Troubled Journey towards Climate Justice: Concerns and views for tackling climate injustice in loss and damage negotiation

Loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change has now become one of the key issues of discussion both in academic and policy arena. Since 1991, despite repeated argument of the developing countries to address ‘loss and damage’, primarily as the means of providing compensation, this entered to the   NFCCC process only in 2010 with a decision of establishing a “work program’ on loss and damage at the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) held in Cancun, Mexico. Henceforth, negotiations on loss and damage clearly gained momentum and marked by; establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage at COP 19 in 2013, and inclusion to the Paris Climate Agreement under a standalone Article (Article 8) that emphasizes the “importance of
averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

Despite considerable progress in the contextual and institutional aspects of anchoring loss and damage at the UNFCCC process, nonetheless it’s still an orphan agenda. Country Parties are yet to endorse ‘loss and damage’ as one of the key approaches, along with adaptation and mitigation, for addressing climate change. Referring to the recent havoc of climate change induced extreme weather events across the world, the least developed country group (LDCs) and small island developing country group (AOSIS) at COP 23 in 2017 were arguing for a standalone ‘loss and damage’ agenda item along with appropriate means of financing and capacity building support; however the rich countries were in favour of keeping loss and damage discussion aside, under the purview of the WIM and its Executive Committee, at least until the WIM review due in 2019. This raises significant concerns about climate injustice – as these countries are helpless victims even not contributing to present day climate crisis, moreover they are being forced to bear the unjustifiable costs of loss and damages largely due to inaction of the rich countries.

However, the only achievement of COP 23, yet trivial, is the decision of holding an “expert dialogue” at the next inter-sessional in May 2018. This dialogue would be exploring how finance might be secured and inform the WIM review in 2019. At COP 23, the developed country group is found seemingly afraid of reappearing compensation claim provided that the political position of the developing country group is shaped in a reinforced manner and ‘loss and damage’ further
gets a breakthrough in the COP process. Therefore, the developed country delegates repeatedly blocked any talks on loss and damage finance – the US was reportedly more vocal in the loss and damage discussions than in any other negotiation room. Given the context of murky political stand of some developed countries and mistrust between major country groups, this analysis provides a tolerant insights on the context and contentious issues of loss and damage negotiation, also presents a likely policy and institutional scenario for addressing loss and damage. Such an insightful analysis is believed to shape future discussion and would tackle climate injustice while agreeing on justice based solutions for addressing loss and damage.

Loss and Damage: What instigated the discussion?
While the global leadership is found seemingly eventful in devising country specific as well as aggregate target of greenhouse gas emission reduction, compatible to the global political goal of limiting global average temperature rise well below 2 degree Centigrade by the end of this century from the preindustrial level, the people all over the world are compensating the harsh reality of climate change with their life and valuable assets. Already with 1.1 degree Centigrade temperature rise from the pre-industrial level, the Earth is experiencing numerous instances of localized extremes like the hottest non–El Niño year, hottest summer, wild fires, cyclones and typhoons, changes in the precipitation leading to early floods or flash floods etc.

According to Global Climate Risk 2018, over the years from 1997 and 2016, the direct consequences of more than 11000 extreme weather events globally caused death of 524 000 people and USD 3.16 trillion economic loss Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) (David, Eckstein., Künzel, Vera and Schäfer, Laura, 2018). Analysis on the occurrence of recorded disasters over this 20-year period (1997-2016) marked Honduras, Haiti and Myanmar as the most affected countries, followed by Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Bangladesh.

These rankings are attributed considering the aftermath of exceptionally devastating extreme events such as Cyclone Roanu in India, Bangladesh and in Sri Lanka in 2017, category 4 hurricane Matthew and Nicole in Haiti in 2016, extreme drought and tropical storm Dineo in Zimbabwe in 2016, category 5 cyclone Winston in Fiji in 2016, Hurricane Sandy in Haiti in 2012, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, Hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 1998; however the ranking didn’t consider the residual impacts of extreme as well as slow onset events, also didn’t consider the cost of non-economic losses.

Yet, the Climate Risk Index 2018 (CRI) revealed some interesting finding; for instance, among the most affected countries nine belong to low income or lower middle income country group. Though the rich countries incurred much higher absolute monetary losses than the low-income countries but the loss of life, personal hardship and existential threats are much more widespread to the later country group. Again, while the number of deaths caused by the conventional sudden onsets e.g. tropical cyclone seems to be reduced (mainly through the consistent effort on disaster risk reduction and preparedness) but the unconventional and localized disasters are causing more deaths irrespective in rich and poor countries. For instance, persistent heat waves and drought in South Asia in 2016 affected over 330
million people (CNN, 2017). In India, with a breaking temperature record of 51 degree Centigrade in Rajasthan reportedly claimed 1800 lives primarily due
to hyperthermia or dehydration (Hindustan Times, 2016). The unusually high temperatures also reported from parts of southern Europe to eastern and southern
Africa, South America, and parts of Russia and China (World Economic Forum, 2018).

