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Editorial Office
Center for Participatory Research and Development (CPRD)
House 1219, Flat A 2, Road 10, Lane 10
Mirpur DOHS, Dhaka 1216
E-mail: info@cprdbd.org

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E-mail: sharif.mehoraf@cprdbd.org

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30TH CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES: EXPECTATIONS, OUTCOMES AND DEBATES AROUND MAJOR AGENDA ITEMS

Md Shamsuddoha, Sheikh Nur Ataya Rabbi, and Sumaiya Binte Anwar provided a comprehensive analysis of the key outcomes of COP 30 held in Belem, Brazil in 2025. They emphasized stronger CSOs movements and planned diplomacy for delivering justice and rights-based decisions from the COP process.

SUMMARY

The 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 30) to the UNFCCC was held in Belém, Brazil from 10–21 November 2025. As is customary, the opening week focused largely on technical and procedural work, building on unresolved issues from previous COPs and Subsidiary Body (SB) sessions. The objective was to narrow options and prepare draft texts for political negotiation and reaching decisions.

Labelled as the "Implementation COP", "Forest COP," and "COP of Truth", the COP 30 opened with a positive political gesture. Unlike the recent COPs and SB sessions, Parties at COP 30 adopted agenda items without much debate. This helped the Presidency to move quickly into substantive consultations rather than becoming entangled in procedural delays.

COP 30 President André Corrêa requested Parties to engage in parallel consultation on four priority issues identified during the preparatory discussions.

- Closing implementation gaps in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) towards limiting global warming to 1.5 °C as reflected in the 2025 NDC Synthesis Report (UNFCCC, 2025e);[sl41.1]
- Clarifying implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement regarding developed countries' finance obligations;
- Addressing unilateral trade-restrictive measures (UTMs) in the context of just energy transition;

- Synthesizing the first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) submitted under the Enhanced Transparency Framework;

As negotiations progressed, the initial 'wave of collectivism' gradually started to be overridden by individualism and strong national interests, weakening the spirit of multilateralism. Divergences between developed and developing countries resurfaced sharply, particularly around finance obligations, fossil fuel transition language, and the interpretation of 1.5°C alignment.

The two weeks of negotiations including extended hours of late-night sessions concluded without a clear operational pathway for ending fossil fuel use or ensuring that NDC implementation aligns with the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C. Instead, the Brazilian Presidency announced the establishment of a parallel voluntary initiative outside of the formal UNFCCC negotiation track to engage countries on phasing out fossil fuels and ending deforestation. While politically symbolic, this external track highlighted the difficulty securing consensus on fossil fuel language within the formal multilateral framework.

At a time when climate action required clarity and courage, the global process remains misaligned with science and justice. Current NDC pathways point toward 2.7°C, while finance commitments emphasize large numbers without ensuring accessible, grant-based support for adaptation and loss and damage. The Loss and Damage mechanism is minimal in scale and procedurally stalled, offering marginal relief against trillion-dollar needs. For Bangladesh, rising climate debt and uncertain external flows for its NDC commitments expose the risk of relying on loan-driven finance. Without decisive ambition from major emitters and structural reform of the financial architecture, the outcomes risk remaining symbolic rather than transformative.

Dr. Fazle Rabbi Sadeque Ahmed
Deputy Managing Director-PKSF
Member, Consultative Group of Experts for the LDC Group to the UNFCCC
LDC Lead Negotiator for Climate Finance

In this sense, COP 30 managed to preserve critical consensus around the long-standing debate over fossil fuel discussions by avoiding a direct collapse of negotiation on the issue. However, it did so without delivering a binding or time-bound multilateral commitment.

The final outcome therefore reflects a dual reality. On the one hand, the conference demonstrated a shared recognition of the urgency of climate action and a willingness among many Parties to continue collaborating on mitigation, adaptation, and finance. On the other hand, the negotiations exposed deep political divisions on how these commitments should be implemented, particularly regarding climate finance, mitigation pathways, and the distribution of responsibilities between developed and developing countries.

The Presidency's overarching political package, titled "Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change," attempted to frame COP 30 as a turning point toward accelerated implementation. The Mutirão decision tried to consolidate multiple strands of negotiation by reaffirming the Paris temperature goal, launching new initiatives to support implementation, and creating platforms for continued political engagement on finance and mitigation.

One notable element of the Mutirão decision was the establishment of a two-year work programme on climate finance to maintain momentum on delivering the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) agreed at COP 29 in 2024 in Baku. This work programme will support discussions on scaling up climate finance toward the broader goal of mobilizing at least USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035, while enabling developing countries to continue advocating for stronger public finance commitments under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.

Adaptation also emerged as a central theme of the conference. The Mutirão decision calls for tripling adaptation finance by 2035, extending the ambition first articulated at COP 26 in 2021. While this signals recognition of the widening adaptation finance gap, many developing countries and CSOs considered the outcome insufficient due to the absence of a clear baseline and the postponement of delivery beyond the previously discussed agreed 2030 timeline.

Negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) further highlighted tensions between technical work and political bargaining. Parties adopted a set of 59 indicators to monitor global adaptation progress, but last-minute revisions to the indicator framework generated significant concern among many delegations and left uncertainty regarding their operationalization. Further technical refinement of the indicator framework is expected to continue through 2027.

On mitigation, a coalition of 88 countries pushed to include a roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels within the Mutirão decision. Opposition from several fossil fuel–producing countries and major emerging economies prevented the inclusion of explicit language on fossil fuel phase-out or fossil fuel subsidy reform. Instead, the final decision launched two new initiatives: a) the Belém Mission to 1.5, and b) the Global Implementation Accelerator aimed at supporting countries in implementing their NDCs and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). While these initiatives could help maintain political momentum, their operational linkages to the formal UNFCCC negotiation process remain unclear.

Trade-related tensions also surfaced particularly regarding unilateral trade restrictive measures such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms and deforestation-related import regulations. Some developing countries argued that these measures risk creating new economic barriers and undermining equitable climate transitions. In response, Parties agreed to continue discussions through a series of dialogues under the subsidiary bodies, with further reporting expected by 2028.

COP 30 also delivered some institutional progress. Negotiators successfully adopted a new Gender Action Plan, and agreed to establish a just transition mechanism to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, and knowledge sharing on socially inclusive climate transitions.

Overall, COP 30 revealed both the potentials and the limits of multilateral climate diplomacy amidst accelerating climate risks. While the conference produced several new initiatives and maintained momentum on adaptation and climate finance, political divisions still persist around fossil fuel transition pathways, finance obligations, and trade-related climate measures.

Eventually, the Mutirão decision emerged as the central political outcome of COP 30, bundling mitigation finance, adaptation progress, and trade-related tensions into a single consensus package.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE (GST)

AGENDA BACKGROUND AND FOCUS AT COP 30

Key Issues	What is it about?	Focus at COP 30
Paris Agreement Article 14	Established a process of periodically stock-taking (referred to as the "global stocktake") to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Operationalizing GST-1 outcomes; clarifying modalities for follow-up processes (UAE Dialogue and annual GST Dialogue); ensuring balanced integration of mitigation, adaptation, finance and equity.
First Global Stocktake (GST-1)	The first Global Stocktake took place in 2023. It concluded that the world is off track to limit warming to 1.5°C and called for deep emissions reductions, scaling renewable energy, strengthening adaptation and increasing climate finance (UNFCCC, 2023b). The outcomes are intended to inform enhanced NDCs submitted in 2025. Subsequent stocktakes will occur every five years (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Translating GST-1 findings into implementation; determining whether follow-up should be facilitative or prescriptive; linking GST-1 signals (including fossil fuel transition and finance alignment) to updated NDCs and preparation for GST-2

CONTEXT

The Global Stocktake (GST), established under the Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, requires Parties to periodically assess and take stock of the collective progress toward achieving the Agreement's long-term goals, in the light of equity and best available science. It is designed as a collective accountability mechanism to inform the updating and enhancing of NDCs and international cooperation.

The first GST (GST-1) concluded at CMA-5 during COP 28 (Dubai, 2023) and is reflected in decision 1/CMA.5, commonly referred to as the UAE Consensus (UNFCCC, 2023b). GST-1 delivered a clear scientific and political message: the world is not on track to meet the Paris temperature goals. Existing policies would lead to warming well above 1.5°C; limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid, sustained reductions in emissions across sectors and achieving net-zero CO_2 emissions around mid-century.

The GST-1 also identified key global transformation benchmarks, including tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvement by 2030, scaling up adaptation action and significantly increasing climate finance. It introduced the formulation to "transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner", although it stopped short of adopting a formal fuel phase-out commitment.

Beyond political messaging, GST-1 established follow-up processes intended to translate collective findings into implementation. These included:

- An annual GST dialogue (para. 187, 1/CMA.5) to share experience on how GST informs new NDCs;
- The "United Arab Emirates Dialogue" (para. 97, 1/CMA.5) on implementing GST outcomes (including finance, technology and capacity-building); and
- A mandate to refine the procedural and logistical elements of future GSTs based on lessons learned.

However, disagreements quickly emerged regarding the purpose and scope of these follow-up processes. During inter-sessional discussions in Bonn, developing countries—particularly the G77 + China— argued that the UAE Dialogue should focus primarily on the means of implementation (MOI), especially finance, technology transfer and capacity-building. They emphasized enabling conditions, equity, and historical responsibility as central to implementing GST-1 outcomes.

In contrast, many developed countries pushed for a broad, cross-cutting scope, covering all elements of GST-1 and emphasizing how Parties are enhancing NDC ambition. They resisted narrowing the Dialogue's focus to finance alone and preferred a facilitative exchange of experiences rather than a platform for assessing delivery gaps.

There were also strong views about whether the Dialogue should be "prescriptive" or strictly "facilitative and non-prescriptive." Concerns were also raised regarding inclusivity, time allocation, and the possibility that the process might be perceived as judging national performance.

As a result, COP 29 in 2024, and SB 62 in June 2025 were unable to agree on refinements to the GST follow up architecture. No consensus emerged on refinement to the GST process, nor on how the annual GST dialogues should evolve and feed into GST-2.

Thereby, COP 30 inherited three unresolved GST follow-up issues:

1. Modalities and scope of the UAE Dialogue,
2. The future direction of the annual GST dialogue, and
3. Procedural and logistical refinements to future GSTs.

DEBATE AT COP 30/CMA 7

Given that GST follow-up is central to implementing the UAE Consensus, discussions on the Global Stocktake quickly overlapped with broader political fault lines on fossil fuels, finance and equity.

A coalition comprising the EU, several Latin American countries (e.g. Colombia), many African and Pacific states, the Alliance of the Small Island States (AOSIS), and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) pushed for COP 30 to move from signals to operationalization. For them, the logical next step after GST-1's call to "transition away from fossil fuels" was the development of a structural roadmap toward fossil fuel phase-out. They viewed the UAE Dialogue and the related GST follow-up processes as appropriate venues to translate scientific findings into concrete sectoral transitions, including clear milestones for reducing fossil fuel production and consumption.

Vulnerable countries also insisted that GST implementation be coupled with scaled-up and predictable finance, in line with the new climate finance goals set at COP 29 and with the decision of tripling adaptation finance by 2035.

However, the fossil-fuel producers and some large emerging economies, including Saudi Arabia, Russia and several members of the Arab Group, at times supported by India and China, resisted any prescriptive language on fossil fuel phase-out. They argued that "transition away" language must respect technological neutrality, national circumstances and energy security. They pushed for the UAE Dialogue to remain non-prescriptive, rejecting attempts to impose new collective targets beyond what had already been agreed in 1/CMA 5(UNFCCC. 2023b). They also warned against "cherry-picking" or selective emphasis on mitigation paragraphs of GST-1 without equally strengthening commitments on finance, adaptation, and loss & damage.

The G77 + China, in their statement ahead of COP30, stressed that implementing GST outcomes must be equity-based and finance-enabled. They stressed that GST follow-up should not become an additional burden on developing countries without corresponding support. Preparation for GST-2 in 2028, they urged, must be grounded in strengthened capacity, data systems and finance flows.

Against this backdrop, Brazil framed COP 30 as the "COP of Truth", positioning itself as a broker between high-ambition proponents of fossil phase-out and cautious opponents to large emitters. Through the Global Mutirão narrative, Brazil sought to bridge science, equity and political feasibility in implementing GST outcomes.

KEY OUTCOMES

The main GST-related outcome at COP 30 is the CMA 7 decision on matters related to the global stocktake as part of the wider "Global Mutirão" political package (UNFCCC, 2025c).

- CMA 7 sets detailed modalities for the UAE Dialogue, stating that it will be "facilitative and non-prescriptive", respecting the nationally determined climate action, and national circumstances.
- The Dialogue is to operate "in the spirit of international cooperation" and is mandated to facilitate sharing of experience, opportunities,

challenges, barriers and needs in implementing GST outcomes. Particular attention is given to finance, capacity-building, technology development and transfer and strengthened international cooperation as key enablers of implementation.

- The decision mandates annual UAE dialogue sessions during the first regular SB session in 2026 and 2027. A high-level ministerial roundtable will be convened at CMA-9 at COP 32 in 2027 as part of the Dialogue. The SBSTA and SBI Chairs are mandated to organize the dialogues and publish the Dialogue reports which must be "factual and non-prescriptive". These reports will serve as inputs to the second Global Stocktake (GST-2).
- COP 30 also decides to conclude the annual GST dialogue established under paragraph 187 of decision 1/CMA.5 at SB 64 in June 2026 (UNFCCC, 2023b).
- The decision underscores the "importance of inclusivity" and encourages "meaningful participation" of non-Party stakeholders via the High-Level Champions and Marrakech Partnership. It further encourages the scientific community (including IPCC and regional institutions) to provide the best available science, with attention to developing countries' scientific inputs. It also asks GST technical co-facilitators to consider loss and damage, social and economic impacts of response measures, and international cooperation, responding to earlier criticism that GST-1 underweighted these aspects.

Beyond these procedural clarifications, the Mutirão decision recalls Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CMA.5, framing COP 30 as a moment to transition from GST-1 findings toward implementation (UNFCCC, 2025d).

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

COP 30 resolves several procedural uncertainties that had remained unsettled after COP 29. It defines modalities of UAE Dialogue, sunsets the annual GST dialogue, and refines the guidance for preparing GST-2. The time-bound structure through 2026-2027 and clearer instructions to the subsidiary bodies reduce procedural confusions and provides Parties with a cleaner road toward GST-2.

By mandating the UAE Dialogue to focus on finance, technology development, and capacity-building as key enablers of GST implementation, the decision addresses the demands from developing countries that GST follow-up must address implementation conditions rather than just mitigation ambition.

However, making the UAE Dialogue explicitly non-prescriptive, and requiring summary reports to be "factual and non-prescriptive", limits its potential to drive stronger ambition. Without evaluative or directional elements, the Dialogue risks becoming an exchange of experiences rather than a process that meaningfully pressures Parties to align updated NDCs with the 1.5°C trajectory identified in GST-1. Although GST-1 and the UAE Consensus highlighted transitioning away from fossil fuels, the Mutirão decision and GST follow-up decisions avoided explicit language on fossil fuel phase-out or supply-side transitions. As the first full COP following GST-1, COP 30 had political space to build on that signal but chose not to translate it into structured collective actions.

