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POLICY Troubled Journey towards Climate Justice: Concerns and views for tackling climate injustice in loss and damage negotiation

Md. Shamsuddoha analyses loss and damage negotiation to provide a tolerant insight on the context and contentious issues also presents a likely policy and institutional scenario

Loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change has now become one of the key issues of discussion both in academic and policy arena. Since 1991, despite repeated argument of the developing countries to address 'loss and damage', primarily as the means of providing compensation, this entered to the UNFCCC process only in 2010 with a decision of establishing a "work program" on loss and damage at the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) held in Cancun, Mexico. Henceforth, negotiations on loss and damage clearly gained momentum and marked by; establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage at COP 19 in 2013, and inclusion to the Paris Climate Agreement under a standalone Article (Article 8) that emphasizes the "importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

Despite considerable progress in the contextual and institutional aspects of anchoring loss and damage at the UNFCCC process, nonetheless it's still an orphan agenda. Country Parties are yet to endorse 'loss and damage' as one of the key approaches, along with adaptation and mitigation, for addressing climate change. Referring to the recent havoc of climate change induced extreme weather events across the world, the least developed country group (LDCs) and small island developing country group (AOSIS) at COP 23 in 2017 were arguing for a standalone 'loss and damage' agenda item along with appropriate means of financing and capacity building support; however the rich countries were in favour of keeping loss and damage discussion aside, under the purview of the WIM and its Executive Committee, at least until the WIM review due in 2019. This raises significant concerns about climate injustice - as these countries are helpless victims even not contributing to present day climate crisis, moreover they are being forced to bear the unjustifiable costs of loss and damages largely due to inaction of the rich countries.

However, the only achievement of COP 23, yet trivial, is the decision of holding an "expert dialogue" at the next inter-sessional in May 2018. This dialogue would be exploring how finance might be secured and inform the WIM review in 2019. At COP 23, the developed country group is found seemingly afraid of reappearing compensation claim provided that the political position of the developing country group is shaped in a

reinforced manner and 'loss and damage' further gets a breakthrough in the COP process. Therefore, the developed country delegates repeatedly blocked any talks on loss and damage finance – the US was reportedly more vocal in the loss and damage discussions than in any other negotiation room.

Given the context of murky political stand of some developed countries and mistrust between major country groups, this analysis provides a tolerant insights on the context and contentious issues of loss and damage negotiation, also presents a likely policy and institutional scenario for addressing loss and damage. Such an insightful analysis is believed to shape future discussion and would tackle climate injustice while agreeing on justice based solutions for addressing loss and damage.

Loss and Damage: What instigated the discussion?

While the global leadership is found seemingly eventful in devising country specific as well as aggregate target of greenhouse gas emission reduction, compatible to the global political goal of limiting global average temperature rise well below 2 degree Centigrade by the end of this century from the preindustrial level, the people all over the world are compensating the harsh reality of climate change with their life and valuable assets. Already with 1.1 degree Centigrade temperature rise from the pre-industrial level, the Earth is experiencing numerous instances of localized extremes like the hottest non-El Niño year, hottest summer, wild fires, cyclones and typhoons, changes in the precipitation leading to early floods or flash floods etc.

According to Global Climate Risk 2018, over the years from 1997 and 2016, the direct consequences of more than 11000 extreme weather events globally caused death of 524 000 people and USD 3.16 trillion economic loss Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) (David, Eckstein., Künzel, Vera and Schäfer, Laura, 2018). Analysis on the occurrence of recorded disasters over this 20-year period (1997-2016) marked Honduras, Haiti and Myanmar as the most affected countries, followed by Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Bangladesh.

These rankings are attributed considering the aftermath of exceptionally devastating extreme events such as Cyclone Roanu in India, Bangladesh and in Sri Lanka in 2017, category 4 hurricane Matthew and Nicole in Haiti in 2016, extreme drought and tropical storm Dineo in Zimbabwe in 2016, category 5 cyclone Winston in Fiji in 2016, Hurricane Sandy in Haiti in 2012, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, Hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 1998; however the ranking didn't consider the residual impacts of extreme as well as slow onset events, also didn't consider the cost of non-economic losses.

Yet, the Climate Risk Index 2018 (CRI) revealed some interesting finding; for instance, among the most affected countries nine belong to low income or lower middle income country group. Though the rich countries incurred much higher absolute monetary losses than the low-income countries but the loss of life, personal hardship and existential threats are much more widespread to the later country group. Again, while the number of deaths caused by the conventional sudden onsets e.g. tropical cyclone seems to be reduced (mainly through the consistent effort on disaster risk reduction and preparedness) but the unconventional and localized disasters are causing more deaths irrespective in rich and poor countries. For instance, persistent heat waves and drought in South Asia in 2016 affected over 330 million people (CNN, 2017). In India, with a breaking temperature record of 51 degree Centigrade in Rajasthan reportedly claimed 1800 lives primarily due to hyperthermia or dehydration (Hindustan Times, 2016). The unusually high temperatures also reported from parts of southern Europe to eastern and southern Africa, South America, and parts of Russia and China (World Economic Forum, 2018).

In contrary to this, hypothermia caused by extreme cold wave claimed lives of 85 people in Chinese Taipei. Again, landslide associated with the torrential rainfall claimed lives of at least 300 people in India in 2016 (Accu Weather, 2016), 152 people in Bangladesh (Dhaka Tribune, 2017) while also affecting livelihoods of millions of people.

On the other side of the coin, the USA-the present time climate denier, experienced adversity of almost all weather related extreme events, which include flash floods accompanied with torrential rains, extreme flooding, intense heat wave accompanied by wildfires, and a number of high impact Hurricanes and Typhoons. Aside with causing billion dollars economic loss by each of the catastrophes, they also killed more than hundred people.

In 2017 alone, 16 weather and climate related multi-category high impact events hit the USA, which include 1 drought, 2 flooding, 1 freeze event, 8 severe storm, 3 tropical cyclone, and 1 wildfire; these events resulted in the deaths of 362 people and had significant economic effects in the impacted areas. According to the US's National Centers for Environmental Information (NECI, 2017) the cumulative damage of these 16 events was USD 306.2 billion, which shattered the previous U.S. annual record cost of USD 214.8 billion (CPI-adjusted), established in 2005 due to the impacts of Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, Rita and Wilma.

According to NCEI, over a period from 1980–2017, the annual average extreme events was 5.8, the

figure was just doubled (11.6 events) in the last five years from 2013-2017. Similarly, an analysis on the occurrence of Tropical Cyclone in the Bay of Bengal confirmed rise in rough sea events resulting from the rise in sea surface temperature by 0.30-0.48°C during a period from 1958 to 2009 (Chowdhury et al., 2012).