In contrary to this, hypothermia caused by extreme cold wave claimed lives of 85 people in Chinese Taipei. Again, landslide associated with the torrential rainfall
claimed lives of at least 300 people in India in 2016 (Accu Weather, 2016), 152 people in Bangladesh (Dhaka Tribune, 2017) while also affecting livelihoods of millions of people.

On the other side of the coin, the USA-the present time climate denier, experienced adversity of almost all weather related extreme events, which include flash
floods accompanied with torrential rains, extreme flooding, intense heat wave accompanied by wildfires, and a number of high impact Hurricanes and Typhoons. Aside with causing billion dollars economic loss by each of the catastrophes, they also killed more than hundred people.

In 2017 alone, 16 weather and climate related multi-category high impact events hit the USA, which include 1 drought, 2 flooding, 1 freeze event, 8 severe storm, 3 tropical cyclone, and 1 wildfire; these events resulted in the deaths of 362 people and had significant economic effects in the impacted areas. According to the US’s National Centers for Environmental Information (NECI, 2017) the cumulative damage of these 16 events was USD 306.2 billion, which shattered the previous U.S. annual record cost of USD 214.8 billion (CPI-adjusted), established in 2005 due to the impacts of Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, Rita and Wilma.

According to NCEI, over a period from 1980–2017, the annual average extreme events was 5.8, the figure was just doubled (11.6 events) in the last five years from 2013-2017. Similarly, an analysis on the occurrence of Tropical Cyclone in the Bay of Bengal confirmed rise in rough sea events resulting from the rise in sea surface temperature by 0.30-0.48°C during a period from 1958 to 2009 (Chowdhury et al., 2012).

While it is relatively convenient to quantify perceptible economic loss and damages caused by sudden onsets, however the truly systemic challenge remains in establishing direct causal link between ‘climate impacts and non-economic losses’ and quantifying them, and establishing interconnectedness among those losses with their secondary and tertiary risk/ loss category. The secondary risks include food and water insecurity, loss of biodiversity, loss of ecosystem services, forced displacement and migration; while the tertiary risks are regression in growth and development, widening inequality, competition and conflict in resource use, domestic and international tensions on displacement and migration issues etc. Among a very few studies in establishing interconnectedness between climate change impacts and it’s secondary risks, Kent, C et.al (2017)estimated that the heat, drought, and flood events- now one-intwenty chance per decade- will cause a simultaneous failure of maize production in the world’s two main growers, China and the United States.

Already the flash flood and early monsoon flooding accompanied with torrential rainfall are causing substantial loss in food production in many developing countries. For instance, in 2016 the heavy rainfall and landside triggered by prolonged monsoon in eastern, western and central India caused death of 300 people, while also destroying standing crops and other physical assets. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the early flash floods occurred in March 2017 destroyed 1.5 million tons of nearly-ready-to-harvest Boro rice in about 290,000 ha areas, also washed away fish and other household resources like poultry cattle etc. (CPD, 2017). The huge rice production in the hoar areas covers 25 per cent of the country’s total annual Boro rice output. Hence, the sudden and complete loss of this rice crop forced the country to import rice in 2017, while Bangladesh has become a net rice exporting country since several years. The probability of such extreme rainfall and occurrence of flash flood will likely be higher in the future due to consistent rise in world’s average temperature.

The stated loss and damage scenario only accounted the noticeable economic losses mainly resulted from the sudden and extreme disaster events; however the non-economic losses both from sudden and slow onset events also should be counted. Such losses include; loss of a homeland (for example, when island dwellers are forced to leave their atolls), biodiversity and ecosystems (for example, mangrove forests), cultural goods (such as cult and burial sites that cannot be relocated for religious reasons) or the increased spread of certain diseases associated with temperature and precipitation change. While not discussed so in the global negotiation, the significant non-economic losses would probably be the biodiversity loss, which is largely due to habitat destruction, practicing monoculture in crop production and also for changes in weather pattern such as rise in temperature and variability in precipitation. Already a recent study in Germany estimated more than 70 per cent of loss in insects over 27 years (Hallmann, C. A 2017). Such an appalling situation posing an impending fear of “ecological Armageddon” while putting global food security in stake (World Economic Forum 2018).

All these sudden and slow onset events and their secondary and tertiary risks are triggering displacement and migration, both internal and across borders. According to IDMC (2017), each year since 2008 an average of 25.3 million people are newly displaced by disasters (IDMC, 2017); of which the annual average displacement by geological hazards is roughly 2 million, remaining 23.3 million are displaced by weather related disasters (IOM 2018). At the end of 2016, globally 31.1 million people displaced in 125 countries; 76% (24.2million) of those displacement were triggered by sudden onset disasters (IDMC 2017). Among numerous instances
of displacement and migration caused by the weather related events a few are; 35 000 by Hurricane Matthew in Haiti in 2016, 34,000 in Fiji by Cyclone Winston
in 2016 (Weather, 2017) several hundred thousand in Bangladesh by Cyclone Mora in 2017 (Solomon, 2017) and around half a million in Sri Lanka in 2017 (IOM,
2017)