GST-1 stressed that finance flows must be aligned with low-emission, climate-resilient pathways. However, COP 30's GST decisions did not create new mechanisms or obligations to ensure such alignment beyond general calls to action.

30 years of climate negotiations yielded minimal financing for addressing adaptation needs and responding to climate induced loss and damages. There is a serious problem with supply side mechanisms, which often is disconnected from demand-side need and priorities.

A recent UNEP report confirms that the flow of international adaptation finance from the developed country's public sources to the developing countries fell from US$28 billion in 2022 to US$26 billion in 2023. Though developed countries promised new and additional financing to developing countries, in practice, the financing is neither new nor additional, ironically subtractional. Even the new target of mobilizing US$300 billion annually by 2035 is far short from need. It has to be sufficiently ambitious to address the ever-widening Climate Finance Gap.

AKM Sohel
Additional Secretary,
Economic Relations Division
(ERD), Ministry of Finance

MITIGATION

AGENDA BACKGROUND AND FOCUS AT COP 30

Key Issues	What is it about?	Focus at COP 30
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)	Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement (PA) established the global goal of holding the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 2.1(a)). Article 3 requires Parties to prepare, communicate and maintain nationally determined contributions (NDCs), and to pursue domestic mitigation measures aimed at achieving the objectives of Article 2.1(a) through such contributions (UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 3).	• Consideration of the 2025 NDC synthesis report. (UNFCCC, 2025e) • Alignment of updated NDCs with 1.5°C. (UNFCCC, 2015b) • Implementation gaps and tracking mechanisms
Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP): 2023- 2026	Established at COP 26/CMA 3 in 2021 to 'urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation' before 2030 through engaging Parties in global dialogues to enhance mitigation actions and investments (UNFCCC, 2021).	Continuation of the Work Programme and translating Global Dialogue reports (Fifth and Sixth) into actions.
Article 6 on NDC Implementation Article 6.2: (Cooperative Approaches between Parties):	Article 6.2 allows Parties to voluntarily cooperate in implementing their NDCs by using the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) authorized by the participating Parties (UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 6.2).	Consideration of the Secretariat's synthesis of Article 6.2 technical expert reviews; recurring issues of transparency, authorization of ITMOs, corresponding adjustments and environmental integrity.
Article 6.4: Market Mechanism	A carbon crediting mechanism, Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), to contribute to GHG emission reductions in host countries, which can then be used by another Party to achieve its NDC targets (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 6.4). The PACM is overseen by a Supervisory Body established under the PA.	Discussion/consideration of the annual report of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body on the implementation of the PACM.
Article 6.8: Non-Market Approaches- NMAs	A framework to promote mitigation and adaptation ambition, which are voluntary actions (non-tradable) to help countries to achieve their mitigation objective, adaptation targets and sustainable development goals (SDGs).	Discussion of the content and progress of establishing a web-platform, entitled the Non-Market Approaches Platform (NMA Platform) established in 2024 to serve as a resource hub for the Parties.
Global Stocktake	Article 14 of the Paris Agreement established a requirement to take stock of global progress every five years to help the Parties to increase ambition towards achieving the Paris goal. The first GST was concluded at CMA 5 in 2023 (Decision 1/CMA.5; UNFCCC 2023b).	Whether the outcome of the GST -1 is taken into account while preparing the enhanced NDCs submitted prior to COP 30/CMA 7 in 2025.
Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs)	Article 13 of the Paris Agreement established an Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), under which Parties are required to submit biennial transparency reports (BTRs) every two years, with the first submission due by 31 December 2024 (UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 13).	Use of BTRs to assess implementation gaps; debates over robustness of tracking mechanisms; concerns regarding differentiation and reporting burdens.

The Global South is no longer a united front of vulnerable nations seeking rapid reduction of global emissions as required by science and maintaining global finance flow by broadening the donor base in a voluntary fashion. It is now led by major emitting and oil-exporting countries in the developing word which downplay their ever increased share of global emissions by putting sole emphasis on historical responsibilities, and block the discussions on broadening the donor base of countries willing to contribute in a voluntary manner. Meanwhile, Article 9.4 gets ignored, clearly stating adaptation finance must come from grant-based public sources with especial attention to particularly vulnerable countries. Most of the major emitters in developed and developing world have regrettably failed to present NDC 3.0 by the extended deadline leading to serious non-compliance issue, while major players also started calling 1.5 -degree goal no longer relevant. We must ground the 2028 Global Stocktake in a solid information base with updated science, and we should continue to fight for direct budgetary support over prevailing slow project-based funding.

Md. Ziaul Haque
Additional Director General
Department of Environment
Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change

CONTEXT

In alignment with the Convention's objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 2), Article 3 of the Paris Agreement requires all Parties to undertake and communicate NDCs that reflect progressively increasing ambition over time (UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 3). These NDCs are to be coherent with the global temperature goal under Article 2.1(a): holding the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2015b).

The Paris Agreement marked a shift from a top-down emission reduction architecture established under the Kyoto Protocol to a nationally determined system. While this approach broadened participation and political ownership, it also allowed flexibility in ambition levels. This was reflected in the first round of Intended NDCs (2015) and the updated NDCs submitted in 2020–2021, which collectively remained insufficient to align with the 1.5°C pathway (UNFCCC, 2025e).

In response to the widening emissions gap, Parties at COP 26 /CMA 3 in 2021 established the Sharm-El Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Program (MWP) to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation during this critical decade, complementing the Global Stocktake process (UNFCCC, 2022a). The programme operates from 2023 to 2026 with the possibility of extension.

The MWP facilitates focused discussion through organizing global dialogues and providing guidance to scale-up mitigation targets reflected in the NDC-specific sectors. With its fifth and sixth dialogues held in 2025, focused on forests and the waste and circular economy sectors respectively, negotiations at COP 30 therefore centered on:

- Integrating outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues into its annual report;
- Launching a digital platform to showcase best practices, actionable solutions, challenges and barriers relevant to the Dialogue;
- Identification of topics for the final two dialogues in 2026;
- Discussing the scope and possible continuation of the MWP beyond CMA 8 at COP 31 in 2026.

In parallel, to accelerate NDC ambition and support implementation of GST-1 outcomes, COP 28 in 2023 mandated the Presidencies Troika (COP 28, COP 29 and COP 30) to enhance coordination toward keeping 1.5°C within reach. The Troika launched the "Roadmap to Mission 1.5" in 2024 and reiterated commitments across subsequent COP cycles. However, the initiative remains political rather than legally binding.

Ahead of COP 30, Parties were expected to submit either new or updated version of the NDCs. As of 2025, only 113 Parties submitted covering nearly 69 percent of global emissions. If fully implemented, these pledges would result in an estimated 12 percent reduction of emissions by 2023 compared to 2019 levels. (UNFCCC, 2025e).

A political fault line persists around the question of fossil fuels. Since COP 28 in 2023, debates have continued over whether COP decisions should explicitly call for a fossil-fuel phase-out roadmap, and if so, how such commitments should be framed in terms of timelines, legal language and differentiation. At COP 30 this issue once again surfaced as a central point of contention between countries seeking explicit supply-side commitments and those prioritizing national sovereignty, energy security and nationally determined pathways.

DEBATE AT COP 30/CMA 7

Parties broadly acknowledged the need to address the growing emissions gap as identified in the first Global Stocktake (UNFCCC, 2023b) and recent scientific assessments (IPCC, 2023; UNEP, 2023). However, deep divisions emerged over how strongly COP 30 should operationalize guidance from the MWP, IPCC findings and the outcomes of the GST-1.

Developed country Parties called on major emitters to submit more ambitious NDCs and supported stronger tracking of implementation through the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) (UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 13). In contrast, many developing country groups emphasized that NDCs are nationally determined and must remain tailored to national circumstances. They resisted attempts to subject NDCs to what they viewed as additional procedural pressure through the MWP or GST follow-up mechanisms. Several delegations argued that advanced economies treat NDCs and their implementation as entirely a voluntary contribution, without strong procedural pressure to ensure implementation and ratcheting up of ambition.

The AOSIS, supported by the LDCs, demanded a robust follow-up mechanism for NDC implementation, including periodic ratcheting-up aligned explicitly with the 1.5°C temperature goal and stronger mitigation outcomes from both the MWP and GST processes.

AOSIS further called for strengthening of the "Roadmap to Mission 1.5°C" launched by the COP Presidencies Troika (COP 28, COP 29 and COP 30). In support of this objective, the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) led by Switzerland proposed a "Belém 1.5°C Action Plan" and an "NDC Roadmap," modeled on structured mobilization frameworks to enhance ambition and coordinated delivery.

The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) and Arab Group opposed explicit references to the 1.5°C goal in certain sections of the negotiation text where they felt it would introduce additional conditionality. They also resisted incorporating procedural guidance of MWP and GST into formal decision language, cautioning against embedding prescriptive expectations into NDC preparation.

Debate also extended to how NDC implementation would be supported. Several Parties stressed that implementation requires robust, measurable and verifiable mechanisms, including effective carbon market arrangements under Article 6 of the PA and adequate means of implementation in finance, technology transfer and capacity-building.

The African Group proposed that the NDC Synthesis Report and a potential "NDC Implementation Roadmap" integrate adaptation and finance considerations including reflecting commitments to scale up adaptation finance.

In relation to the 5th MWP global dialogue on forest, the EIG, supported by New Zealand and Paraguay, called for stronger language on sustainable forest management and use protection of Indigenous Peoples' rights, and recognition of their traditional knowledge in forest conservation and management. Canada proposed referencing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (United Nations, 2007) to strengthen safeguards. LMDCs opposed singling out specific groups in a way that they believed could introduce political sensitivities or exceed the mandate of the MWP.

Several country groups, including African Group, LDCs, and LMDCs, proposed launching a dedicated digital platform under the MWP to showcase best practices and implementation solutions. Others argued that this would duplicate the Non-Market Approaches (NMA) platform under Article 6.8 of the PA. Concerns were raised regarding governance, resource implications and functional clarity. India suggested exploring a dedicated window within the existing NMA Platform instead. AOSIS, AILAC, Japan and others requested greater clarity before endorsing any new structure.

On future MWP dialogues in 2026, Colombia proposed addressing industry and the pathways for transitioning away from fossil fuels in alignment with the 1.5°C goal. Nigeria pointed out that any such discussions must remain nationally determined and respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC).

AOSIS, LDCs and AILAC supported continuation of MWP beyond CMA 8 at COP 31 and proposed including language to guide discussion of its next phase. LMDCs, supported by African and Arab Groups, opposed any text on MWP continuation and preferred a "no text" option. LMDCs criticized the MWP for being less ambitious and argued that some Annex I countries were attempting to reinterpret its mandate to pressure developing countries to enhance their mitigation targets.

On fossil fuels, a coalition of 88 countries called for a strong language on fossil-fuel "roadmap" to be included in the mitigation outcome-Mutirão text. This was opposed by the oil and gas producing countries along with some major emerging economies, that have resisted prescriptive language, arguing for sovereignty and energy security. Consequently, no explicit language on fossil fuel phase-out was included in the final COP 30 text.

During the closing plenary, COP 30 President declared the intention to develop two Presidency -led roadmaps: one on transitioning away from fossil fuels and another on halting and reversing deforestation by 2030, with progress to be reported at COP 31. The Presidency also referenced the upcoming First International Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels scheduled to convene in Colombia in April 2026, as a part of this effort.

KEY OUTCOMES

The COP 30 reaffirmed the Paris goal of limiting global average temperature rise to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The decision recognizes the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions to reach net zero by 2050 in order to keep the 1.5°C goal within reach.

However, beyond reaffirmation of the existing commitments, the COP did not adopt any concrete or binding measures to close the emissions gap or operationalize a clear pathway toward net-zero emissions. The outcomes are largely procedural and facilitative in nature. The key elements of the decision include:

- Launching of the Global Implementation Accelerator, intended to enhance coordination and accelerate implementation across all actors to support delivery of NDCs and NAPs, and to help keep 1.5°C within reach.
- Launching of the "Belém Mission to 1.5," aimed at enabling ambition and strengthening implementation efforts related to NDCs and NAPs through enhanced cooperation and political engagement.
- Recognition of the Non-Market Approaches (NMA) Platform under Article 6.8 as the UNFCCC web-based platform, with a call for Parties to increase its use, as appropriate. The Secretariat was requested to prepare a technical paper exploring options to enhance the platform's features and functionality for consideration at SBSTA 64 (UNFCCC, 2025d).
- Taking note of the 2025 Global Dialogues, including a) the critical role of forests as carbon stocks and sinks, b) the need to support Indigenous Peoples and local communities in the sustainable management and use of forests, c) the importance of waste reduction and management, d) the co-benefits of waste reduction, management, and prevention and circular economy approaches; e) the importance of international cooperation and access to means of implementation (MoI) for supporting efforts to implement mitigation actions in the forest and waste sectors.
- Continuation of the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) until CMA 8 at COP 31 in 2026, with a view to considering its possible extension. Implementation remains voluntary and nationally determined, and the text provides no clarity on future thematic focus areas or on how dialogue outcomes will translate into concrete implementation. As structured, the MWP continues to function as a facilitative platform rather than a mechanism that drives enhanced ambition (UNFCCC, 2025d).

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

- The final text does not contain an explicit roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels. There is also no decision on reforming fossil fuel subsidy. The absence of a binding pathway weakens the credibility of the 1.5 °C goal; voluntary coalitions can accelerate pockets of action but do not guarantee global alignment (UNFCCC, 2025d).
- Although the “Belém Mission to 1.5” and the “Global Implementation Accelerator” were presented as follow-up instruments to the first Global Stocktake, their relationship remains loosely defined. The Mission operates as a political mobilization effort, while the Accelerator is framed as an implementation coordination tool. Neither is anchored in a formal UNFCCC mandate, linked to national reporting cycles, nor supported by a defined accountability framework or dedicated finance stream. Their capacity to translate GST signals into measurable emissions reductions therefore remains uncertain.
- The announcement of two Presidency-led roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels and halting deforestation after adoption of the Mutirão text raises procedural concerns. These issues were central expectations for COP 30 itself. Deferring them to COP 31 through informal processes may have prevented negotiation collapse, but it shifts substantive decision-making outside the formal UNFCCC mandate. For many Parties, this represents a compromise that avoided breakdown but failed to match the urgency of the science.
- The MWP continues as a dialogue platform without defined milestones, thematic direction, or linkage to finance and accountability frameworks. Without structural reinforcement, it risks remaining facilitative rather than transformational.