While it is relatively convenient to quantify perceptible economic loss and damages caused by sudden onsets, however the truly systemic challenge remains in establishing direct causal link between 'climate impacts and non-economic losses' and quantifying them, and establishing interconnectedness among those losses with their secondary and tertiary risk/loss category. The secondary risks include food and water insecurity, loss of biodiversity, loss of ecosystem services, forced displacement and migration; while the tertiary risks are regression in growth and development, widening inequality, competition and conflict in resource use, domestic and international tensions on displacement and migration issues etc. Among a very few studies in establishing interconnectedness between climate change impacts and its secondary risks, Kent, C et.al (2017) estimated that the heat, drought, and flood events- now one-in-twenty chance per decade- will cause a simultaneous failure of maize production in the world's two main growers, China and the United States.

Already the flash flood and early monsoon flooding accompanied with torrential rainfall are causing substantial loss in food production in many developing countries. For instance, in 2016 the heavy rainfall and landside triggered by prolonged monsoon in eastern, western and central India caused death of 300 people, while also destroying standing crops and other physical assets. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the early flash floods occurred in March 2017 destroyed 1.5 million tons of nearly-ready-to-harvest Boro rice in about 290,000 ha areas, also washed away fish and other household resources like poultry cattle etc. (CPD, 2017). The huge rice production in the hoar areas covers 25 per cent of the country's total annual Boro rice output. Hence, the sudden and complete loss of this rice crop forced the country to import rice in 2017, while Bangladesh has become a net rice exporting country since several years. The probability of such extreme rainfall and occurrence of flash flood will likely be higher in the future due to consistent rise in world's average temperature.

The stated loss and damage scenario only accounted the noticeable economic losses mainly resulted from the sudden and extreme disaster events; however the non-economic losses both from sudden and slow onset events also should be counted. Such losses include; loss of a homeland (for example, when island dwellers are forced to leave their atolls), biodiversity and ecosystems (for example, mangrove

forests), cultural goods (such as cult and burial sites that cannot be relocated for religious reasons) or the increased spread of certain diseases associated with temperature and precipitation change. While not discussed so in the global negotiation, the significant non-economic losses would probably be the biodiversity loss, which is largely due to habitat destruction, practicing monoculture in crop production and also for changes in weather pattern such as rise in temperature and variability in precipitation. Already a recent study in Germany estimated more than 70 per cent of loss in insects over 27 years (Hallmann, C. A 2017). Such an appalling situation posing an impending fear of "ecological Armageddon" while putting global food security in stake (World Economic Forum 2018).

All these sudden and slow onset events and their secondary and tertiary risks are triggering displacement and migration, both internal and across borders. According to IDMC (2017), each year since 2008 an average of 25.3 million people are newly displaced by disasters (IDMC, 2017); of which the annual average displacement by geological hazards is roughly 2 million, remaining 23.3 million are displaced by weather related disasters (IOM 2018). At the end of 2016, globally 31.1 million people displaced in 125 countries; 76% (24.2million) of those displacement were triggered by sudden onset disasters (IDMC 2017). Among numerous instances of displacement and migration caused by the weather related events a few are; 35 000 by Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in 2016, 34,000 in Fiji by Cyclone Winston in 2016 (Weather, 2017) several hundred thousand in Bangladesh by Cyclone Mora in 2017 (Solomon, 2017) and around half a million in Sri Lanka in 2017 (IOM, 2017)

Though the great majority of displaced people in the world believed not to migrate across borders; however the recent figure of international migrants shows the different picture. As anticipated by IOM, by 2050 the international migrants would account for 2.6 per cent of the global population or 230 million (IOM, 2003). However, the latest global estimate on international migrants accounted to 244 million, 3.3 per cent of the global population (UN DESA, 2016) that already surpassed the IOM's earlier projection. With the constant rise in international migrants- both numerically and proportionally – the IOM revised its earlier projection estimating 405 million international migrants globally by 2050 (IOM, 2010). Such rise in cross border migration may significantly intensify present day migration crisis, also could rise tension between countries. However, it's the migrants who suffers most in either situation-staying with the known risk at the origin or escaping with unknown risks and uncertainties.

While all the facts and figures signifies the growing urgency of combating emission reduction and the consequent global warming, however the emissions of CO₂ had risen for the first time in four years, bringing atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ to 403 parts per million, compared with a preindustrial baseline of 280 parts per million (NECI, 2017). In contrary to this, the CO₂ storage and sinking capacity of the world's natural ecosystems are declining. Ocean as the most potential natural systems of offsetting atmospheric CO₂ concentration and earth's heat content so far have absorbed 30 per cent of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide since the pre-industrial times (IPCC 2012); also have absorbed 93 per cent of the increase in global temperatures between 1971 and 2010 (Levitus, S., J. et. al. 2017). With consistent rise in global CO₂ concentrations the world's oceans would continue to get warmer resulting more frequent and intense rough sea event; however the oceanic heat content as well as CO₂ absorbing capacity may be declining at a certain point of time (Ayres, R. 2016). Worryingly, The other potential natural system e.g. the tropical forests are now releasing rather than absorbing CO₂ (Baccini, A., 2017).

Three Regime of Climate Negotiation: 'U Turn' from justice to climate injustice

Over the years, since the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) held in Berlin in 1995, there has been considerable shift not only in setting agenda items but also in the ideological basis of the convention (Shamsuddoha Md, Rahman Mizanur, 2013). There has been always an influence of scientific findings (e.g. the IPCC) and the push from global CSOs that shaped and reshaped political priorities and agenda settings in the COP negotiations. In the initial years, from 1990 to 2000, the policy focus was on mitigation. From 2001 to 2010, it was on adaptation and since 2010 discussion on loss and damage got considerable attention as the third pillar of agenda item-along with mitigation and adaptation.

The continued lack of mitigation ambitions and inadequate resources to implement adaptation actions pushed developing countries to tremendous suffering, causing significant loss and damage of assets and properties that could no longer be avoided and recovered through adaptation. Hence, with the growing demand from the LDCs and developing country groups for a 'compensation mechanism' for climate induced 'loss and damage' got the height of momentum as well as become a debated issue at the entire COP process. Vanuatu, on behalf AOSIS, first tabled loss and damage proposal in the early 1990s, AOSIS again proposed a 'Multi-Window Mechanism' at COP 14 held in Poznan in 2008. That proposal included a rehabilitation and compensation component as a basis for future negotiations; the

other components are risk transfer (insurance) and risk management. In contrary to this, the developed country group opposed the compensation / liability component. With the increased support of the LDCs to the AOSIS proposal to address unavoidable loss and damage, the COP16 held in Cancun in 2010 established a SBI Work Programme on Loss and Damage under the scope of Cancun Adaptation Framework.

