate Justice Alliance Bangladesh