ADAPTATION

AGENDA BACKGROUND AND FOCUS AT COP 30

Key Issues	What is it about?	Focus at COP 30
Adaptation Goal (Paris Agreement)	Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement adopted adaptation goal as ‘Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions, in a manner that does not threaten food production (UNFCCC, 2015b);	Ensuring adaptation receives equal political and financial priority alongside mitigation.
Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)	Article 7 of the Paris Agreement established the Global Goal on Adaptation with the aim of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change (UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 7.1).	Operationalizing the GGA through a measurable and implementable indicator framework without creating unintended obligations or conditionalities.
GGA Targets	At CMA 5/ COP 28 in 2023, Parties adopted the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience under Decision 2/CMA.5, structuring the GGA into thematic and dimensional targets (UNFCCC, 2023b). The UAE–Belém Work Programme was subsequently launched to develop indicators aligned with these targets (UNFCCC, 2023b).	Finalization, scope and refinement of the global indicator list; treatment of politically sensitive areas such as transboundary risks and climate-induced mobility.
National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and Adaptation Communication	Article 7.9 of the Paris Agreement required each Party to engage in adaptation planning processes and implement adaptation actions (UNFCCC, 2015b). Article 7.10 further requires Parties to submit and periodically update adaptation communications without imposing additional burdens on developing country Parties (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Alignment of GGA indicators with NAP implementation and reporting frameworks, and concerns over additional reporting burdens.
Adaptation Finance	Article 7.13 emphasized that continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided to developing country Parties for implementing adaptation actions, including those related to the Global Goal on Adaptation and national planning processes (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Scale, predictability and accessibility of adaptation finance; linkages between GGA indicators and means of implementation; avoidance of finance conditionalities tied to indicator performance.

CONTEXT

Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC required the Parties to take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects (UNFCCC, 1992). It further affirmed that adaptation actions should not be delayed due to scientific uncertainty, stating that,

"Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures …."

By virtue of Article 3.3, the Convention emphasized anticipatory actions aimed at reducing vulnerability to current and projected climate impacts, either by minimizing exposure to risk or by strengthening adaptive capacity. This obligation requires context-specific, vulnerability-informed adaptation planning and implementation, supported by adequate finance, technology transfer and capacity building. These requirements are operationalized in Article 4.1(b), Article 4.3 and 4.4 of the Convention.

Article 4.1(b) of the convention required Parties to formulate, implement and regularly update national programmes containing measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change. Article 4.3 further provides that developed country Parties shall required financial resources to support developing countries in implementing these measures, while Article 4.4 required assistance for countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

Collectively, these provisions established a differentiated framework in which adaptation planning is a universal responsibility, while financial support for adaptation is a binding obligation of developed country Parties (UNFCCC, 1992).

National Adaptation Plans (NAP) have been prepared by vulnerable countries, but the fund to implement them still does not exist. The negotiation process has lost sight of the urgency, allowing adaptation to fall behind while the rhetoric continues. Although negotiation on the implementation of National Adaptation Plan is ongoing, plans without resources are not progress, they are placeholders.

Shawkat Ali Mirza
Director, Climate Change and International Conventions, Department of Environment
Bangladesh's Lead Negotiator for Adaptation

Although the Convention treated mitigation and adaptation with equal importance, the climate policy historically evolved with a strong mitigation bias. Momentum for adaptation strengthened particularly following the IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001), which highlighted unavoidable impacts and the limits of mitigation alone (IPCC, 2001).

This shift was reflected at COP 7 in Marrakesh, where Parties established several key mechanisms. These included the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) to support priority adaptation measures communicated by National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) to support LDCs in formulation and implementation of NAPAs and later NAPs.

Further institutional strengthening occurred in COP 16 in Cancun, (2010), which established the Adaptation Committee (AC) as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, tasked with promoting coherent adaptation action under the Convention and the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2010).

The Paris Agreement further elevated adaptation within the climate regime. Article 7 of the agreement established the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change. The Agreement also requires the Parties to engage in an adaptation planning process, implement adaptation actions and periodically update adaptation communication (UNFCCC, 2015b). The COP also recognized the efforts of the local communities and Indigenous Peoples in climate action through the establishment of Local Communities and Indigenous People's Platform (LCIPP) (UNFCCC, 2015a).

At COP 23 in 2017, the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) was established to support its implementation with balanced representation of local communities and indigenous peoples and Parties (UNFCCC, 2018).

A major structural milestone was reached at COP 28/ CMA 5 in 2023. The Parties adopted the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience to guide the achievement of the Global Goal on Adaptation and to assess collective progress (UNFCCC, 2023b).

Despite this institutional progress, post-Paris adaptation negotiations have converged around a single unresolved issue: operationalizing the GGA in measurable and comparable terms.

COP 28 in 2023 launched the two-year UAE–Belém work programme to prepare a technically sound indicator framework aligned with the 11 GGA targets (UNFCCC, 2023b). COP 29 in 2024 reaffirmed that COP 30 in 2025 must finalize a list of indicators, not exceeding 100, and instructed the Work Programme to ensure a balanced set of qualitative and quantitative dimension metrics across input, output, outcome, impact and process dimensions (UNFCCC, 2024a).

Prior to COP 30, the Work Programme submitted a technical annex listing 100 proposed indicators. Negotiation resumed in Belém based on an informal note carried forward from SB 62 in June 2025. However, several political disagreements remained unresolved, including:

a. How the indicators should be refined, the usefulness of the indicator list and their implementation in regard to transformational adaptation;

b. How the indicators would track means of implementation (finance, technology and capacity-building);

c. When and under which authority should the indicators be formally adopted;

d. How adequate and predictable finance would be mobilized for NAP implementation and reporting under the GGA framework.

DEBATE AT COP 30/CMA 7

Parties opened the discussion by “welcoming” progress under the UAE-Belém Work Programme for finalizing the GGA indicators but quickly emphasized the need for further refinement (UNFCCC, 2025b). The early debate centered around three politically sensitive issues: data disaggregation, transboundary and cascading climate risks, and references to climate change-induced migrants and mobility.

Several Parties cautioned that incorporating indicators on transboundary risks could imply cross-border accountability and potentially create new obligations that governments were not prepared to accept. So, the more politics entered the room, the less technical the indicators became.

Many developing countries, especially the African group, stressed that indicators should not become tools for donors to impose conditions or increase reporting burdens. They warned against “prescriptive metrics” that overlooked national circumstances and structural capacity constraints. There was concern that poorly designed indicators could be used to question governance performance and ultimately restrict access to adaptation finance.

Finance quickly became the center point of the debate. Developing countries argued that meaningful implementation of the GGA required scaled up adaptation finance, particularly to support National Adaptation Plans (NAP) implementation. They also sought clarity on how the Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund would support reporting and implementation linked to the indicators.

Developed countries firmly rejected all attempts to link the indicator framework to finance discussions, emphasized that this agenda item should be concerned about the indication only, and should not be expanded into finance negotiation. They argued that means of implementation (MoI) discussions belong under other negotiating tracks.

Procedural concerns also emerged. The Arab Group raised concerns about the inclusion of new text that would expand the original mandate of the indicator framework.

Meanwhile, divisions also emerged among developing countries regarding timing. The LDCs wanted the indicators to be adopted at COP 30 to begin tracking resilience outcomes immediately. The LMDCs, supported by the Africa Group, preferred deferring adoption until 2027 (COP 32/CMA9), to allow further work of the UAE–Belém work programme and for refinement and alignment with national policy contexts.

Then came the classic UNFCCC debate over verbs: should Parties “provide,” “provision” or “mobilize” means of implementation for NAPs? Developing countries argued that emphasizing “mobilizing” over “providing” or “provisioning” would shift responsibility from public finance obligation towards private finance flows. They resisted reference to ‘all sources of finance’ and language implying excessive reliance on ‘private sector’ funding for NAP implementation.

Developed countries proposed deleting or softening MOI references for NAP altogether, arguing that linking GGA indicators to finance duplicated other negotiation tracks. In response, several developing countries proposed deleting paragraphs on enabling conditions for NAP implementation, viewing them as potential conditionalities tied to access to adaptation finance.

Tensions escalated when the Presidency introduced a new L-document (CMA.2025/L.25) containing a significantly revised annex. The proposed list was reduced from around 100 indicators to 59, presented as a voluntary "menu of options", allowing countries flexibility in selection. The revised indicators were voluntary, facilitative, and flexible.

Delegations quickly identified substantive changes. Structured indicators on transboundary and cascading risks, climate-induced displacement and mobility, and community-based adaptation were either removed or substantially diluted. Requirements for social and geographic disaggregation were replaced with optional language.

These abrupt changes triggered strong reactions and set the stage for one of the most contentious closing plenaries of COP history. Several developing country groups, including the African Group and Caribbean representatives, immediately raised formal points of order. They questioned both the procedure and the substance of the revised annex. They argued that the L-document did not reflect the technical output of the UAE–Belém Work programme. They insisted that the removal of key categories undermined the purpose of the GGA, which was to capture the full spectrum of adaptation needs, including risks that cross borders or disproportionately affect communities with low adaptive capacity. They stated that the incomplete indicators could be misused or become an extra reporting burden without corresponding support.

In an unusual procedural breakdown, the dais initially bypassed these points of order, contradicting normal plenary practice. This triggered even sharper interventions. Following a strong backlash, the COP 30 President described the incident as “an accident” and suspended the plenary for urgent consultations.

When the plenary resumed, the indicator annex was adopted without reopening the negotiation text, locking in an outcome that many delegations considered both weak and procedurally problematic.

KEY OUTCOMES

The COP 30 decision on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) marked a turning point, but not in the way many Parties had anticipated.

The revised annex tabled by the Presidency reduced the list to 59 indicators (CMA.2025/L.25), a change that generated significant dissatisfaction among the Parties and raised concerns about the integrity of the multilateral negotiation process. Despite the controversy, the decisions contain several elements intended to guide further testing and implementation

- Establishment of a two-year policy alignment process during which Parties will test and implement the indicators, drawing on their practical experience and ongoing technical work on metadata and methodologies. This process is to be undertaken by the Subsidiary Bodies (SBss) to develop guidance for operationalizing the indicators;
- Requests to technical bodies- the Adaptation Committee (AC), the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE), and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) to provide technical guidance and support to Parties in implementing the GGA Framework and reporting thereon, including through the development of tabular formats. The Secretariat is further

requested to prepare a technical paper on operationalization for consideration by COP 31/ CMA 8 in 2026.

- Decides to review the indicators after GST-2 in 2029, with the terms of reference for the review to be developed by the SBs in 2026 and 2027.
- Further guidance on operationalizing the Baku Adaptation Road Map, including the organization of two workshops during 2026–2028 under the leadership of the SB Chairs.

The decision also initiated new processes, the Belém–Addis Vision, a technical task force under the subsidiary bodies (SBs), and continued work under the Baku Adaptation Road Map to develop methodologies, metadata standards, and guidance.

For countries now preparing their second Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) or updating National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), the reduced indicator list provides only partial guidance. This may limit the ability to systematically assess adaptation progress ahead of the second Global Stocktake due in 2028.

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

COP 30 technically delivered a global set of indicators aligned with the 11 targets of the GGA framework. On paper, this is a milestone. However, in practice, there are serious concerns regarding its legitimacy and effectiveness.

The adopted indicators are explicitly described as voluntary, non-prescriptive, and non-punitive as well as global in nature, and they cannot be used as a condition for developing countries to access adaptation funding or creating new financial obligations or commitments, nor liability or compensation (UNFCCC, 2025b).

Methodological gaps are significant. Several indicators lack baselines, clear measurement approaches, or alignment with existing national systems. The exclusion or dilution of politically sensitive topics leaves blind spots in areas like transboundary risks, climate-induced mobility, and community-driven adaptation issues.

Eventually the GGA decision represents a careful political compromise. It advances a global framework for measuring adaptation, while limiting its legal and financial implications. The challenge ahead will be whether the ongoing technical processes can strengthen operational clarity without reopening the political fault lines that shaped the Belém outcome.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

AGENDA BACKGROUND AND FOCUS AT COP 30

Key Issues	What is it about?	Focus at COP 30
Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM)	COP 19 in 2013 established the 'Warsaw International Mechanism' to enhance support, including finance, to address loss and damage through a five-year rolling workplan (UNFCCC, 2013, Decision 2/CP.19). COP 20 in 2014 established a Party constituted Executive Committee (ExCom) to guide implementation of the functions of the WIM (UNFCCC, 2014b, Decision 2/CP.20).	Third Review of the WIM's five-year rolling workplan (initiated at SB 61/COP 29) in 2024 remained unresolved. Governance debate persisted on whether WIM should be governed exclusively by the CMA or jointly by the COP and CMA.
Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD)	Established at COP 25/CMA 2 in 2019 to catalyze demand-driven technical assistance for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage (UNFCCC, 2019a, Decision 2/CMA.25). The Network is governed by an Advisory Board and hosted by UNDRR and UNOPS.	Concerns over administrative efficiency, coordination with WIM and FRLD, and effectiveness of technical support delivery.
Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD)	Established a new funding arrangement at COP 27/CMA 4 in 2022 for responding to loss and damage (UNFCCC, 2022a), operationalized at COP 28 as an entity of the Financial Mechanism serving the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2023f)	Replenishment, scale of funding, direct access, rapid disbursement modalities, safeguards, and linkage (or lack thereof) to the NCQG finance architecture.

CONTEXT

The Loss and Damage agenda at COP 30 focused on three key issues brought forward from the previous COP and SB sessions. These include:

a. the third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2013),

b. the joint annual report of the Executive Committee of WIM and the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage, (UNFCCC, 2019a; UNFCCC, 2025f);

c. implementation of the Barbados Implementation Modalities and

d. the report of the fund for responding to loss and damage (FRLD) (UNFCCC, 2025f).

The Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) was established at COP 19 in 2013 to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including both extreme events and slow onset events, particularly in vulnerable developing countries (UNFCCC, 2013, Decision 2/CP.19). WIM is operated under a five-year rolling workplan supported by the WIM's Executive Committee (ExCom) established at COP 20 in 2014. The first was adopted at COP 23 in 2017 for a period 2018–2022 (UNFCCC, 2017), and the second workplan was adopted at COP 27 in 2022 covering 2022–2023 (UNFCCC, 2023).

To implement these workplans, the WIM ExCom created five expert groups covering slow onset events, non-economic losses, comprehensive risk management, human mobility, and action and support. The COP established a periodic reviewing of WIM's structure mandate and effectiveness to inform to the COP (UNFCCC, 2013, Decision 2/CP.19). The third review process began at SB 61, at COP 28 in 2023 and continued through COP 29/CMA 6 and SB 62 in June 2025, but no consensus decision was reached.

Loss and Damage finance remains delayed and far below what urgent needs demand. The Fund must be substantial, predictable and grant-based, kept entirely separate from adaptation finance, with simplified direct access for vulnerable countries. The new collective finance goal must include a dedicated sub-target for loss and damage, ensuring predictability and adequacy of support where it is needed most.

Sabine Minninger
Senior Policy Advisor
Climate Change,
Bread for the World, Germany

Parallel to this institutional track, the Santiago Network was established at COP 25/CMA 2 in 2019 to address capacity gaps by providing technical assistance for implementing approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage (UNFCCC, 2019a, Decision 2/CMA.2).

At COP 27/CMA 4 in 2022 Parties established a new funding arrangement, including a dedicated Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) (UNFCCC, 2022a). At COP 28/CMA 5 in 2023, the FRLD was operationalized as an entity under the Financial Mechanism of the Convention serving the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2023a). The Fund is currently hosted by the World Bank.