Finally, at COP 18 held in Doha in 2012, developing country Parties traded off their core demand i.e. 'compensation' for having an institutional mechanism, which was established at COP 19 in 2013 as 'Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) along with a WIM Interim Executive Committee (ExCom). The ExCom was tasked to develop its work plan for the next 2 years and get approved at COP 20. Again, at COP 21 held in Paris in 2015 the developing country group raised the demand for compensation, which was further traded off for having a standalone Article at the Paris Agreement (Article 8). This time the 'compensation demand' was nailed by the developed countries through a COP Decision that reads '*that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation*' (Decision 1/CP.21; Para 51), and the word "compensation" was replaced by "action and support."

The analysis on the two decades of UNFCCC negotiation process clearly shows its distracted focus from one to another- mitigation to 'mitigation and adaptation', and now loss and damage- as befitted with the interest of the developed countries, however none of them got adequate political priority as was required to combat global warming. Again the miserably weak political commitment on the structurally detracted climate agendas also undermines the ideological basis of the Convention that literally was framed based on the historical legacy of injustice and unfair footprint of the developed countries to the global ecological space. And, by the Convention, the developed country group was held responsible to take the lead in combating the changing climate system (through mitigation actions) and the adverse impacts thereof.

Such policy shifting in climate change negotiation from justice based framework to injustice, largely due to murky political position of the developed country group, in turn, reinforces the moral obligation towards 'climate justice', which should be reflected in the future negotiation while giving due attention to all three Pillars of the Paris Agreement.

Loss and Damage beyond Paris: A misleading attempt to perish the Paris outcome

Though the standalone Article (Article 8) on loss and damage in the Paris Agreement was considered as a big way forward, however disagreement of some developed countries on the key issues of negotiation,

especially on loss and damage finance, resulted in impasses in the negotiation of subsequent COPs beyond Paris. While the developing countries wanted to institutionalize loss and damage to the Paris doctrine, the developed countries favoured keep it aside meddling with the pre-Paris doctrine such as WIM and its Work Plan.

Referring to 'Action and Support' provision as stated in the Paris Agreement and citing the already incurred loss and damages, the developing countries at COP22 proposed to earmark dedicated financial recourses, which was opposed by the developed country group and refused any discussion on loss and damage finance until the WIM review in 2019 that would elaborate sources of financial support. Debate on loss and damage finance even become more intense at COP 23. Under the presidency of Fiji-that suffered USD 1.4 billion loss by an ever strongest full-on cyclone Winston in early 2016- the COP 23 amplified voices of the small island nations as well as puts a moral weight on loss and damage, especially on the provision of additional finance. Given the context, the COP 23 outcome on loss and damage is just reiteration of earlier issues; knowledge generation, WIM review and its strengthening, development of technical papers etc. Moreover, discussion in the COP 23 surfaced the old debate and suspicion on the 'theoretical perspective' of loss and damage and associated financing.

According to COP23 news update by TWN (TWN 2017), the developing countries namely the Bahamas, Cuba, Group of LDCs and AOSIS raised their concern on the WIM's budgetary constraints and proposed a financing provision from the Secretariat's core budget. They also proposed the WIM becoming a permanent agenda item of the subsidiary bodies. The developed country groups opposed those proposals with their procedural response: such as-budget issues belong in the budget consultations; resources are more than finance; and a WIM standing item might inhibit progress by the ExCom. However the developing country group termed the WIM not a mechanism in true sense, only playing a facilitative role in developing tool for action and financial resources are needed for the WIM to be effective in helping developing countries on the ground.

Again, while the developing countries were arguing for a permanent agenda item under SBI and Paris Agreement, few of the developed countries namely Australia and the USA were found insistent keeping loss and damage under the mandate of Cancun Adaptation Framework and asked developing countries to include approaches for addressing loss and damage to the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) that the developing countries will be preparing by next few years. Such a misleading proposition disregards the theoretical understanding of loss and damage that refers people's incompatibility to adapt (Warner

and van der Geest, 2012), also would perish the Paris outcome that functionally established 'loss and damage' as one of the standalone approaches untying with adaptation.

Given those points of disagreement, the COP 23 finally didn't include any permanent agenda item for loss and damage especially on "action and support. However, requests the Secretariat, under the guidance of the ExCom and the SBI Chair to organize expert dialogue in parallel to SBI meeting in May 2018. The aim of this expert dialogue would be securing of expertise, and enhancement of support, including finance, technology and capacity building. The COP 23 decision also encourages parties to actively engage in the work of the WIM and its ExCom by establishing a loss and damage contact point through their respective UNFCCC national focal point.

Hence, there was no substantive outcome on loss and damage, the same talks on knowledge generation and continuation of routine work. The bottom line is: there is no guarantee of financial support for those affected by catastrophic disasters or even for the body (WIM) tasked to identify the sources of finance (Don Lehr, Lili Fuhr, Liane Schalatek 2017).

Loss and Damage Negotiation: recommendations for establishing 'climate justice'

While a standalone 'loss and damage' Article (Article 8) in the Paris Agreement was considered a major victory for developing countries, however the concurrent policy debate and disagreement denoted that 'victory' as the starting of a new phase of struggle towards climate justice. As discussed above, since the adoption of Paris Agreement in COP21, many of the previously debated issues were also being raised in the subsequent COPs. Yet there are some achievements; some are procedural while less significant, and some are political while more significant. Decision for holding an expert dialogue during the COP inter-sessional in May 2018 and establishing a Loss and Damage Contact Point are procedural, but the more significant achievement was the strong political coherence of the LDCs and AOSIS established in the process of negotiation. The other significant dynamics of the COP process, especially found at COP 23, is the strong presence of 'non-state actors' who just not chases the government's delegates but also challenged them with new research findings, solutions and commitments for establishing climate justice. Those achievements might not so noticeable, yet achieving such progress in the procedural miniature of multilateral climate policy should not be underestimated as these could be referenced from now on in the future rounds of negotiations (Steffen Bauer, 2017).

Based on the achievements so far and considering the global urgency for addressing climate induced loss and damage this chapter recommends a few aspects to be considered in the upcoming negotiations.