The FRLD has received approximately USD 365 million out of USD 768 million in pledges from 27 contributors in 2025. Although the FRLD Board developed a resource mobilization strategy, real progress in converting pledges into actual contributions has been slow. Since its establishment, debates have focused on replenishment timelines, pledges vs. conversions to contributions, direct vs indirect access, balance between financing for non-economic and economic losses, safeguards and fiduciary rules, and coordination other climate finance windows.

DEBATE AT COP 30/CMA 7

By COP 30, the Loss and Damage architecture functions under three operational pillars: Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), the Santiago Network (SNLD), and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD).

With the Fund now operational, expectations were high that the discussion would shift decisively from institutional design towards implementation and capitalization.

On the opening day of COP 30, the FRLD launched its first call for funding request for implementing start-up projects under the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) with an initial allocation of USD 250 million grants for 2025-2026 (UNFCCC, 2025f). While Parties welcomed the symbolic move toward implementation, many stressed that the amount fell far short of the scale of needs associated with escalating climate impacts.

Members of the G77 and China referenced Decision 1/CP.28, paragraph 20(e), which provides for direct access to the Fund, and called for the establishment of a rapid disbursement mechanism to ensure timely support (UNFCCC, 2025f). Several vulnerable countries emphasized that slow and bureaucratic access modalities would undermine the Fund's credibility.

A major point of contention concerned whether the FRLD should be explicitly linked to the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) architecture. Developing countries called for referencing the FRLD in the paragraph 16 of Decision 1/CMA.6 on the NCQG, which mandates increase of public resources through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and also called for tripling annual outflows from the climate funds by 2030 from 2022 levels (UNFCCC, 2024a).

Developed countries opposed this linkage, arguing that the FRLD has this own mandate and governance structure and should not be structurally tied to the NCQG architecture. For many developing countries, this resistance signalled reluctance to anchor Loss and Damage finance within predictable and scaled up public finance commitments.

Negotiations on the third review of the WIM exposed deeper institutional tensions. Disagreements centered on:

a. How to minimize the coordination gap among the WIM, the Santiago Network, and the FRLD, and how these institutions might contribute to a "global state report of loss and damage",

b. How to make WIM more action and delivery oriented, including the potential mandate to mobilize resources for knowledge development and capacity building activities,

c. On the governance of WIM and the Network, developed countries preferred WIM to be governed solely by the CMA, while G-77 and China urged for WIM's governance under both the COP and CMA, consistent with the mechanism's original mandate (UNFCCC, 2013, Decision 2/CP.19).

In the final days, negotiations moved from heavily bracketed text toward a consolidated outcome. G-77 and China proposed minor textual refinements, while Kenya raised concerns about high administrative costs within the SNLD, arguing that these could undermine delivery effectiveness.

Many countries opposed re-opening the text, noting the compromises made to reach this outcome. AILAC, Vanuatu, and Norway re-stated their preference to include reference the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the obligations of states in respect of climate change. AOSIS and the African Group highlighted their flexibility in excluding references to the GST to reach consensus.

By the close of COP 30, these disagreements remained unsolved and were effectively deferred. The WIM review outcome was adopted with heavily bracketed issues deferred to SB sessions in 2026, and no consensus emerged on governance alignment. No clear pathway emerged to strengthen coherence across the WIM–SNLD–FRLD architecture.

The result reflects a broader political reality: while Loss and Damage institutions are now formally operational, questions of governance alignment, coordination and adequate capitalization remain among the most politically sensitive and unresolved issues.

KEY OUTCOMES

The COP 30 presidency eventually dropped the final text FCCC/CP/2025/L.10 (UNFCCC, 2025f). The key decision includes:

- Requests the WIM ExCom to, among others, enhance its work on non-economic losses and develop knowledge products focused on enhancing understanding of approaches to managing compound risks;
- Decides to prepare a regular report on critical issues, lessons learned, and policy advice in relation to loss and damage, with the decision of providing detailed guidance for this process, including the determination of the report's frequency;
- Notes the continued divergence on WIM's governance, hence agrees to defer the discussion and continue with the existing practice of the CMA taking decisions and the COP endorsing those decisions.

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

Structurally, COP 30 advanced the Loss and Damage agenda by operationalizing the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) and reaffirming direct access to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). The decision "welcomes the rapid progress" of the FRLD, including its first call for proposals.

However, expectations of stronger financial commitments were not met. COP 30 could not result in any notable increase in pledges or contributions. The only forward-looking commitment is that the first replenishment process will begin in 2027. Given the accelerating scale of climate impacts, this timeline remains a concern.

There was also an expectation that Loss and Damage would be more firmly anchored within the broader climate finance architecture, particularly through a subgoal under the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). That linkage did not materialize. The final text leaves Loss and Damage finance outside of mandatory climate-finance scaling commitments. While the Board is urged to avoid "disproportionate bureaucratic obstacles," the decision does not include measures for a fast-track access modalites.

On governance, the WIM outcome provides no new clarity. Core disagreements remain regarding accountability whether under the COP, CMA, or both—remain unresolved (UNFCCC, 2013; UNFCCC, 2015b, Art. 8). The decision neither strengthens institutional mandates nor establishes a clear coordination mechanism across the WIM, Santiago Network and the FRLD. Instead, it defers further discussion to future work plans.

On the positive side, there is the decision to prepare the "Loss and Damage Report", which is prescribed to include, among others, projections of risk, scenarios and solutions on risk analysis by capturing occurrences, typologies and costs of loss and damage at the national level in all regions and across all types of climate-related hazards. Although the decision does not explicitly mandate assessment of resource gaps, the inclusion of "costs of loss and damage" may implicitly open space for future discussion on adequacy of finance.

The COP30 decision text merely "notes" the joint annual report of the WIM Executive Committee and the Santiago Network Advisory Board, rather than "welcoming" or formally "endorsing" it. In diplomatic terms, this signal limited political endorsement and leaves the report without operational standing (UNFCCC, 2025f).

Overall, COP 30 consolidated the institutional architecture of Loss and Damage but did not substantially strengthen its financial base or resolve its governance tensions. The framework is operational yet remains structurally undercapitalized and politically cautious, reflecting the continuing sensitivities surrounding Loss and Damage finance within the international climate regime.

FINANCE

AGENDA BACKGROUND AND FOCUS AT COP 30

Key Issues	What is it about?	Focus at COP 30
Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement (Finance Goal)	Established the long-term objective of making global financial flows consistent with pathways toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Operationalizing Article 2.1(c) while ensuring it does not dilute or substitute developed countries' obligations under Article 9.
Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement	Required developed country Parties to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties in mitigation and adaptation, continuing obligations under the Convention and consistent with CBDR–RC (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Clarifying whether "shall" constitutes a binding legal obligation; scope of public finance commitments; relationship with broader Article 9 provisions.
Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement	Required developed country Parties to biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information on projected public financial resources to be provided to developing countries (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Strengthening transparency, comparability and methodological guidance for ex-ante finance reporting.
Article 9.7 of the Paris Agreement	Required developed country Parties to biennially report on financial resources provided and mobilized for developing countries (UNFCCC, 2015b).	Enhancing accounting methodologies, disaggregation (mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage), and verification of ex-post finance reporting.
The new collective quantified goal (NCQG)	Replaced the goal for mobilizing USD 100 billion annually from 2020-2025; established a floor of USD 300 billion per year, with efforts to scale up to USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035 to support developing countries (UNFCCC, 2024a).	Credibility and delivery of the USD 300 billion core goal; a pathway to mobilizing USD 1.3 trillion; burden-sharing, sources of finance (public vs private), and alignment with adaptation and loss and damage needs.

CONTEXT

Finance was treated as one of the "basket issues" of COP 30 Presidency consultations. At the core of the discussion was the need for greater clarity on the relationship among Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, which establishes developed country finance obligations, Article 2.1(c), which addresses alignment of global financial flows, and Article 4.3 of the Convention, which anchors the original commitment to providing new and additional resources (UNFCCC, 1992).

With priority concern, finance discussion at COP 30 covered four main tracks:

a. Operationalization of Article 2.1(c) and Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement,

b. Ex-ante and ex-post reporting of financing respectively under Article 9.5 and 9.7 of the Paris Agreement,

c. Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and its 2nd Review, and,

d. Guidance on the funds established under the financial mechanism of the Convention, especially on the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 11).

Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement established a systematic objective of aligning finance flows with low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways. In contrast, Article 9.1 sets out a specific obligation- that developed country Parties "shall" provide financial resources to developing country Parties, in continuation of their commitments under the Convention and consistent with the CBDR–RC. (UNFCCC, 2015b).

Tensions arise from differing interpretations of these provisions. Many developed countries emphasize the broader scope of Article 9, including Article 9.3 on mobilizing finance from a variety of sources. Developing country Parties argue that Article 2.1(c) cannot substitute for the legally grounded public finance obligations under Article 9.1.

To address these differences, COP 27/CMA 4 in 2022 established a dedicated dialogue to enhance understanding of the scope of, and relationship between, Articles 2.1(c) and 9.1 (UNFCCC, 2022). COP 28/CMA 5 in 2023 subsequently extended this dialogue with the intention of concluding discussions at CMA 7/COP 30 (UNFCCC, 2023b).

Fairness and transparency of climate finance reporting have been a key concern. Articles 9.5 and 9.7 require developed countries to provide biennial communications on projected (ex-ante) and delivered (ex-post) finance respectively (UNFCCC, 2015b). Although three rounds of communication have been submitted, concerns persist regarding comparability, disaggregation and methodological consistency.

COP 30 also considered implementation pathways for NCQG, which sets a floor of USD 300 billion annually, alongside broader efforts to scale up to USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2024a).

The COP 30 Mutirão decision referred to the "Baku-to-Belém Roadmap" as a pathway towards achieving the USD 1.3 trillion ambition (UNFCCC, 2025d). The Presidencies of COP 29 and COP 30 issued a joint roadmap outlining potential mechanisms for scaling finance, complemented by recommendations from the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, including reform of multilateral development banks and enhanced mobilization of private capital.

A long-standing structural imbalance in climate finance allocation, with adaptation receiving a significantly lower share than mitigation, continued to shape negotiations. While political momentum has grown around scaling adaptation finance, disagreement persists over baseline years, accounting rules, and time horizons. Vulnerable countries have called for near-term scaling by 2030, while several developed Parties argued for a longer, phased target (to 2035) and resisted binding short-term numeric obligations.

Debate also continued over the public vs private finance, the share of grants versus loans, additionality relative to the official development assistance (ODA), and the methodologies for tracking and verifying adaptation finance while avoiding double counting.

In this context, finance negotiations at COP 30 were not only about numbers, but about legal interpretation, equity, transparency, and the credibility of delivery mechanisms within the Paris Agreement framework.

Debate on finance at COP 30 was anchored in differing interpretations of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The central question was whether the term "shall" constitutes a legally binding obligation on developed country Parties to provide climate finance, and how this obligation should be interpreted in light of the Convention's principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR–RC) (UNFCCC, 1992).

Developing country groups, including the LMDCs, the Arab Group and the African Group — expressed concern that emerging interpretations of Article 9.1 risk diluting its legal character. They argued that an over-emphasis on Article 2.1(c) should not undermine the clear obligation under Article 9.1 to provide public financial resources. In this context, they called for a dedicated work programme to clarify the scope, mandate and legal implications of

The consistently rising debt burden in climate-vulnerable developing economies is shrinking their fiscal space and constraining both development and urgent climate action. Bangladesh's climate negotiations must press for alignment of GGA and MWP with Article 9 financing and ensuring transparent ex-ante and ex-post biennial communications of climate finance. We must work together to advance just transition through BAM with concessional capital and technology support from Annex-II countries, prevent Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs) like the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) from becoming green protectionism, and strengthen participatory, transparent, and knowledge-driven climate negotiation processes.

Shah Abdul Saadi, PhD
Deputy Secretary, Economic Relations Division (ERD), Ministry of Finance

Article 9.1 under both the Paris Agreement and the Convention, including its relationship with Article 3.5 of the Convention on maintaining a supportive and non-discriminatory international economic system (UNFCCC, 1992).

The G-77+ China cautioned that implementation of Article 2.1(c) must remain complementary to, and not a substitute for, commitments under Article 9. They stressed that aligning global finance flows should not result in prescriptive measures, unilateral trade-related actions, or additional burdens on developing countries.

Transparency and quality of finance reporting emerged as another major fault line. Under Articles 9.5 and 9.7, developed country Parties are required to submit biennial communications on projected (ex-ante) and delivered (ex-post) finance. Developing country groups, including G-77+ China, AOSIS, Africa Group, LDC Group, Arab Group called for a robust methodology and system for both ex-ante and ex-post reporting of finances. Proposals included updating the information types required in biennial communications, providing disaggregated data on adaptation and loss and damage finance, clarifying timelines and recipient information, improving accounting methodologies, and exploring burden-sharing arrangements among developed countries. The African Group further proposed subjecting biennial communications to a technical expert review under the Enhanced Transparency Framework to improve consistency.

These proposals and arguments, however, were opposed by the developed country groups, who warned of inclusion of any language that would undermine national sovereignty, such as references to internal budget processes (ENB, 2025). They characterized biennial communications as primarily transparency-enhancing tools rather than compliance instruments and encouraged broader voluntary reporting by all Parties providing finance.

The NCQG debate also featured prominently. Referring to the COP 29's NCQG decision and the Presidencies' Roadmap, the developing country Parties led by the G77+ China remarked that USD 300 billion is insufficient to address developing countries' needs and urged for the scaling up of NCQG to USD 1.3 trillion and its timely delivery (UNFCCC, 2024a).

Guidance to the operating entities of Financial Mechanism generated further divergence. The discussion covered: a) the outline and focus of the SCF's 7th Biennial Assessment and Second Review of its Functions, b) Replenishing GEF (GEF-9), c) Composition of Adaptation Fund Board and its resourcing, d) Resourcing of, and accessing the Green Climate Fund, e) Accessing the FRLD.

On the Adaptation Fund, disagreement emerged over terminology for Board composition — whether to retain references to "Annex I and non-Annex I Parties" or shift to "developed and developing country Parties" in line with Paris Agreement language. The Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol with a provision of being resourced primarily with 2 percent levy on the transaction of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued under the CDM projects. The Paris Agreement that succeeded to an inclusive agreement for all Parties incorporated the entire KP modalities with a decision that the Fund will "exclusively serve" the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2018c) with the provision of resourcing with 5 percent of the issued credits traded under Article 6.4 of the Agreement.

However, Parties discussed the annual report (2024-2025) of Adaptation Fund and composition of Adaptation Fund Board (AFB).

Parties could not agree on whether to include references to Annex 1 and Non-Annex countries or developed of developing parties. They also couldn't agree on if this should be sent to the Presidency for resolution or should be forwarded to the next SB session.

Divergence in views surfaced in terms of mobilizing USD 300 million target agreed in COP 29 /CMA6 2024 (UNFCCC, 2024a, Decision 13/CMA.6). Developed Parties called for exploring innovative financial instruments, which was denied by developing Parties.