A standalone agenda item on loss and damage

Though in the COP process, loss and damage was first anchored to the Enhanced Adaptation Action with a decision to establish a work programme to identify feasible approaches to address climate induced loss and damage (Decision 1/CP.16 para 26, 27, 28), however the subsequent COP decisions made it clear that loss and damage is something beyond of adaptation. Finally the Paris Agreement made a clear distinction between ‘Adaptation’ and ‘Loss and Damage’ placing them in separate Articles; Article 7 for adaptation and Article 8 for loss and damage. Such emergence of loss and damage as a focus area of the international climate policy arena is caused by the realization that existing mitigation commitments and actions will not prevent dangerous climate change induced impacts. Moreover, not all climate change impacts can be successfully adapted to, be it due to financial, technical or physical constraints (Künzel Vera, Laura Schäfer, Roxana Baldrich, Sabine Minninger, 2017). Again the substantial loss and damage incidents, even at 1 degree warmer world from the pre-industrial era, seems to be unmanageable by most of the developing countries, let alone the 1.5 degree Centigrade of warming (so far unrealistically ambitious) and the 3-4 degree Centigrade of warming the world is heading towards as far as the current mitigation pledges are concerned.

Given the context of ‘moral obligation’ for ensuring climate justice as sated above, as also enshrined in the

Framework Convention, the global policy stakeholders should give immediate attention in addressing loss and damage unless the situation become irreversible with increasingly feeble attention to both mitigation and adaptation. Similar to mitigation and adaptation approaches, addressing loss and damage also requires very specific national and international measures guided by policy and pragmatic directives of the COP process. And this only be possible if country parties include loss and damage as a standalone and regular agenda item in the COP process, include this in the Paris rulebook, establish a dedicated funding mechanism and facilitate capacity building and strengthening of national institutions and mechanisms.

Let alone loss and damage, the other two approaches e.g. mitigation and adaptation have already been streamlined or so with their global goals, required national strategies with identified measures and targets, funding mechanisms etc. Understandably, the effective implementation of emission reduction and adaptation strategies essentially also will reduce potential risks of loss and damage and vice-versa. Even though loss and damage specific strategies and measures are required to address incurred and future loss and damage, particularly for the climate vulnerable developing countries. Figure 1 shows the approaches for all three pillars that would contribute implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement in a comprehensive and justifiable manner.

A standalone financing mechanism: new and additional, not aligned to other humanitarian assistance

The COP 23 showed an intense debate on loss and damage financing, which might become more intense in the following COPs. Despite having the decision (Decision 2/CP.19) for mobilizing loss and damage finances by the WIM, and reinforcing the same i.e. enhance action and support in the Paris Agreement, currently there is no recognized funding mechanism or entity to minimize and avert the risk of potential loss, and offset the incurred loss and damages. As stated earlier, being one of the most victims of climate induced loss and damages Fiji’s Presidency at COP23 gave a particular dimension and moral weight for demanding a separate finding mechanism. However COP 23 failed to raise any hope for establishing loss and damage funding mechanism, also failed to




Fig.1: Approaches and pillars under the Paris Agreement: Post 2020 scenario

mainstream loss and damage discussion to the COP process.

Studies indicate that by mid-century global loss and damage costs may exceed USD1 trillion per year, with developing countries shouldering the majority of the burden. Baarsch et al. (2015) estimated loss and damage costs for developing countries of around USD 400 bn a year by 2030, rising to USD 1.1-1.7 trillion a year by 2050. Given the context of meagre finance flow, primarily through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Adaptation Fund (AF), earmarked only for mitigation and adaptation activities, a separate financing entity is essentially required to address the loss and damage on the ground.

Loss Damage Vs Humanitarian Finance

Another debate that emerged at COP 23 is around the additionally of loss and damage finance. As argued by the developed countries, they are already supporting countries in need through humanitarian assistance, which is in other way loss and damage financing. In fact Humanitarian Assistance (as it is called) is completely different from any climate related finance, not only from their differentiated nature but also from the moral context. By nature, humanitarian assistance is voluntary relief (mostly goods and services) support provided to the people in crisis e.g. disaster. A country in dire humanitarian crisis may request for support, on the other hand any country/party may not be obliged to respond to the request. Hence, from the climate justice perspective 'climate finance' should not be considered mere as assistance or aid, rather it's an obligation of the rich countries. Again, counting humanitarian assistance as loss and damage finance essentially will undermine the principles of climate finance e.g. new, addition to ODA, not tying with any conditionalities etc.

It is also important to keep loss and damage funding mechanism separated from the GCF, AF and ECHO. At COP 23, developed country group proposed ECHO, the Humanitarian Aid Services of the European Commission, to channel loss and damage funds. Mandate of ECHO is just not addressing climate change rather to provide aid during core humanitarian and civil crises. On the other hand, GCF already turned similar to a traditional multilateral bank; less amount of grants, mandatory co-financing from the recipient countries, senior loans, subordinate loans etc. Such complexity of GCF's funding mechanisms may not helpful meeting urgent and need based funding requirements for addressing loss and damage.

Concluding Remarks

Compared to mitigation and adaptation, loss and damage is the very lately inclusion to the COP

negotiations. With the growing evidences of 'climate injustice' to the developing countries- as discussed in the previous chapter-loss and damage attracted outmost priority and finally got the status of a standalone agenda item in the Paris Agreement. However the impasses of loss and damage negotiation beyond Paris symbolizes that the inclusion of loss and damage in Paris Agreement was not to correct the 'manifest injustice' rather to appease collective argument of the developing countries-supported by global CSOs. Again with the incurred loss and damage scenario and 'proliferation of climate injustice' to the developing countries reinforces the argument for ensuring 'climate justice', which should not be overlooked only from the conservative and nationalistic standpoint of the rich countries.

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An online version with detail references will be available soon at www.cprdbd.org/dialogue/



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On the web: A longer version of the article also can be available soon at www.cprdbd.org/resources

Climate Risk Transfer by Insurance Mechanism: a snapshot on the barriers and opportunities of introducing crop insurance in Bangladesh.

Muhammad Mizanur Rahman explicates a study result regarding the challenges for introducing crop insurance in Bangladesh

Loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change is not an apprehension for the future, it has become a reality for the countries that are exposed to unprecedented extreme weather and climatic events triggered by changing climate. According to the IPCC, the economic losses from weather and climate related disasters have increased significantly, estimated from a few USD billion to above 200 billion annually from 1980 to 2010 (IPCC, 2012), also causing higher fatality rates, especially in developing countries.

With the increase of climate related disasters and subsequent loss and damages the developing countries were demanding ‘compensation’ in the conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC; finally the COP 16 held in Cancun in 2010 recognized the need for strengthening international cooperation and expertise to understand and reduce climate induced loss and damage and established a ‘Work Programme’ on Loss and Damage under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) – a technical body under the UNFCCC. In the following COP (COP 17) Parties decided to continue the Work Programme under three thematic areas, which include identifying a range of approaches e.g., risk reduction and risk transfer among others.

Over the years, since the establishment of the Work Programme the negotiation on loss and damage progressed well in procedural aspects. Meantime, loss and damage got an institutional mechanism, namely Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) in Cop 19 in 2014 and also considered as a standalone approach, apart from adaptation and mitigation, in the Paris Agreement. However, still no significant progress in undertaking and implementing appropriate measures for addressing loss and damage on the ground.

Among the approaches only the ‘risk transfer tools’ e.g. insurance progressed well especially by the patronage of the development countries and insurance companies. For instance, in 2015 the G7 started the InsuResilience Initiative, an initiative on climate risk insurance. The specific goal of InsuResilience is to increase the number of people in low- and middle-income countries with direct insurance coverage against the negative impact of climate change induced events by 400 million people over the period from 2015 to 2020 (BMZ, 2015).

While the G7’s Climate Risk Insurance Initiative is considered to be a good start, but this should not be considered the only panacea as insurance, by its

nature, has many limitations. Primarily it’s a market based approach, which would create another ‘phase of injustice’ if climate victims in the developing countries are asked to pay premium for accessing to insurance benefits. Because, people in those developing countries who need insurance, yet are unable to afford the insurance, insurance literacy is also significantly low (Hirsch, Thomas et.al 2015), on the other hand not all loss and damages e.g. cultural loss, non-economic losses, and loss and damages caused by slow onset events etc. are not insurable.

Given the potential and limitation of ‘insurance tools’ as one the approaches to address loss and damage (especially risk transfer) this article provides a brief analysis on the prospects and barriers of developing an effective insurance package that would effectively transfer risks of the climate vulnerable sectors. This analysis summarises a study findings that CPRD has been implementing to identify scope and barriers for introducing a risk transfer mechanism such as crop insurance to the climate vulnerable sectors. CPRD employed both qualitative research method e.g. surveying the insurance companies and other relevant stakeholders, conducting Key-informant Interviews (KII) of some insurance experts etc. in implementing the said study.

The study also identifies the challenges and supports to be required so that the insurance companies in Bangladesh finds business interest in launching ‘insurance product’ objectively to transfer climate induced risks.

Insurance as Climate Risk Transfer Tools: Context and relevant experience

According to KI’s opinion, insurance sector in Bangladesh is rather at rudimentary stage to think about a new package for transferring risks of natural catastrophe like cyclones, rainfall variability and drought. With the growing concerns for supporting smallholders with risk transfer facilities, a very few insurance companies are in the process of developing such products.

However, there some initiatives practiced to a limited scale to support smallholders to recover crop loss caused by sudden onset disaster. For instance, the Pragati Insurance Company Ltd, a privately owned venture established in 2000, introduced crop insurance scheme in Sirajgongj district in 2013 to support loss recovery caused by monsoon floods. That initiative, however, was a

periodic attempt, not eventually conceptualized as a 'business product' also didn't consider its operational sustainability. Collaborated by a number of national and international organizations with differentiated roles and responsibilities e.g. Oxfam Bangladesh in planning, SDC (Swiss Development Agency and Corporation) in financing, MMS (Manob Mukti Songstha a local NGO) in implementation, CRM India and IWFM (Institute of Water and Flood Management) respectively in technical support and data collection and Swiss Re- the leading global reinsurance company as the reinsurer this initiative didn't last long.

As per the scheme this insurance covered 1661 households from 17 villages which got affected by flood during 2013. Each of the insured household could claim yearly gross insurance benefit of BDT 8000, irrespective of what amount of losses they incurred, if the flood water level reaches the trigger point set earlier by the insurance beneficiaries and the technical experts IWFM and CRM. In the initial year there was no claim as the flood water level didn't reach to the trigger point. Hence, for the following year the 'trigger point of flood water level' reset at relatively lower scale and every household claimed insurance benefit in 2014. In 2015, the insurance scheme was extended to other villages and then suddenly phased out, presumably due to phasing out of the project supported by SDC. As informed by the key informants, the insured households/people were relieved from paying premium, it's the funding agency who paid premium on their behalf.

Focus of Risk Insurance: vulnerable sectors and communities first

Climate resilient agriculture and crop production system is the key to sustaining country's growth and economy-as most the KIs opined. Considering country's agrarian economy, rural employment and strive for attaining food self-sufficiency it is critical to undertake required adaptation measures to climate change impacts. Also to undertake appropriate measures to support smallholders' to recover and offset any loss and damages of standing crops caused by climate change impacts and variability. Hence with the increased exposure to the weather related disasters like flood, flash flood, river erosion, salinity ingress, cyclone etc. agriculture sector should be the first choice of introducing risk transfer mechanisms.

However, currently there is no such scheme, from both public and private agencies, that would support farmers to get back at least some of their incurred loss they are facing almost every year by climate change induced rough weather events. Next to crop, livestock are considered as the critical assets that support farmers in farming, producing organic manure and most importantly as the last resort of recovering

economic crisis. Every year, the weather related extreme events kill or wash away hundred thousands of livestock putting farmers deeper to economic shock and debt trap. Hence, insurance facilities against those productive assets would support farmers recovering from economic loss and debt-trap of local money lenders.

Such mechanism or scheme is also important to help farmers to keep practicing agriculture while majority of them do not consider farming as the 'way of livings', rather as an ancestral occupation as this symbolizes wellbeing and cultural attachment. Unfortunately one, may be the only, initiative of crop insurance scheme once introduced by Shadaran Bima Corporation, a state run company, couldn't operationally successful due to lack of manpower, team structure, poor monitoring and poor rapport with its beneficiaries. Experts believe that with sustained fund flow from the public sources, Shadharan Bima could have been done better if they followed transparent and target specific mechanisms.

Other than crop, the insurance experts considered Shrimp farming that could brought under insurance coverage because the climatic parameters like temperature, rainfall and humidity are very diligently linked to the shrimp cultivation. Shrimps are very susceptible to changes in temperature and rainfall. Delayed rainfall or prolonged rainless situation, as being observed in the recent years, increases water salinity that ultimately results poor growth even death of shrimp making farmers economically vulnerable.

The experts also find potential for a new insurance scheme for the Poultry sector in Bangladesh. There is an estimated 150,000 poultry farms in Bangladesh (The Daily Star, 2017). In every year the poultry farms face huge economic losses due to fatal outbreak of diseases such as bird flu which is very much linked to rise in temperature. Widespread cold wave and sudden temperature fall in the recent years are also causing death of poultry birds.