The SCF's expanded role in monitoring the NCQG was welcomed by several developing country groups, who proposed integrating an ex-post assessment of NCQG delivery and progress on adaptation finance scaling within the 7th Biennial Assessment. Developed countries argued that such tracking elements were already addressed under the NCQG decision and resisted additional mandates.

On the Green Climate Fund, calls were made to enhance direct access and reduce approval timelines. While developed countries resisted language explicitly calling for increased contributions from developed Parties, they supported stronger reference to access modalities for Indigenous Peoples and vulnerable communities.

On the ninth replenishment of GCF (GEF-9), developed countries proposed inviting "countries in a position to do so" to contribute. Developing country groups opposed this language, viewing it as an attempt to expand the donor base beyond Annex

II country's obligations. They also rejected references to innovative financing instruments, emphasizing that the GEF should remain anchored in scaled-up public funding.

On the FRLD, Parties appreciated operational progress, particularly the launch of funding requests under the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM). The Arab Group, however, criticized the eligibility criteria for accessing the FRLD that reads 'developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change' noting that the COP 28 decision [Decision 1/CP.28, paragraph 20(e)] on the operationalization of FRLD allows all developing countries to directly access resources from the Fund.

Finally, the LDC group supported by small-island states (AOSIS), the African group, proposed to triple adaptation finance to USD 120bn by 2030. The EU and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), opposed including such language, arguing that it would reopen the NCQG settlement. Ultimately, parties agreed to continue discussing the issue untill 2028 under "Veredas Dialogue" established at COP 30, succeeding the Sharm el Sheikh Dialogue.

KEY OUTCOMES

- The Mutirão text reaffirms the NCQG, takes note of the Baku to Belem Roadmap towards 1.3 trillion, and decides to urgently advance actions to scale up climate financing towards USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035, while emphasizing implementing the USD300 billion goal (UNFCCC, 2025d).
- It decides to convene a high-level ministerial round table to reflect on the implementation of the NCQG, including the quantitative and qualitative elements related to the provision of finance (UNFCCC, 2025b).
- On Article 9.1 of Paris Agreement, COP establishes a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1, in the context of Article 9 (UNFCCC, 2025b, UNFCCC, 2015b).
- With regard to adaptation finance, the COP30 calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, and urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties (UNFCCC, 2025b, para. 53).
- Building on the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue (UNFCCC, 2022), COP 30 established a process called Veredas Dialogue on 2.1(c) with a view to establishing its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. UNFCCC, 2025d).
- It further decides that the Veredas Dialogue will be organized in an open, transparent and inclusive manner, be open to all Parties, and engage all actors, including governments and financial and non-financial sector actors; at least one meeting per year under the Dialogue will be held in conjunction with the first regular sessions of the subsidiary bodies of the year (UNFCCC, 2025b).
- The decision recalls the NCQG commitment to pursue efforts to at least triple annual outflows from the operating entities of the UNFCCC's Financial Mechanism from the 2022 level by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2024a).

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

Although widely expected, the "Roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion" received limited attention at COP 30. Mutirão decision merely "takes note" of the roadmap and "decides" to "urgently advance actions" to scale up finance to USD 1.3 trillion by 2035, without establishing concrete delivery mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2025d). (UNFCCC, 2025d).

The two-year work program on climate finance could create a platform for political follow-up on the Baku to Belém Roadmap, particularly on public finance.

However, the decision texts come with a footnote reading "Without prejudging the process for the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance", which narrows the space for developing countries to push for the provision of public finance from developed countries to meet the core USD 300 billion goal through the work program (UNFCCC, 2024a).

Similarly, the decision to consider Article 9.1 within the broader context of Article 9 could dilute the clarity of developed countries' obligation to provide public finance. Article 9.3's reference to mobilizing from a variety of sources could shift emphasis toward private or leveraged finance. This raises concern emong many developing countries that the legally grounded obligation under Article 9.1 may be softened in practice (UNFCCC, 2015b).

While the decision emphasizes the urgent need for public, grant-based and concessional finance, particularly for adaptation in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2025b), however, it does not establish monitoring triggers, burden-sharing arrangements, or enforcement mechanisms.

Yet most politically significant outcome at COP 30 is the call to triple adaptation finance by 2035. While symbolically important, the decision leaves critical elements undefined, including the baseline year, accounting methodology, composition of finance (public grants vs private finance flows) and safeguards for additionality. Without clarity on these parameters, scaled figures may reflect reclassified or leveraged flows rather than new and predictable public finance. Moreover, the decision to achieve the target to 2035, rather than 2030 as advocated by vulnerable countries, weakens the immediacy of the response to escalating adaptation needs.

Finally, although the decision recalls the commitment to triple annual outflows from the operating Financial Mechanism by 2030, it does not establish a clear pathway, interim benchmarks, or compliance review process.

Overall, COP 30 reaffirmed finance commitments and expanded dialogue process. However it did not materially strengthen delivery guarantees for predictable and equitable climate finance delivery within the Paris Agreement framework.

JUST ENERGY TRANSITION

AGENDA BACKGROUND AND FOCUS AT COP 30

Key Issues	What is it about?	Issues at COP 30
Paris Agreement (Preamble)	The PA required Parties to 'Take into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities' (UNFCCC, 2015b).	How to translate the preambular recognition of just transition into operational and institutional arrangements under the Paris framework.
United Arab Emirates' Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP)	Parties at CMA.4/ COP 27 in 2022 established a work programme on just transition pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2022a, Decision 1/CMA.4).	Whether to conclude the JTWP in 2026 as scheduled or replace it with a more permanent institutional mechanism.
JTWP Dialogues and Ministerial Roundtables	CMA 4/ COP 27 mandated the SBs for conducting annual high-level ministerial roundtables and technical dialogues, producing dialogue reports to inform CMA deliberations (UNFCCC, 2022a, Decision 1/CMA.4).	Institutional arrangements to support just transition beyond dialogue-based exchanges; Incorporating and operationalizing key messages from the dialogue reports into concrete implementation pathways.

CONTEXT

Building on the Paris Agreement's preambular recognition of the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce (UNFCCC, 2015b, Preamble), Parties at CMA 4/ COP 27 in 2022 established a dedicated work programme on just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2022a, Decision 1/CMA.4, para. 52). The mandate placed just transition within the framework of Article 2.1 mitigation, adaptation and finance in the context of equity and sustainable development under Article 2.2. (UNFCCC, 2015b).

The CMA 4/ COP 27 requested the SBs (SBI and SBSTA) to finalize the modalities of the Work Programme, organize dialogues and convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on just transition (UNFCCC, 2022, Decision 1/CMA.4, para. 53). The SBs were also mandated to implement the WP through a joint contact group to be convened at each of their sessions, starting at their 60th sessions in June 2024 (UNFCCC, 2022a, Decision 3/CMA.5, paras. 2–4).

Decision 1/CMA.4 (COP 24, 2018) underscored that just and equitable transitions encompass multiple dimensions. It includes energy systems, socioeconomic structures, workforce and social protection. It must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include measures to mitigate adverse social and economic impacts associated with the transition (UNFCCC, 2022a, Decision 1/CMA.4, para. 51). Similar considerations have also been emphasized the impact of the implementation of response measures, which highlighted the importance of economic diversification and workforce transition when implementing climate policies (UNFCCC, 2025h). The SBs have so far organized four dialogues in 2024 and 2025,

1. Just Transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement through NDCs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDs),
2. Ensuring support for people-centered and equitable just transition pathways with a focus on a whole-of-society approach and the workforce,
3. Enhancing adaptation and climate resilience in the context of just transitions,
4. Just energy transition pathways and holistic approaches to just transitions including socioeconomic, workforce, social protection and other dimensions, based on nationally defined development priorities.

These dialogues contributed to a shared conceptual understanding of just transition, but significant divergence remained on how to operationalize the outcomes.

At COP 29 in 2024, the developing country Parties led by G77 and China urged for a formal new institutional structure for the Work Programme, however, couldn't make progress. Developed and developing country Parties were in divergent views at least on three issues e.g. institutional arrangements of JTWP; ways to contextualize the dialogue outcomes; and Unilateral Trade Restrictive Measures (UTMs).

Negotiation at COP 30 opened with those unresolved issues and bracket-heavy text forwarded by SBI 62 in June 2025. By the time Parties arrived in Belém, two competing visions had emerged. At the center of the debate was a fundamental question: Is just transition primarily a social transformation agenda, or a mitigation agenda framed in social terms?

COP 30 generated substantial political hype around the establishment of the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), presenting it as a hard-won procedural achievement in institutionalizing and governing Just Transition under the Paris Agreement and the Convention. However, several critical elements remained unresolved, particularly the question of fossil fuel phase-out and the provision of finance and other means of implementation, both of which faced strong resistance from developed countries. Without a clear signal on fossil fuel phase-out and an operational link to mitigation ambition and finance obligations, BAM risks becoming yet another paper tiger in the COP negotiations.

Lidy Nacpil
Coordinator
Asian Peoples' Movement on Debt and Development

DEBATE AT COP 30/CMA 7

As the negotiation unfolded in Belém, all the unresolved tension from the previous sessions resurfaced immediately. The tone of the early discussion was shaped by the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) Dialogue Reports. The reports summarized a year of discussion, highlighting opportunities, barriers and good practices. But they deliberately avoided politically sensitive questions. There was no reference to finance obligations, no mention of fossil fuel phase-out and no clear direction on supply-side transition. This omission quickly became the center of political debate.

Developed countries and fossil fuel producers relied on the Dialogue Reports to argue that finance and fossil fuel phase-out did not belong under the just transition agenda. In contrast, African countries and labour groups used the references in the reports to push for recognition of critical minerals and workers' rights to widen the agenda (UNFCCC, 2022a, Decision 1/CMA.4, para. 51). In practice, many Parties leaned on the same reports, but selectively and strategically.

Unilateral Trade Restrictive Measures (UTMs) also emerged as a major point of tension. Several developing countries insisted that trade measures affecting climate transitions should be addressed under the just transition agenda. Others strongly resisted. No agreement was reached, and the issue was ultimately shifted to the Mutirão decision, reflecting how politically sensitive it remained within the just transition space (UNFCCC, 2025d).

Means of Implementation became another fault line. Developing countries pushed for stronger language on finance, institutional mechanisms and predictable support, including clear references to Article 9.1. Developed countries argued that finance discussions are already taking place in other agenda items and should not be duplicated. The LMDCs insisted that support for just transition must be anchored in Article 9.1 and resisted attempts to separate transition pathways from finance obligation.

At the same time, EU and AOSIS asked for establishing a direct link between just transition and the 1.5°C goal. LMDC and the Arab Group pushed back, demanding the exact referencing to the Paris Agreement, which is 'holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.'

Language on fossil fuel phase-out met even greater resistance. AOSIS, Colombia, and several Latin American allies pushed for language on "fossil fuel phase-out" or at least "transitioning away from fossil fuels" (UNFCCC, 2023b, Decision 1/CMA.5, para. 28(d)). Fossil fuel producers opposed every formulation. Even references to transition as socio-economic opportunities were contested upon.

Debates on labour and human rights language also triggered resistance. Several Parties argued that these concepts lacked "uniform UN definitions." Institutional ambiguity was strategically used for avoiding stronger commitments on workers' protection and community rights.

By the end of the first week, the G-77+ China proposed for establishing the "Belém Action Mechanism" as the successor of JTWP, which is due to end in 2026. The EU countered with a lighter "just transition action plan" arguing that creating a new mechanism would duplicate existing work.

G77/China position of establishing below action mechanism gradually gained momentum. They were backed by a united developing country front, a supportive Presidency, and vocal civil society pressure. This institutional question became the entry point for ministerial meeting.

Ministers found a text filled with red lines. Finance, fossil fuels, rights, trade, and even the temperature goal language remained unresolved. Nothing had come closer to agreement. Negotiations remained deadlocked until Parties quietly agreed to remove the most politically sensitive elements, including references to finance obligations, fossil fuels and trade measures.

The compromise text adopted a new institutional mechanism without attaching binding commitments.

KEY OUTCOMES

COP 30 adopted the decision of establishing the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) as the successor to the Just Transition Work Programme (UNFCCC, 2025h). The decision includes several core elements:

- Establishes a Just Transition Mechanism to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing, for an equitable, inclusive just transitions. The decision clarifies that the mechanism is to be implemented in a manner that builds on and complements relevant workstreams under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including the JTWP (UNFCCC, 2025h, Decision 2/CMA.7, para. 25).
- Requests SB 64 in June 2026 to recommend a draft decision on the process for its operationalization for consideration by CMA 8/ COP 31 in 2026 (UNFCCC, 2025h, Decision 2/ CMA.7, para. 25);
- Emphasizes the connection between 1.5°C and just transition, underscoring the inherent link between pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C and advancing transition pathways (UNFCCC, 2025h, Decision 2/CMA.7, para. 1);
- Affirms that the JTWP is not policy-prescriptive and encourages a holistic and integrated approach that reflect diverse national circumstances and capacities (UNFCCC, 2025h Decision 2/CMA.7, para. 5);

- Invites the JTWP to integrate the outcomes of GST-1 relevant to just transition in line with the invitation in paragraph 186 of decision 1/CMA.5 (UNFCCC, 2023b, para. 186);
- Recalls that scaling up new and additional grant-based, highly concessional finance and non-debt instruments remains critical to supporting developing countries, particularly enabling their transition in a just and equitable manner (UNFCCC, 2025h, para. 22);
- Stresses the centrality of Means of Implementation (MoI), including capacity-building, climate finance, and technology development and transfer, as well as enhanced international cooperation, are essential to facilitating the pursuit of just transition pathways that promote sustainable development and poverty eradication in developing countries, while noting that high debt burdens and limited fiscal space may hinder such efforts (Decision 2/CMA.7, para. 21-22, UNFCCC, 2025h);

The Belém Action Mechanism is a meaningful institutional step. It anchors just transition within the Paris Agreement, strengthens recognition of workers and Indigenous Peoples, and ensures socio-economic transformation remain central to climate governance (UNFCCC, 2025b).

However, while structurally it is an upgrade from the previous work, the mechanism remains substantively limited. It contains no dedicated finance window, no reference to Article 9.1, no obligations, no mention of fossil language. In effect BAM offers a space for cooperation but not the means for implementation. It gives Parties a place to talk, but not the tools to act.

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

With the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) Parties now have a permanent standing institutional arrangement on just transition embeded within the Paris Agreement architecture.

Politically, one of the clearest gains is the stronger recognition of workers and Indigenous Peoples. After years of advocacy, the decision explicitly references Indigenous Peoples' rights and calls for meaningful participation of workers, local communities and affected stakeholders. It signals that climate transition is not only about energy systems, but also about people, livelihoods and social protection.

Despite the progress, the financial dimension had collapsed in the final hours. The mechanism does not establish dedicated finance window, no reference to Article 9.1, and no new obligations for public climate finance. Language on MoI, which was one of the most politically charged elements, was softened or removed entirely. Developed countries and fossil fuel exporters continue to arguing that finance belongs elsewhere. For developing countries, the absence of finance is a structural risk. As a just transition without finance can quickly become a transition for some and not for others (UNFCCC, 2025h).