Besides direct loss and damages of cash crops and other valuable assets, climate change are also affecting livelihoods of the marginalized professional groups such as the coastal fishers whose livelihoods depend primarily on fishing in the Bay of Bengal. According to Chowdhury et al., (2012) livelihoods of around 3.5 million coastal peoples are in stake with the rise of rough sea events resulting from the rise in sea surface temperature by 0.30-0.48°C during a period from 1958 to 2009. The rise of rough sea events forces fishers to avoid fishing, hence the more the rough sea weather days the less the fishing days. Considering fishing as the only means of livings of around 3.5 million people, they should brought under an insurance scheme as opined most of the stakeholders interviewed.

Introduction of Climatic Risk Insurance products: barriers and hurdle

Public-sector: As identified through stakeholders' discussion, paying insurance premium by a smallholders is one of the major hurdles of launching crop insurance in Bangladesh. Currently, there is no clear guideline or initiative from Bangladesh government to overcome this hurdle. The ways of overcoming this hurdle possibly either by subsidizing the premium amount or paying full premium amount on the basis of exposure and extent of vulnerability to the impacts of climate variability and associated disasters. Taking example of 'Prodhhanmontri Soshho Bima', a crop insurance scheme of Indian government, country's insurance experts felt introduction of such scheme with the provision of huge subsidy and effective engagement of the local institutions similar to the Indian initiative. However, insurance companies in Bangladesh should invest in capacity building and institutional strengthening; for example, establishment of risk pooling mechanism in both public and private sectors, ensuring transparent and accountable governance system and rebuilding trust among their clients.

Technological innovation and advancement, for instance installation of Automated Weather Station, is also required for introducing weather index based insurance product. Hence, insufficient technical support from Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) is also another barrier for developing crop insurance scheme in Bangladesh.

Technical, institutional and infrastructural:

The insurance companies are unevenly expanded throughout the country, leaving rural areas out of insurance services. Moreover, there are less reinsurer support in national level and have to rely on foreign reinsurers. Besides, poor implementation knowledge and shortage of skilled manpower are also another challenge of expanding area coverage as well as designing an innovative scheme such as weather index based scheme. Moreover, literacy on insurance and insurance benefits is significantly low in Bangladesh. The insurance experts believe that this area needs special focus and investment to make beneficiaries aware, rebuild their trust and motivation.

Coordination: Lack of coordination among government institutions, NGO and community people is also identified as another barrier of introducing crop insurance in Bangladesh. Country need to establish a proper coordination mechanism and support among the key public institutions like Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock, and Meteorology etc., as well as support from NGO as they have wider access up to the community level.

Financial support: As most of the stakeholders stated, the insurance company often suffers financial crisis due to lack government's patronage as well as inadequate funding both from national and international sources. Key government agencies like department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Livestock etc. should mobilize resources (both financial and technological) from international sources for introducing innovative insurance schemes.

Lack of understanding: The high-up management personnel of the insurance companies also need to understand the significance of introducing crop insurance scheme to the impacts of climate change. As interviewed, most of the private insurance companies consider crop insurance as a risky venture, hence they need proper orientation on this. Sharing of similar initiatives of other countries may help building understanding and motivation of country's insurance experts and company owners. Besides, it's also important to establish insurance as a public service mechanism. Ironically image of insurance activities in Bangladesh has got 'negative impression' due to ill practice and non-accountability to their clients. Rebuilding positive image on insurance mechanism is undoubtedly a big challenge in Bangladesh.

Recommendations

Given the context of barrier and opportunities as discussed above, the insurance experts and other relevant stakeholders made following recommendations for introducing an effective crop insurance mechanism in Bangladesh;

First: There should have a crop insurance policy with relevant guiding principles to be regulated by relevant ministry of the government of Bangladesh. In this regard, government could subsidize partial or full premium on the basis of exposure and vulnerability to the climate induced disasters. The crop insurance could be made obligatory with every agricultural loan and the insurance could be paid directly to the insurer agency at the time of loan disbursement. Reinsurer support could be made available in country and also from abroad with easy terms and condition.

Second: A central, regional as well as a local level technical team could be established to select geographical area, types of crop, premium rate, duration and other support mechanisms. This team should include relevant experts from the government agencies, meteorological department, insurance company, NGOs representative etc. A coordination mechanism among the key sectors like agriculture, fisheries, livestock, cooperatives and local government also could be established to collaborate with the insurance companies, building community trust and to establish an accountable governance mechanism.

Third: A small pooling mechanism could be established with the participation of 4/5 insurance companies having offices in remote areas. Insurance companies also should undertake awareness raising activities at community level so that people understand the potential risk of climate change induced loss and damages and enthused by the benefits of risk transfer schemes.

Fourth: Government should invest in developing climate risk as well crop insurance experts through training, professional degrees and academic curricula. Information communication technology like smart phone, internet etc. could be incorporated to disseminate weather forecasts, premium deposit and process insurance claim.

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On the web: This article was written from some findings of an ongoing research of CPRD which is supported by Bread for the World. For further information, visit www.cprdbd.org

CALL FOR ARTICLE

Dialogue is pleased to invite submission of articles for its next issue that will be featuring **climate change induced non-economic loss and damages**. We encourage potentials authors to submit ongoing policy debate, new findings, on the ground evidences on non-economic loss and damages.

The objective of such theme-based publication is to generate new knowledge and to promote the dissemination of ideas and findings to the national as well as global policy processes. We request the authors to submit their article to <doha@cprdbd.org>by the end of April to get the article published in the next issue, due in June 2018.

Authors who have questions about the appropriateness of their submission or have any advice on the quality and content of **Dialogue**, please write to <dialogue@cprdbd.org>

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Mechanized country boat for near-shore fishing

Photo Credit: Yousuf Mehedi, CPRD.

The Plight of Climate Migrants in Urban Settings: Experiences of Dhaka city

S. M. Saify Iqbal illustrates the state of climate migrants and challenges they face in the slums of Dhaka city.

Background

There is no chance of any debate about the existence of climate change. It is happening right now. The world's scientific community has already acknowledged the gravity of climate change impacts that the humanity is facing now, and to be faced in near future if global political leadership fail to contain temperature rise well below 2 degree centigrade-the global goal set by endorsing the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. Already, with a 1 degree warming world from the pre-industrial level is causing adverse impact, especially in the developing countries. Among the foreseeable impacts forced displacement and migration could be the worst form that would disrupt many of the human rights while posing persistent risk to national and global security, along with creating other social and cultural difficulties. According to the first assessment report of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), about 150 million people will be migrated and displaced due to different natural disasters like flood, cyclone, scarcity of water and desertification by 2050 (IPCC, 1990), meantime in 2015, the Norwegian Refugee Council estimated around 20 million displacement caused by the adverse effects of climate change (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015). Bangladesh, being one of the most climate vulnerable countries, is frequently cited as a 'ground case' of displacement and migration. In coastal Bangladesh, for example, sea level rise and extreme weather events like flooding and tropical cyclones could forcibly dislocate more than 35 million people.