Equally striking is the complete disappearance of fossil fuel language from the final text. There is no reference to fossil fuel phase-out, no mention of supply-side transition, and no operational linkage to mitigation ambition (UNFCCC, 2023b, para. 28(d)) While Brazil signaled externally that it would pursue national roadmaps on deforestation and fossil fuel transition in other forums, including the G20, the Belém Action Mechanism itself offers no clear pathway for transitioning away from fossil fuels.

In short, BAM strengthens institutional footing and social language of just transition, but avoids the hardest political questions. It establishes a structure for cooperation, yet leaves unresolved two key issues that ultimately determine whether just transition can be credible: finance and fossil fuel phase-out.

GENDER

AGENDA BACKGROUND AND FOCUS AT COP 30

Key Issues	What is it about?	Focus at COP 30
Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG)	Established at COP 20 in 2014 to advance gender balance and integrate gender considerations into implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2014a, Decision 18/CP.20).	Strengthening implementation of the LWPG and ensuring that gender balance and gender responsiveness move beyond participation to measurable outcomes.
Paris Agreement Decision 1/CP.21	Calls on Parties, when taking climate action, to respect, promote and consider human rights obligations, including gender equality, the empowerment of women and intergenerational equity, alongside the rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations (UNFCCC, 2015a, Decision 1/CP.21).	Translating rights-based and gender-equality commitments in the Paris decision into operational guidance of national climate policies, finance and reporting frameworks.
Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG); 2020-2024	Adopted at COP 25 in 2019 with a Gender Action Plan (GAP) focused on capacity-building, women's participation in negotiations, and gender-responsive climate action at national and international levels (UNFCCC, 2019b, Decision 3/CP.25).	Reviewing implementation gaps and deciding the future structure and ambition of the Gender Action Plan beyond 2024.
Extended LWPG and Gender Action Plan	COP 29 in 2024 extended the LWPG for ten years (2025–2035) and mandated development of a new Gender Action Plan for adoption at COP 30 (UNFCCC, 2024b, Decision 7/CP.29).	Adoption of the Belém Gender Action Plan (2026–2034), resolving bracketed issues on terminology, participation, data systems and resource mobilization for implementation.

CONTEXT

Gender integration within the UNFCCC process has evolved gradually but steadily over the past decade and a half. The Cancun Adaptation Framework adopted at COP 16 in 2010 marked the first formal recognition that climate adaptation measures should be gender-sensitive, participatory, and transparent, and should integrate both scientific evidence and traditional knowledge (UNFCCC, 2010, Decision 1/CP.16).

Since then, many of the COP decisions, influenced by the UNFCCC Women and Gender Constituency, have progressively strengthened the gender agenda. These decisions have sought to ensure that climate policies address differentiated impacts on women and men, enhance women's participation in climate governance, and promote gender-responsive planning and finance. The key decisions include:

- COP 18 in 2012 remarked the under-participation of women in the COP negotiations. It also emphasized ensuring more effective climate change policy that addresses the needs of women and men equally (UNFCCC, 2012, Decision 23/CP.18).
- COP 20 in 2014 established the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) with a mandate for developing a Gender Action Plan (GAP), which was adopted at COP 23 in 2017 (UNFCCC, 2014a, Decision 18/CP.20), outlining five priority areas to enhance gender responsiveness in global as well as national plans and policies.
- COP 21 in 2015 adopted the Paris Agreement through Decision 1/CP.21, which recognizes in its preamble the importance of gender equality and the empowerment of women. Article 7.5 of the Paris Agreement further affirms that adaptation action should be country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory, and fully transparent (UNFCCC, 2015b).
- COP 24 in 2018 reviewed implementation of the LWPG and its GAP for identifying areas for strengthening and implementation (UNFCCC, 2018d).
- COP 25 in 2019 adopted the Enhanced Lima Work Programme and its GAP reinforcing the integration of gender perspectives across UNFCCC processes, promoting gender balance in delegations, strengthening women's leadership,

and encouraging gender-responsive climate finance (UNFCCC, 2019b, Decision 3/CP.25).

- COP 27 in 2022 reaffirmed the importance of gender-responsive climate action and the continued implementation of the LWPG and its GAP (UNFCCC, 2022b, Decision 24/CP.27).
- COP 29 in 2024 extended the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender for a further ten years (2025–2035) creating the mandate to develop a new Gender Action Plan for adoption at COP 30 (UNFCCC, 2024b, Decision 7/CP.29).

COP 29 tasked the 62 SBI session in June 2025 to develop a new GAP for adoption at COP 30. (UNFCCC, 2024b). Negotiations at SBI 62 produced a draft containing numerous bracketed provisions, reflecting disagreements over terminology, timelines, coherence across UN frameworks, and most notably, resource mobilization for implementing the GAP.

In practice, gender negotiations under the UNFCCC have rarely been neutral or technical. Questions of participation, rights, finance and accountability often sit just beneath the surface. By the time Parties arrived in Belém, the new Gender Action Plan was formally on the agenda, but politically unresolved.

DEBATE AT COP 30/CMA 7

When negotiators arrived in Belém, the Gender Action Plan draft was already heavily bracketed. SBI 62 had formally initiated the process but left many of the politically sensitive questions unresolved. COP 30 therefore inherited a text that reflected disagreement more than convergence. Inside the rooms another irony hung heavy in the air: decisions on gender equality were being negotiated in rooms where women remained underrepresented. Three core issues dominated the debate:

a. Ensuring gender balanced representation in the UNFCCC constituencies, meetings and conferences,

b. Addressing gender exclusiveness and ensuring meaningful participation of women, and,

c. Mobilizing resources for GAP development and implementation.

Developed country group supported the language on "full, equal, and meaningful" participation of women. The Arab Group objected to the term 'equal', arguing that delegation composition is a matter of national sovereignty. To be fair, delegation sizes also depend on the availability of resources and expertise.

Questions of terminology became unexpectedly contentious. Discussions around how to reference African women revealed political sensitivities about identity and recognition. What appeared to be minor word choices carried symbolic weight for several delegations. Similar tensions surfaced around references to Indigenous women, women with disabilities and youth. Some Parties supported broad, intersectional language acknowledging multiple layers of vulnerability. Others preferred narrower formulations, expressing concern about expanding categories beyond agreed UN terminology.

Intersectionality itself became a dividing line. For some Parties, it was essential to recognize overlapping forms of discrimination. For others, the concept lacked agreed definitions within the UNFCCC context and was therefore resisted.

Procedural concerns also surfaced. Russia expressed dissatisfaction that the SBI summary did not fully capture all views. Several Parties noted that time

Although the adoption of the Belém Gender Action Plan (GAP) for 2026-2034 is a welcome development, it does not adequately respond to the needs and circumstances of the LDCs and other climate-vulnerable countries. The accompanying decision, by failing to provide finance and other means of implementation, has literally shifted the burden of GAP implementation onto Parties without equipping them to deliver. Gender-responsive climate action cannot succeed under an unfunded framework. Without dedicated finance, robust data systems, and meaningful participation, the most vulnerable will continue to be excluded, and the commitments risk becoming ambition without implementation.

Nuzhat Jabin
Partnership and Strategy Lead
Asia Multi Country Cluster (MCC)
Christian Aid

constraints limited substantive engagement. The EU rejected claims of backsliding on previously agreed language and maintained that established gender commitments were being preserved.

In Belem throughout the two weeks, convergence remained difficult. Gender language is often treated as technical, but in practice it touches on sovereignty, representation, identity and resource allocation. These tensions remained close to the surface, making agreement on the new Gender Action Plan more politically complex than the mandate initially suggested.

KEY OUTCOMES

After intensive late-night bilateral and 'informal-informals', the ministerial negotiations reached an agreement by adopting the Belém Gender Action Plan for 2026–2034 (Decision 7/CP.30, FCCC/CP/2025/L.16) that preserved an operational mandate for gender-responsive climate action under the UNFCCC. The key decisions include;

- Adopts the Belém Gender Action Plan (2026–2034) structures around five priority areas; a) capacity-building, knowledge management and communication, b) gender balance participation and women's leadership, c) coherence, d) gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation; e) monitoring and reporting (UNFCCC, 2025a, FCCC/CP/2025/L.16).
- Decides a review of the implementation of the Belém GAP for 2026–2034 in conjunction with the review of the implementation of the enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender. The SBI is mandated to initiate review at its 70th session (June 2029) and conclude at 71st session (November 2029) for its adoption at COP 34 (November 2029);
- Recognizes that the Belém GAP may inform Parties as a tool for implementing climate action, and that pathways and approaches should be nationally determined;
- Takes note of the gender policies of relevant public and private entities that are providing finance for climate action and invites those entities to consider the Belém GAP and support its implementation;
- Invites Parties, United Nations entities, UNFCCC constituted bodies, implementing entities, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other relevant stakeholders to enhance implementation of the Belém GAP.

A notable development is the explicit recognition of groups that have historically been marginalized in climate texts. The final GAP includes : Indigenous women, women and girls with disabilities, women and girls of African descent, migrant women, women smallholder farmers, rural and remote women, youth and girls, and other groups experiencing multidimensional vulnerabilities. For once, structurally excluded groups were not just footnotes; they are named, spelled out, and acknowledged in ways previous COP texts avoided (UNFCCC, 2025a).

Parties also agreed to strengthen the gender evidence base by committing to:

- Expand sex- and age-disaggregated data collection,
- Conduct national gender analyses across climate sectors,
- Develop and apply country-driven indicators, and
- Integrate gender data into NDCs, NAPs, the Global Goal on Adaptation, and transparency reports.

This marks a shift toward making gender considerations measurable and embedded within core climate instruments. However, the decision offers no accompanying resources to help countries, especially LDCs, to collect any of this data, or build the system or the capacity to generate this data.

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

The Belém GAP is clearly a step forward. It updates and expands the gender mandate for the next eight years and broadens the scope of gender considerations to reflect lived reality more honestly. But the final text also reflects a negotiation process that remained cautious in its commitments, and sacrificed ambition to secure agreements. Several limitations stand out.

- Intersectionality is acknowledged but not operationalized.
- Data systems are required but not resourced.
- Participation is encouraged but not guaranteed.
- Finance is applauded but not delivered.
- Implementation is nationally determined, wrapped in the diplomatic safety blanket: "subject to availability of financial resources."

Finance is where the GAP text thins out. Despite strong demands from developing countries for predictable and scaled-up financing support, the final decision includes no dedicated gender finance window, no binding commitments, and no links to NCQG, GEF or GCF guidance. There is no operational roadmap for mobilizing gender-responsive climate finance.

Instead, the text relies heavily on the softest verbs in the UNFCCC dictionary, such as "encourages" and "invites." In practical terms, that makes implementation largely voluntary. The success of the new GAP will depend on national will, domestic budget priorities, and fragmented donor initiatives. COP 30 delivered a framework, while also diverting the global responsibility and burden to the national governments. Now the responsibility and the burden shift to Parties. Whether the Belém GAP becomes a transformative tool or remains a well-crafted statement of intent will depend on how seriously governments choose to implement.

EMERGING ISSUE

CLIMATE-RELATED TRADE MEASURES

CONTEXT

Climate-related trade measures have not traditionally featured as a standalone agenda item under the COP process. However, their legal grounding can be traced to Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC, which states:

'….Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade."

The issue has received a significant level of attention at recent climate conferences, under the agenda of "Matters relating to the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures under the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement. Debates revolved around whether the Forum and its Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) have centered on the economic and social consequences of climate policies, especially their cross-border impacts (UNFCCC, 2018a, Decision 7/CP.24; UNFCCC, 2018b, Decision 7/CMA.1).

Developing countries have consistently argued that Unilateral Trade Restrictive Measures (UTMs), including carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM) and other climate-linked trade instruments adopted by developed economies, can impose significant treade-related compliance burdens on developing countries. These measures may affect export competitiveness, fiscal space, employment and industrial development pathways.

At SB 62 in June 2025, UTMs once again became a critical issue of debate. The issue was framed in three interrelated ways:

- As a potential barrier to implementing the GST-1 outcome (i.e., they could redirect finance flows away from the developing countries);
- As a just transition concern i.e., (they may cause serious negative impact to the labor market and labor rights),
- As a priority area for the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures under the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement.

Developing country groups, like G77+China, the LMDC and the African Group favored focused discussion on UTMs, while developed country groups remained reluctant to discuss this. The divergence at SB 62 prevented resolution and resulted the issue being carried forward to SB 63 at COP 30, where it intersected with broader negotiations on just transition, GST follow-up and response measures.

DEBATES AT COP 30/CMA 7

Unilateral Trade Restrictive Measures (UTMs), particularly those introduced in the name of climate ambition and just energy transition, became one of the most politically sensitive issues at COP 30. What had previously been a technical discussion under response measures quickly turned into a broader equity debate.

In the opening plenary, the LMDC slammed UTMs, describing them instruments of protectionism that contradict the Convention's equity principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) and undermine trust in multilateral cooperation. They referred to the Convention that emphasized that climate ambition should not be pursued through trade barriers that disproportionately affect developing economies (UNFCCC, 1992).

Developed countries, particularly the EU and UK, tried to promote UTMs as a potential mechanism to prevent carbon leakage and maintain environmental integrity. From their perspective, without such measures, domestic decarbonization efforts could be challenged by weaker climate policies and action.

Developing countries strongly opposed that narrative. They argued that imposing additional tariffs on industrial goods with higher carbon footprints might serve bilateral trade more than the genuine emission reduction benefit. The concern was not only theoretical but practical.

For instance, if the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a likely form of UTM, becomes fully effective from January 2026 and imposes additional tariffs on Bangladeshi ready-made garments (RMGs), the consequences could be significant. Many small and medium scale RMG industries will fail to transition to the low-carbon production system due to capacity and investment gaps and ultimately will collapse. At the same time, green certified technologically advanced RMGs will lose their comparative advantage (for being an LDC) and will be forced to compete with other RMG exporting developing countries that have in-built capacity and resources for transitioning to low-carbon production systems. Increased production costs may ultimately translate into reduced competitiveness and potential job losses.

Beyond sectoral impacts, there is also a concern about applying UTMs through a narrow interpretation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, which calls for making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

Some developing countries warned against a narrow interpretation of Article 2.1(c) that could justify financial or trade conditionalities. They argue that such interpretation would clearly violate Article 3.5 of the Convention, which states that "measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade."

Because of these worrying concerns, developing country groups, including the G77+ China, LMDCs, African and Arab group, demanded a common interpretation of Article 2.1(c). They also emphasized that Article 2.1(c) should respect countries' fiscal, monetary and policy sovereignty in planning and implementing low-carbon and climate-resilient development pathways.

Several country Parties proposed a dedicated dialogue on UTMs for a detailed understanding of their design and implications, and for assessing their impacts on NDC implementation. The EU called for further work on Article 2.1(c), and Parties also suggested a process of inviting voluntary submissions from Parties and non-party stakeholders on the implementation of Article 2.1(c).