Being unable to survive in the increasingly climatic risk exposed locations people are already migrating to the urban areas, preferably to the Dhaka city. Destination of those migrants usually ends-up in the urban slums, where they again being trapped to another episode of risk and vulnerabilities-along with socio-economic deprivation and violation of basic human rights.

Based on the empirical observations on the causes and consequences of climate induced displacement and migration, this article analyses plight of the climate migrants living in Dhaka city and recommends several measures for rights-based solutions of climate change induced displacement and migration.

Disasters that trigger displacement and migration

Migration or displacement is not a new issue for Bangladesh. People usually displace and migrate for many different reasons that cover social, political,

economic, and disaster incidents. However, the recent discourses on displacement and migration suggests that the climate change induced weather events, both slow and sudden onsets, are forcing people to be displaced and migrated especially for the southern Bangladesh.

On November 15, 2007, the south-west coastal belt of Bangladesh especially Patuakhali, Barguna and Jalokathi districts were hit by a category 4 cyclone *Sidr* - resulted to loss of life, rupturing of coastal embankment, road, infrastructure & housing and loss of standing crop. In two years gap another severe cyclone '*Aila*' hit the same coastal districts affecting around 9.3 million people (Islamic Relief, 2014) and leaving 1 million homeless (Emergency Capacity Building Project, 2009). Further, Cyclone *Mohasen* in 2013 displaced more than a million people from the southeastern coastal areas. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center considered this as the fourth large displacement caused by a natural anomalies that year (IDMC, 2015). Again in 2016 and 2017 the south-eastern coast of Bangladesh was hit respectively by Cyclone *Roanu* and Cyclone *Mora*; while Cyclone *Roanu* caused substantive economic loss of the sanding crops and damaged around 1 million households (Daily Star, 2017), the later affected 3.3 million people and displaced hundreds of thousands (Relief Web, 2017). It is noteworthy that the frequency of deadly cyclone have increased alarmingly; within 10 year period from 2007-2017, Bangladesh faced 5 high velocity cyclones-on an average 1 in every 2 years, however gap between two consecutive cyclones is even less than 2 years. The frequent attack of these cyclones pushes people even deeper to the danger as they loss almost all their means of living and cannot recover within a short gap of occurring the next extreme event. Such a situation forces people to flee away elsewhere from the climate hot-spots as an attempt of 'survival'.

While sudden onset disasters e.g. tropical cyclones are causing mass displacement, the slow onset disasters like drought, sea level rise and salinity intrusion are also forcing people to be migrated respectively from Northern and Southern part of Bangladesh. The combined impact of sea level rise and saline water influx by tropical cyclones in the southern coastal areas already pushed smallholders to dire livelihoods crisis as saline water abandoned most of the agricultural lands. The availability of saline water, in turn, boasts shrimp cultivation putting livelihoods of agricultural labor at stake. As number of shrimp farms, locally known as 'Gher', goes high, the numbers of migrated people also goes high as the shrimp

farms require seasonal and comparatively less labor. Many smallholders are also found selling their small pieces of land to the wealthy shrimp farm owners and migrate elsewhere permanently. People of Khulna's kayra, Dakop and Paikgacha, Mongla and Sharankhola of Bagerhat, Assasuni and Shyamnagar upazilas of Satkhira are at the highest risk of salinity ingress and population growth has declined in these three districts in the last three years, as presumably people are migrating from those Upazillas.

Destination of Migrants: Big cities are the first choice

Unable to make a living in the climatic risk exposed areas people undertake both seasonal and permanent migration primarily to the bigger cities as cities could provide employment opportunities- despite having many other social and economic constrain. A major portion of the climate migrants prefers Dhaka city as they think this city could offer diversified livelihoods options; besides easy communication and connection to already migrated people to that city etc. are also major pull factors that attracts migrants primarily to the Dhaka City. According to the Independent (2016), 2000 people daily enter into Dhaka city. Public Radio International (2010) cautioned that the population of Dhaka city will rise to 20 million in 2025, wherein internal migration would contribute about 63 % of the total increase of Dhaka's population (The Independent, 2016). Such trend in population growth in Dhaka city would make this city more populated than some megacities such as Mexico City and Beijing. Figure 1 shows remarkable and steady increase of urban population from 2.4% in 1901 to 23.3% in 2011.




Fig.1: Urbanization Trend in Bangladesh from 1901 to 2011 (Source: BBS, 2011 and BBS, 2001)

As observed, Kallayanpur Slum, Beguntilla Slum and Korail Slum are the notable places where climate migrants settle down to survive. IOM (International Organization for Migration) stated that about 70% of the slum dwellers are climate migrants (Daily Sun, 2017).

Major Challenges faced by the Migrants

Currently, about 40% of the total population of Dhaka city live in the informal settlement of slum (ICCCAD, 2015). Again in the urban settings the slum dwellers become the first victims of any natural calamities e.g. seasonal flooding and water logging and face all sorts of social and economic deprivation.

They are also left behind from enjoying basic human rights like access to energy facilities, access to safe drinking water, health, sanitation and education facilities.

It is not a new issue that groundwater problem is so severe in Dhaka city. The water table is depleting 3 meters per year (Islam & Islam, 2017). Slum people do not get adequate water to maintain their daily household chores. Though some non-government initiative e.g. Habitat International, DSK (Dushtha Shasthya Kendra), BRAC, WaterAid etc. are providing support services, including safe drinking water, to the slum dwellers but these are still inadequate. Again, in an unhealthy environmental condition the slum people, especially the children, are being affected by various vector-borne diseases like typhoid and diarrhoea. They also suffer from dengue fever carried by *Aedes* mosquito. Climate is regarded one of the significant factors for dengue fever (Ebi & Nealon, 2016) as the said vector prefer breeding in the relatively warmer and water logged environment.

The transition of occupation of the migrated people is another big concern. Cities though offer diverse employment opportunities e.g. day labor, rickshaw pulling, working in readymade garments or street vending but the migrants having some skills on agricultural activities often cannot adapt with the new profession. However, they don't have other choices as most of them are illiterate. Besides, migrants in the urban context often faces harassment by the employers or by police at the street or in the slum as many of the slums in Dhaka city are built illegally. Hence the slum dwellers live with the persistent threat and trauma of being evicted at any time. For instance, the Korail Slum, Dhaka's largest informal settlement was evicted on the 4th of April, 2012 resulting the removal of illegal structures, including houses, shops and tea stall. According to slum resident, several people got injured and one girl went under the bulldozer during forced eviction (The Guardian, 2012).

These people are basically low wage worker but have to expense more on food, medicine and water. They are also the helpless victims of extortion, ransacking and

monetary exploitation. It is not a rare picture in Dhaka city that police take bribes from the street vendors if he or she wants to run their business (The Guardian, 2012). Sometimes they even can't go for working due to political turmoil which also brings huge pressure to them and their family.

Global Context of Forced Migration:

Still there is no any institution of legal mandate to discuss the cause and consequences of climate change induced displacement and migration and the basic human rights of the climate migrants. In the 1951 refugee covenant there is no legal definition of environmental or climate migrants. According to the Article 1 of the 1951 Convention a refugee is "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". On the other hand, there is no legal basis and legal regime for the protection of climate migrants in international law.

However, decisions text (CP 16; para f) of the 16th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC held in 2010 included a stand-alone paragraph 14(f) on displacement and migration. That decision only discussed about the understanding of displacement and migration but avoided the causes and consequences of climate change induced displacement and migration. At the 18th COP held in Doha in 2012, some relevant text on displacement and migration was included in the "draft decision 3" aside by Paragraph 14 (f). Following the decision (decision 3) of COP 18, an institutional mechanism named "Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM)" was established to address the climate change induced loss and damage and slow and sudden onset events in the developing countries that are vulnerable to the adverse effect of climate change (Decision 2/COP19).

In December 2014, at COP 20 an initial two year work plan was developed under the WIM. Out of nine action areas as identified in the work plan, displacement and migration was placed in Action Area 6 "Migration, Displacement and Mobility". The main objective of that Action Area was to boost understanding of how climate change is affecting migration, displacement and human mobility and what policy steps could be taken to enable people's mobility as a measure of resilience building.

After reviewing the progress of two year work plan, a five year rolling work plan (2017-2021) was developed at COP 22 in 2016 held in Marrakesh, Morocco. The five year rolling work plan is divided into six strategic work streams. Amongst them, Strategic Work stream (d) discusses about the enhanced cooperation and facilitation in relation to human mobility, including migration, displacement and planned relocation.

National context of Forced Migration

Being one of the most climate affected countries Bangladesh so far has developed a number of strategies and sectoral plans to tackle the adverse impacts of climate change. They include the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) developed in 2005 (modified in 2009); Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) developed in 2008 (modified in 2009); Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Act 2010; Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2015. Among them BCCSAP, which is considered as the most strategic one, includes 44 programmes under six pillars but none of them explicitly mentions the primacy of addressing climate change induced displacement and migration.

Concluding Remarks

It can be concluded that the future of Dhaka city is on the edge of collapse if effective measures are not taken timely. While it is important to make Dhaka as a migrant's friendly city, however the most strategic intervention would be undertaking localized adaptation measures and livelihoods diversification so that people prefer staying back at their homes of origin. Given the context, government could take some pragmatic steps like improving the adaptive capacity of the vulnerable people, establishment of coastal embankment to reduce risk of flooding, distribution of salinity resistant seed to the farmers and make climate related information available to all the people. Furthermore, social and cultural facility need to be increased in rural area. Garments and big industries should be decentralized to another city in order to ease the pressure exerted by huge population. Finally, urban planners and policy makers of Bangladesh should formulate proper policies on urbanization and urban settlement.

Reference: Available in the web version



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Global Report on Internal Displacement

Some countries drop off the international agenda only to re-emerge a few years later with significant numbers of new displacements. This was the case in 2016 for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and highlights how the failure to address the underlying causes of conflict and displacement results in recurrent crises, takes a heavy toll on communities and undermines the search for sustainable solutions to IDPs' needs.

On the web: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2017/20170522-GRID.pdf>

Global Risks 2018: Fractures, Fears and Failure

The World Economic Forum presents the latest Global Risks Report 2018 at a transformational time for the world. This report introduces three new series: Future Shocks, Hindsight and Risk Reassessment. The aim of this report is to broaden the analytical reach of each of these elements and to provide a new lens in understanding increasingly complex world of global risks.

On the web: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf

Discussion Paper: Non-Economic Loss And Damage With Case Examples from Tanzania, Ethiopia, El Salvador and Bangladesh

Non-economic loss and damage is part of the much wider discourse on loss and damage: Climate-related damage and the associated economic costs have been constantly increasing since 1970 and even more so in the last two decades. These trends are scientifically well documented and closely related to both an increase in extreme weather events and long-term

changes in climate variables in the context of climate change.

On the web: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Analyse76-en-v06.pdf>

GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2018

The Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index is an analysis based on one of the most reliable data sets available on the impacts of extreme weather events and associated socio-economic data. The Germanwatch Climate Risk Index 2018 is the 13th edition of the annual analysis. Its aim is to contextualize ongoing climate policy debates – especially the international climate negotiations – with real-world impacts during the last year and the last 20 year.

On the web: <https://germanwatch.org/en/download/20432.pdf>

Loss and Damage at COP23: Looking at Small Island Developing States

Climate induced or aggravated extreme weather events pose a real threat to development in the Pacific Islands: They have direct and indirect, short and long term socioeconomic impacts which are similar to those of SLR – if not worse, at least in the short term. The health risks associated with extreme weather events include drowning, injuries, certain vector, food- and water-borne diseases, increased disease transmission and health problems associated with deterioration of water quality and quantity. The destruction of infrastructure and loss of productive farmland also pose a great threat to human health and economic development, and there is some proof that severe weather-related events in a destination country can have a significant negative impact on tourism as well.

On the web: <https://germanwatch.org/en/download/20288.pdf>



*March for Climate Justice
Photo Credit: actalliance*

Challenging Manifest Injustice

'This is evident enough in our day-to-day life, with inequalities or subjugations from which we may suffer and we have good reason to resent, but it also applies to more widespread diagnoses on injustice in the wider world in which we live. It is fair to assume that Parisians would not have stormed in Bastille, Gandhi would not have challenged the empire on which the sun used not to set, and Martin Luther King would not have fought white supremacy in 'the land of the free' and the home of the brave, without their sense of manifest injustices that could be overcome.

Amartya Sen, Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 'The Idea of Justice'

As argued in this issue, the present day climate crisis has been instituted through chronological legacy of injustice to the poor countries by the developed ones, and by their unfair footprint to the global ecological space. Such 'manifest injustice' may not be battled (as cited above from Sen) in this 'neoliberal economic theory' dominated world where wealth-power dominates political will, yet we can mobilize peoples' opinion for justice; may be not with an aim of having a perfectly just world but for a fairer world. Why shouldn't we try to establish just and fairer world with climate justice to the extent we can.

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