KEY OUTCOMES

COP 30 marks an important shift in acknowledging that trade policies and climate actions are deeply interconnected. This reflects the degree to which climate action is increasingly seen as integral to broader economic transformation, and how economic systems can either act as barriers or catalysts to the pace, scale and distributional impacts of the transition.

The Mutirão decision reaffirms Article 3.5 of the Convention, stating that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing countries. It also reiterates that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restrictions on international trade. In operational terms, the decision:

- Requests SB 64 in June 2026, SB 66 in November 2026 and SB 68 in November 2027 to examine opportunities, challenges and barriers related to trade and climate cooperation, with the participation of Parties and relevant stakeholders, including the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD and the World Trade Organization.

- Decides to convene a high-level event in 2028 to exchange experiences and views on trade-related climate measures.
- Requests the Subsidiary Bodies to prepare a report summarizing the discussions and findings from that high-level exchange.

In parallel, the response measures adopted at COP 30 establishes annual two-day global dialogues (during 2026–2029) to examine the broader impacts of response measures, continuing the work programme agreed at COP 29 on cross-border impacts. However, explicit references to UTMs that appeared in earlier drafts were removed from the final text.

CONCERNS AND CRITIQUES

The mandate given to the SBs to continue discussions on trade-related climate measures, along with the decision to convene a high-level event, is a constructive procedural step. The SB diologues in 2026, 2027 create a structured process with embedded participation of trade institutions (WTO, UNCTAD, ITC). This is an important recognition that trade policy is now central to climate action. This will provide a political space for countries to discuss their concerns and challenges, as well as possible solutions for the way forward, while also giving an opportunity to discuss more trade-related issues having implications for climate change outcomes.

However, the SB dialogues have no explicit mandate to develop standards, recommend remedial action or restrict unilateral measures; they are framed as a scope to "consider" opportunities and barriers and to "exchange views". There is no authority to develop standards, recommend corrective action or assess the legality or fairness of unilateral measures. While discussions proceed within the UNFCCC, mechanisms such as the EU's CBAM are moving ahead according to their own timelines (European Union, 2023). At the same time, WTO deliberations on climate-related trade measures remain slow and politically complex (WTO, 1994).

The Mutirão text simply restates Article 3.5 of the Convention without interpreting what counts as "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or a "disguised restriction on international trade." It does not establish criteria, benchmarks or procedures for assessing whether specific measures (like CBAM) comply with there (UNFCCC, 2025d).

The final decision on the Just Transition Work Programme and "technology implementation programme" removed all references to trade and "trade barriers". This leaves UTMs largely siloed into non-binding dialogues, rather than embedded across relevant regimes (just transition, technology, finance). This may create debates while negotiating these in future sessions, making it difficult to reach substantive decisions, as the trade measures are highly integral to both agendas.

ON THE SIDELINES

BELÉM HEALTH ACTION PLAN (BHAP)

The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Government of Brazil, under the COP 30 Presidency, jointly launched the Belém Health Action Plan (BHAP) on Health Day, 13 November 2025 (WHO, 2025). It urges nations to build climate-resilient, low-carbon, and equitable health systems, positioning health as a central pillar of both adaptation and mitigation efforts. It focuses on three priority areas.

First, building climate-resilient health surveillance systems: This includes encouraging countries to link meteorological and health data, improve early warnings for heatwaves, and strengthen public health infrastructure to manage disease outbreaks triggered by floods, droughts, and temperature changes. This is one of the BHAP's strongest and most actionable components, and also the one most closely aligned with ongoing GGA negotiations.

Second, integrating health co-benefits into national climate policies: The Plan urges nations to view health as both an adaptation and a mitigation advantage, with the measures that reduce emissions, improve air and water quality, and enhance sanitation to boost public health. The equity considerations emphasize reproductive health, mental well-being, and menstrual hygiene, especially for women and girls in vulnerable regions.

Third, advancing equity, finance, and monitoring frameworks: The BHAP calls for global metrics on climate-related mortality, disease burden, and loss of well-being to be integrated into UNFCCC mechanisms such as the Global Goal on Adaptation, loss and damage, and climate finance. The plan stresses improving access to national and international funds to ensure rapid and effective implementation of health-focused adaptation initiatives.

COP 30 welcomed the launch of the BHAP but did not formalize it within the UNFCCC structure. There are no binding obligations and no dedicated finance stream. While the GGA discussions referenced improved health metrics, the BHAP may inform indicator development informally, it lacks institutional anchoring. It was not embedded in Loss and Damage or Article 9 finance negotiations.

In political terms, the BHAP elevated health within climate discourse and marked a diplomatic win for the Presidency and WHO, however, remains outside the Convention's core architecture. Its implementation will depend on national commitment and external financing rather than UNFCCC mandates.

LAUNCHING OF TROPICAL FOREST FOREVER FACILITY (TFFF)

The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) was formally launched at COP 30 by the Government of Brazil alongside ten other tropical forest countries, though notably outside the UNFCCC framework. Politically, this was Brazil's flagship initiative, intended to signal a new era of forest-centered cooperation beyond the formal negotiation tracks.

The launch attracted considerable political momentum. Sixty-four countries endorsed the TFFF declaration, while over 90 nations supported the call to end deforestation, a symbolic display of alignment at a COP hosted in the Amazon. Substantively, the Facility positions itself as a long-term conservation instrument that contributes to all three Rio Conventions: The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) (UNFCCC, 1992)

The Facility proposes mobilizing USD 125 billion through two main channels: sponsor contributions from governments and philanthropic actors, and senior debt raised on international capital markets. It presents itself as a scalable financing mechanism to reward forest conservation and shift incentives toward long-term protection.

Despite the political momentum, COP 30 did not embed the TFFF in the Mutirão outcome text or adopt forest-specific binding targets linked to it (UNFCCC, 2025h). Brazil's deforestation roadmap remains voluntary and external to the formal UNFCCC decision-making process. This creates a structural paradox: a high-profile, high-ambition initiative with no formal anchoring within the Convention.

The most sensitive gap remains the rights of Indigenous Peoples. While the TFFF emphasizes conservation finance, observers and several Parties raised concerns about how the Facility will ensure robust protections for Indigenous Peoples and local communities, particularly if large-scale market borrowing becomes central to its financing model.

The coming years will determine whether the TFFF evolves into a transformative financing instrument or becomes another ambitious forest initiative constrained by governance and equity challenges. Like BHAP, it reflects COP 30's broader pattern: strong political signalling, limited institutional embedding.

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FROM ALLOCATION TO ACCOUNTABILITY: MAKING WASH COUNT IN CLIMATE FINANCE LANDSCAPES IN BANGLADESH

Sumaiya Binte Anwar, Shanjia Shams, Elmee Tabassum, Md Shamsuddoha, Nafis Imtiaj Hossain, and Al Imran present data-driven evidence of how climate-resilient WASH financing translates policy into measurable resilience outcomes from the broader climate finance architecture to the community level.

CONTEXT

Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture in climate adaptation governance. As one of the world's most climate risk exposed deltaic nations, the country faces escalating risks from salinity intrusion, flooding, drought, and cyclones. Such risks have a direct impact on the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) systems, undermining public health, increasing coping costs and affecting wellbeing especially in informal settlements, drought- and saline-prone areas (Abedin et al., 2018; Anik et al., 2023; Moon, 2024; Chowdhury et al., 2020).

Over the past decade, Bangladesh has developed a comparatively mature climate-finance system. The Climate Fiscal Framework (CFF), Climate Relevance Codes (CRCs), the Integrated Budget and Accounting System (iBAS++), and the Annual Climate Budget Report collectively represent a sophisticated effort to institutionalize climate budgeting within the national fiscal system. Despite this shift, the WASH continues to be a low-end investment in domestic and international climate portfolios, which receive a small share of the overall adaptation funds (Steffen and Michaelowa, 2022). WASH expenditures are usually bundled in with larger financing codes, comprising of being water, health or disaster-response and thus their disaggregation cannot be done and their contribution to resilience results is obscure. Reporting systems emphasize allocations and expenditure volumes, rather than measurable adaptation outcomes, such as service continuity during shocks, a decrease in water-borne disease, or improved access for vulnerable groups.

Reliable climate-resilient water and sanitation systems are therefore not merely social services but core adaptation investments vital to protecting health, sustaining productivity and safeguarding vulnerable populations from escalating climate risks. A justice-based approach to WASH financing requires not only scaling up resources, but also ensuring fair allocation, participatory governance and gender responsiveness. These principles form the foundation of Green Accountability (GA), a globally championed framework coined by World Resources Institute. GA is built on three interrelated values:

- Transparency: Climate and WASH financing should be publicly accessible, traceable, and comprehensible.
- Participation: The Citizen, particularly women, indigenous peoples and marginalized groups, should also have informed contributions in resource allocation, project designing and monitoring.
- Equity: Climate financing must be distributed fairly, prioritizing population and geographical areas most exposed to climate risks.

Bangladesh possesses the institutional instruments required to embed climate-responsive WASH within its fiscal system; however, fragmentation across tiers of governance, incomplete tagging, limited gender and equity markers, and poor linkage between the budgetary inputs and the resilience outcomes constrain impact. This article argues that embedding a GA lens within the current fiscal and governance structures would transform the fragmented climate-tagged spending into a coherent, equitable and measurable climate -WASH financing structure.

Methodological and Analytical Approach

The study draws on a mixed-method and multi-scalar analytical framework designed to bridge fiscal diagnostics with governance and equity assessment. The approach combines across the three levels of quantitative financial analysis, institutional mapping, and field-based validation of climate-related WASH finance, allocation, and experience of climate-related WASH finance across governance levels.

Financial data were obtained through the database of Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Adaptation Fund (AF) projects database; the Economic Relations Division (ERD) portfolio (FY 2020-21 – FY 2024-25); the Climate Budget Reports (FY 2019-20 – FY 2025-26), and the Bangladesh National WASH Accounts (BNWA). The review evaluated how WASH-related components are found within broader climate projects using CRCs and CFF coefficients and operationalization in iBAS++ platform. To ground the fiscal analysis in implementation realities, field consultations were carried out in three climate-vulnerable hotspots: urban informal settlements, drought-prone northern districts, and coastal saline-impacted areas.

Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews with community members, local officials, implementing agencies, and civil society actors were used to evaluate the transparency, participation, equity and accountability in financial patterns.

Findings were triangulated through expert review sessions involving policymakers and development partners. This combined strategy allows the study to transcend descriptive portfolio analysis and identify entry points for structural reform within the current fiscal architecture of Bangladesh.

Financial Architecture and Governance Landscape

The climate-WASH finance architecture of Bangladesh, which channel resources from international funds to frontline service delivery, operates at three levels: global, national, and local. The framework signifies a great institutional advancement; however, the WASH is still not fully integrated on multiple levels, and the sanitation, hygiene, and equity-sensitive investments are often overwhelmed into larger infrastructure or disaster-response efforts.

At the global level, Bangladesh relies on the GCF, GEF and AF, as well as concessional and technical support from ADB, World Bank, KfW, JICA and DANIDA. Project approval usually starts with the endorsement by the Economic Relations Division (ERD) as the National Designated Authority (NDA), followed by review by MoEFCC and routing through accredited entities such as PKSF, IDCOL, etc.

Domestically, climate finance is regulated through an integrated fiscal system combining ERD, MoEFCC, Finance Division and Planning Commission. CFF, CRCs and iBAS++ tagging platform jointly direct the classification and reporting of climate-relevant expenditure. The Annual Climate Budget consolidates both domestic and external funds across 25 ministries; within it, WASH is mainly captured under Code 0108 water, sanitation and health. Resources flow through two principal channels: Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF), a domestic instrument; and - Annual Development Programme (ADP), a blend of external aid and national revenue. The Planning Commission screens and prioritizes projects and the Local Consultative Group facilitate dialogue between the government, donors, and the NGOs.

At the local level, WASH services are provided by the upazila parishads, municipalities and city corporations through ADP allocations and small-scale climate-grant pilots. NGOs also have significant roles in hygiene promotion and inclusion, but their activities are mostly off-budget. Private sector involvement, whether through microfinance, CSR or green lending, is emerging yet limited due to credit risk and lack of incentives. The effectiveness of the system is eventually reached at the communities through WASH programmes that build their daily resilience.

Institutional Assessment of Climate-WASH Finance in Bangladesh

Macro-Fiscal Composition and Debt Sustainability: ERD portfolio for 2012 – 2025 with USD 3.7 billion in 21 WASH relevant projects, making it the single largest gateway to external WASH investment in Bangladesh. Loans comprise 78.4 percent of the portfolio, significantly overshadowing grants (7.5 precent) and government



Figure 1: Two-way accountability system within Bangladesh's climate-resilient WASH finance architecure that illustrates how accoountability and feedback flow create a participatory and transparent governance loop. The accountbility mechanisms channels (left) links citizens, communities and local governments to ERD and MoEFCC throught participatory budgeting, social audits and grievance redress. The feedback channel (right) connects NGOs, local governments and private actors to the Finance Division and NGOAB through monitoring, evaluation and financial reporting systems.

co-financing (14.1 percent). Such a high loan-to-grant ratio indicates dependency on debt-based financing and is a threat to fiscal sustainability, particularly for services that do not produce direct commercial payoff. Moreover, although the CFF provides a roadmap for integration, only 11 percent of this portfolio is currently climate-tagged, implying a climate-blind manner of large-scale infrastructure procurement. There is a vertical coordination gap between ERD, LGED, and MoEFCC which reduces integration and consistency in tracking the WASH finance in national climate pipelines. Less than 12 percent of the total WASH finance in the ERD portfolio targets vulnerable groups, women or marginalized populations, indicating an underinvestment in equity and gender.

Sectoral Imbalances and infrastructural Bias: The current patterns of investment structure are based on a choose-and-build process that ignores the most adaptive sub-sectors. The metro-centric bias, which swallows about 35 percent of the overall WASH funds, privileges mostly urban infrastructure and under-invests in sanitation, hygiene, and soft systems. Water Supply has 55 percent of the total finance primarily directed to the megaprojects of the metropolitan area such as the Saidabad Water Treatment Plant (WTP). In contrast, the sub-sector with the highest average climate relevance (60 – 65 percent), hygiene and behavior change is allocated an insignificant 7 percent of the total allocation. Sanitation and Sewerage take 28 percent of the share and has moderate climate relevance of 40 – 50 percent. This disproportionate focus on hard infrastructure, to the detriment of soft adaptation measures, harms the resilience of the WASH sector in general.

Fragmentation in International Climate Mobilization: Mobilization in UNFCCC-linked funds (GCF, GEF and AF) is still fragmented, with USD 640 million spread over 45 projects. The institutional profile of such funds is quite different:

- **Green Climate Fund (GCF):** At USD 441.2 million, it is the primary vehicle for scale but with a very narrow rural focus, largely excluding sanitation and hygiene. Of this, approximately USD 345 million has been in the form of grants and about USD 96 million as concessional loans attributed to Bangladesh. Only 6.41 percent (3 out of 7 projects)— approximately USD 37.7 million— goes directly on WASH-related activities primarily in drought and flood adaptation. All of their projects use the gender-responsive design, but there is no sex- and WASH-disaggregated financial reporting, obscuring how resources benefit women or marginalized households in practice (GCF, 2018; 2019; 2023).
- **Adaptation Fund (AF):** Although smaller (USD 36 million), it boasts better institutional integration; 30–40 percent of the portfolio is devoted to WASH (USD 10-12 million), and attributes 3 out of 4 projects (UNDP, 2024; WMO, 2024; ICIMOD, 2023).
- **Global Environment Facility (GEF):** Although it has a wide range of projects (34 projects with USD 165 million) its direct WASH investment is less than 2 percent, indicating a failure to leverage GEF resources for water security. Among 17 climate-related projects, only one: the Ecosystem-based Adaptation in the Barind Tract and Haor Wetland (GEF ID 5456) contains direct WASH intervention such as pond and canal re-excavation, rainwater harvesting and aquifer recharge which is about 20-25 percent of its USD 9.4 million budget. Across all 34 projects, there is no design and results framework that would include sanitation, hygiene, and fecal sludge management (FSM).

Domestic Policy Integration and Execution Lapses: The ADP continues on a positive path with the WASH-linked allocations (Code 0108) increased over 110 percent since the FY2019–20, and the budget share on the same continues to be steady with 4-5 percent. On the national level, the overall rate of climate-budget implementation was ≈ 87 percent over the same period, which proves that the efficiency of implementation on the macro level has been improved. Implementation of this budget is still highly centralised, led by the Local Government Division (LGD), with emerging but small contributions from a few other ministries. As per the FY 2025–26 Climate Budget Report, LGD continues to serve as the principal agency for WASH interventions, managing an overwhelming BDT 1,965.66 crore (MoF, 2025) or 95.8 percent of total climate-relevant WASH under Code 0108.

Strategic frameworks as the National Adaptation Plan (NAP 2023–2050), have successfully set high-value CRCs, including CRC5 (BDT 367 billion) of inclusive WASH or CRC6 (BDT 291 billion) of urban sanitation and hygiene. However, these CRCs are not yet integrated into the iBAS++. There is also the absence of gender-disaggregated indicators and CRC 5/6 tagging, which restricts transparency and accountability. WASH is made central to long-term water governance and flood resilience in the Delta Plan 2100. The 8th Five Year Plan (2020–25) focuses WASH for poverty reduction, population health and disaster response, and requires greater institutional coordination and rural services. But still development partner projects, NGO interventions, community-financed systems are not entirely included in consistent reporting platforms, restricting financial consistency in the sector. This disconnect results in uneven execution and hampers the adequate reflections of these strategic priorities in actual ADP ceilings.

Community Realities and Layered Vulnerabilities

Although national climate-tagged allocations comprise of WASH infrastructure and drainage projects, sanitation and hygiene services in informal neighborhoods often remain beyond the structural planning processes. For communities, economic burden is high, with a significant portion of household income drained by WASH recovery. Households reported high out-of pocket expenses in relation to access and maintenance of water points, informal water vendors, etc. that no financial systems substantially recognize. Additionally, weak coordination and strategic alignment between GO/NGO efforts lead to project-based, fragmented and piecemeal interventions. Overlapping mandates across ministries further complicate monitoring and accountability.

Pathways of Change: Policy Implications for WASH through a Green Accountability Lens

The climate-finance system of Bangladesh lacks the regulatory and institutional scaffolding required to strengthen the climate-WASH integration. A Green Accountability lens, therefore, offers a systematic way forward to transition from fragmented climate-tagged expenditure toward traceable, and equity-based and outcome-focused WASH financing integrated into the fiscal framework.

1. **Fiscal traceability and precision:** Current climate tagging gives a view of sanitation, hygiene, faecal sludge management, and gender responsive elements at the macro level only. The systematic monitoring of the ADP, revenue budget, BCCTF, and externally financed projects would be possible by introducing a specific WASH climate marker into iBAS++ aligned with the existing CRCs. Publishing an annual consolidated Climate-WASH Expenditure Statement as a formal annex to the Climate Budget Report would further enhance transparency and policy coherence.

2. **Institutional integration and vertical coherence:** Fiscal instruments are centrally coordinated whereas no real operational coordination is observed between the MoF and ERD, line ministries, and local governments, especially translating climate interests into sub-national investments. By having a well-organized Climate-WASH coordination mechanism, the pipeline development would be synchronized, the process of appraisal would be standard and there would be interoperability of the data.

3. **Equity in operationalization of budgets:** Integration of vulnerability-weighted allocation formulas to climate-exposed districts, along with gender disaggregation as a condition for project approval and fund release would transform normative inclusion into measurable fiscal practice.

4. **Behavioral Alignment:** Despite strong policy commitments, infrastructure-heavy interventions receive the lion's share, instead of community-based solutions. Shifting the trend to people-centric outcomes, ensuring that interventions provide not only the required pipes but also sustaining behavioral support to maintain them would reflect that accountability is not just an issue of central fiscal systems but that of community interfaces.

This article thus demonstrates the loop between finance, governance, and outcomes and the ways of how accountable climate-resilient WASH financing



Figure 2: Theory of Change showing how Green Accountability mechanisms link climate-finance inputs to equitable WASH outcomes through transparent, participatory, and inclusive governance.

can translate policy into measurable resilience at community level. If pursued, such reforms will ensure that every investment reinforces inclusive, climate-resilient water, sanitation, and hygiene services, bridging the gap between policy commitments and community realities.

Acknowledgment: This study was conducted with WaterAid under the project "Climate-Resilient Green Accountability for WASH", funded by the World Resources Institute (WRI). We extend our heartfelt appreciation to Partha Hefaz Shaikh, Adnan Ibne Abdul Qader, Zakia Naznin, H. M. Rayhanul Islam, Rai Dhar Ruchi, and Jannat Binte Jalal for their cooperation, data support, and insights throughout the study.

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UPCOMING EVENTS

64th Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64)

June 8–18, 2026 | Bonn, Germany

The 64th Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) will provide an important platform to advance this discussion. At SB 64, CPRD will jointly organize two side events to highlight the interconnection of climate change, health impacts, and gendered vulnerabilities. Building on a recent field research conducted by CPRD in coastal Bangladesh, the sessions will highlight how water scarcity and salinity exposure are contributing to serious reproductive health challenges among women in climate-vulnerable communities.

Strategy Workshop on Climate Change Policy Narrative: Shaping CSO Positions towards COP 31

July 11–13, 2026 | Dhaka

CPRD will organize a three-day strategy workshop in collaboration with Climate Justice Alliance Bangladesh (CJA-B) and CANSA Bangladesh to develop a concerted civil society position ahead of COP 31. The workshop will bring together representatives from civil society organizations, youth networks, women—led groups, researchers, and media to deepen understanding of evolving climate science, policy debates, and negotiation dynamics. Through thematic discussions on mitigation ambition, adaptation, loss and damage, climate finance, and just transition, participants will collectively identify priority demands and advocacy strategies. The workshop aims to strengthen coordinated civil society engagement and shape evidence informed policy narratives to influence the global climate negotiations leading to COP 31.

First International Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels (Santa Marta Conference)

April 24–29, 2026 | Santa Marta, Colombia

The First International Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, scheduled for April 24–29, 2026 in Santa Marta, Colombia, will serve as a key global platform to advance discussions on a just and equitable transition away from fossil fuels. Co-hosted by the Governments of Colombia and the Netherlands, the conference will bring together policymakers, civil society, and international stakeholders to explore practical pathways for fossil fuel phase-out, strengthen climate policy coherence, and support implementation efforts complementary to processes under the UNFCCC.

EVENTS COMPLETED IN 2025

Workshop: Governance of Bangladesh's National Loss and Damage Framework Scope of Addressing Climate-Induced Displacement

February 22, 2025, Dhaka

This workshop highlighted integration of climate-induced displacement to the Bangladesh's Loss and Damage framework. Key recommendations included defining L&D clearly, improving governance, expanding social protection, and ensuring inclusive, transparent, and decentralized approaches. The insights inform a policy brief to support future policymaking.

https://cprdbd.org/national-loss-and-damage-framework-scope-of-addressing-climate-induced-displacement/

Women's Role in Transformational Adaptation: Gaps and Challenges

August 12, 2025, Dhaka

CPRD, with Christian Aid Bangladesh, hosted a national seminar in Dhaka on women's role in climate adaptation, sharing findings from a study in Kurigram. The event highlighted structural barriers to women's adaptive capacity and called for gender-responsive policies, inclusive decision-making, and transformative approaches to climate action.

https://cprdbd.org/womens-role-in-transformational-adaptation-to-climate-change-gaps-and-challenges/



Road to Green Manifesto: Dialogue on Integrating Climate into Political Agendas

July 26, 2025, Dhaka

Bringing together political leaders, civil society, researchers, and youth voices, CPRD and its allied organizations convened a policy dialogue in Dhaka to integrate climate-induced displacement and migration into political party manifestos. The discussion highlighted the water–food–migration nexus and called for coordinated governance, climate-resilient agriculture, and urban planning to address rising climate mobility.

https://cprdbd.org/national-level-dialogue/

Capacity Building of Local Stakeholders on Climate Policy and Climate Finance

September 18-20, 2025, Chattogram, Satkhira, and Khulna

CPRD, in partnership with CANSA-BD, organized a three-day regional training engaging local government representatives, CSOs, youth networks, women leaders, and media actors. The training strengthened understanding of climate science, policy and negotiations, and enhanced their capacity to implement community-led climate action.

https://ypsa.org/2025/12/cansa-bangladesh-organizes-capacity-building-workshop-on-climate-policy-and-politics-in-chattogram/

Workshop on Critical Aspect of Climate Science, Impacts, and Policy Negotiations Under the UNFCCC

September 27-28, 2025, Dhaka

CPRD organized this learning workshop for youth, media and the grassroots members of the Climate Justice Alliance. The workshop strengthened the capacity of youth, media, and CSOs through expert sessions on climate science, loss and damage, adaptation, mitigation, and global negotiations. Concluding with a panel discussion the workshop emphasized inclusive climate action and stakeholder collaboration.

https://cprdbd.org/training-for-youth-media-and-csos-on-climate-science-policy-and-politics/

COP 30 Side Event on Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships and Water Transversality

November 17, 2025, Belém, Brazil

CPRD joined a multi-stakeholder side event at COP 30 with international partners to highlight water's transversal role in climate adaptation. Reflecting on field evidence from Bangladesh's southwest coast, the discussion underscored drinking water insecurity, salinity impacts, and gendered burdens, and emphasized the urgent need to embed water governance within the Global Goal on Adaptation.

COP 30 Side Event on Climate Change-Implications for Women's Health: Evidence-based Recommendations for its Integration into the NAP

November 17, 2025, Belém, Brazil

CPRD, together with Bread for the World (BftW) and HEKS/EPER, hosted a policy dialogue at the Bangladesh Pavilion during COP 30 focusing on the overlooked reproductive health impacts of climate change on women. The discussion highlighted evidence from Bangladesh and explored pathways to incorporate gender-responsive health risks into national adaptation planning and climate finance frameworks.

National Seminar on COP 30 Outcomes: Promise, Performance, and the Politics In Between

December 6, 2025, Dhaka

Climate Justice Alliance Bangladesh, led by CPRD, convened this national seminar in Dhaka to critically examine the outcomes of COP 30 and the "Belém Political Package." The discussion assessed progress and gaps in mitigation ambition, climate finance, adaptation indicators, and fossil fuel phase-out commitments, fostering informed policy and civil society engagement in future climate negotiations.

https://cprdbd.org/national-seminar-on-cop-30-outcomes-promise-performance-and-the-politics-in-between/

CPRD PUBLICATIONS IN 2025

Ground Evidence of Non-Economic Loss and Damage: Doomsday at the Doorstep

November, 2024

This case story compendium presents ground-level evidence of non-economic loss and damage across drought-prone, erosion-affected, and coastal regions of Bangladesh. It highlights identity erosion, health crises, gendered vulnerabilities, displacement, and intergenerational trauma driven by climate extremes.

https://cprdbd.org/ground-evidence-of-non-economic-loss-and-damage/

Climate & Development Dialogue: COP29 Issue

September, 2024

This dialogue issue critically examines COP 29 outcomes through a justice lens, highlighting debt-driven climate finance and weak mitigation ambition. It brings together frontline expert perspectives and field evidence on climate migration, emphasizing the need for grant-based finance and rights-centered action ahead of COP 30.

https://cprdbd.org/dialogue-issue-5/

Assessing Climate-Induced Non-Economic Loss and Damage in the Sundarbans

September, 2024

Building on field-based assessment aligned with the UNFCCC's NELD framework, this study explores complex and layered non-economic loss and damages experienced by Sundarbans-dependent communities in southwest Bangladesh. It highlights the interplay of climatic shocks and governance gaps contributing to these ripple effects, and calls for integrating NELDs into adaptation planning, and advancing their recognition under the UNFCCC.

https://cansouthasia.net/non-economic-loss-and-damageneld-in-the-sundarbans/



Women's Role in Transformational Adaptation in Kurigram

September, 2024

This study examines how rural women in Kurigram navigate floods, droughts, and erosion through evolving livelihood strategies, asset use, and collective action. It highlights structural barriers that widen the resilience gap and calls for gender-transformative adaptation supported by inclusive finance, infrastructure, and institutional reform.

https://cprdbd.org/womens-role-in-transformational-adaptation-in-kurigram/

Bangladeshi CSOs Unite Ahead of COP 30: A Call for Climate Justice and Ambition

September, 2024

The Climate Justice Alliance Bangladesh (CJAB) released this CSO Position Paper in the lead-up to COP 30. The paper outlines arguments and demands on different key agendas at COP 30.

https://cprdbd.org/bangladeshi-csos-unite-ahead-of-cop-30-a-call-for-climate-justice-and-ambition/

Invisible Losses: A Climate Justice Lens on Non-Economic Loss and Damage

September, 2024

The Climate Justice Alliance Bangladesh (CJAB) released this CSO Position Paper in the lead-up to COP 30. The paper outlines arguments and demands on different key agendas at COP 30.

https://cprdbd.org/bangladeshi-csos-unite-ahead-of-cop-30-a-call-for-climate-justice-and-ambition/

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Political Leadership!!
Rise with Purpose! Run-away will Ruin Us All

EDITOR'S PICK

Global climate diplomacy stands at a decisive moment, yet the outcomes of COP30 reveal a stark gap between urgency and action. At a time when climate impacts are intensifying and the global carbon budget is rapidly shrinking, the negotiations once again fell short of the ambition needed to keep the 1.5°C goal within reach. Key expectations, including a credible fossil fuel phaseout pathway, scaled-up and predictable climate finance, and enforceable commitments, were diluted, deferred, or left without clear implementation pathways.

For vulnerable countries and frontline communities, this shortfall carries real consequences. Without stronger mitigation, predictable and grant-based finance, and accountability from historical emitters, climate risks will continue to deepen where coping capacity is limited.

The science is clear. The impacts are already here. The world cannot afford another cycle of delay. The moment demands renewed ambition and leadership to turn commitments into credible action for climate justice.

Climate & Development Dialogue

A knowledge product of the cooperation partnership between:

Center for Participatory Research & Development CPRD | Brot für die Welt | Diakonia