Though the great majority of displaced people in the world believed not to migrate across borders; however the recent figure of international migrants shows the different picture. As anticipated by IOM, by 2050 the international migrants would account for 2.6 per cent of the global population or 230 million (IOM, 2003). However, the latest global estimate on international migrants accounted to 244 million, 3.3 per cent of the global population (UN DESA, 2016) that already surpassed the IOM’s earlier projection. With the constant rise in international migrants- both numerically and proportionally – the IOM revised its earlier projection estimating 405 million international migrants globally by 2050 (IOM, 2010). Such rise in cross border migration may significantly intensify present day migration crisis, also could rise tension between countries. However, it’s the migrants who suffers most in either situation-staying with the known risk at the origin or escaping with unknown risks and uncertainties.

While all the facts and figures signifies the growing urgency of combating emission reduction and the consequent global warming, however the emissions of CO2 had risen for the first time in four years, bringing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to 403 parts per million, compared with a preindustrial baseline of 280 parts per million (NECI, 2017). In contrary to this, the CO2 storage and sinking capacity of the world’s natural ecosystems are declining. Ocean as the most potential natural systems of offsetting atmospheric CO2 concentration and earth’s heat content so far have absorbed 30 per cent of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide since the pre-industrial times (IPCC 2012); also have absorbed 93 per cent of the increase in global temperatures between 1971 and 2010 (Levitus, S., J. et. al. 2017). With consistent rise in global CO2 concentrations the world’s oceans would continue to get warmer resulting more frequent and intense rough sea event; however the oceanic heat content as well as CO2 absorbing capacity may be declining at a certain point of time (Ayres, R. 2016. ). Worryingly, The other potential natural system
e.g. the tropical forests are now releasing rather than absorbing CO2 (Baccini, A., 2017).  Three Regime of Climate Negotiation: ‘U Turn’ from justice to climate injustice  Over the years, since the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) held in Berlin in 1995, there has been considerable shift not only in setting agenda items
but also in the ideological basis of the convention ( Shamsuddoha Md, Rahman Mizanur, 2013). There has been always an influence of scientific findings (e.g. the IPCCC) and the push from global CSOs that shaped and reshaped political priorities and agenda settings in the COP negotiations. In the initial years, from 1990 to 2000, the policy focus was on mitigation. From 2001 to 2010, it was on adaptation and since 2010 discussion on loss and damage got considerable attention as the third pillar of agenda item-along with mitigation and adaptation.

The continued lack of mitigation ambitions and inadequate resources to implement adaptation actions pushed developing countries to tremendous suffering, causing significant loss and damage of assets and properties that could no longer be avoided and recovered through adaptation. Hence, with the growing demand from the LDCs and developing country groups for a ‘compensation mechanism’ for climate induced ‘loss and damage’ got the height of momentum as well as become a debated issue at the entire COP process. Vanuatu, on behalf AOSIS, first tabled loss and damage proposal in the early 1990s, AOSIS again proposed a ‘Multi-Window Mechanism’ at COP 14 held in Poznan in 2008. That proposal included a rehabilitation and compensation component as a basis for future negotiations; the
other components are risk transfer (insurance) and risk management. In contrary to this, the developed country group opposed the compensation / liability
component. With the increased support of the LDCs to the AOSIS proposal to address unavoidable loss and damage, the COP16 held in Cancun in 2010
established a SBI Work Programme on Loss and Damage under the scope of Cancun Adaptation Framework.

Finally, at COP 18 held in Doha in 2012, developing country Parties traded off their core demand i.e. ‘compensation’ for having an institutional mechanism,
which was established at COP 19 in 2013 as ‘Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) along with a WIM Interim Executive Committee (ExCom). The ExCom
was tasked to develop its work plan for the next 2 years and get approved at COP 2014. Again, at COP 21 held in Paris in 2015 the developing country group raised
the demand for compensation, which was further traded off for having a standalone Article at the Paris Agreement (Article 8). This time the ‘compensation
demand’ was nailed by the developed countries through a COP Decision that reads ‘that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for
any liability or compensation’ (Decision 1/CP.21; Para 51), and the word “compensation” was replaced by “action and support.”

The analysis on the two decades of UNFCCC negotiation process clearly shows its distracted focus from one to another- mitigation to ‘mitigation and adaptation’, and now loss and damage- as befitted with the interest of the developed countries, however none of them got adequate political priority as was required to combat global warming. Again the miserably weak political commitment on the structurally detracted climate agendas also undermines the ideological basis of the Convention that literally was framed based on the historical legacy of injustice and unfair footprint of the developed countries to the global ecological space.
And, by the Convention, the developed country group was held responsible to take the lead in combating the changing climate system (through mitigation actions)
and the adverse impacts thereof.

Such policy shifting in climate change negotiation from justice based framework to injustice, largely due to murky political position of the developed country group, in turn, reinforces the moral obligation towards ‘climate justice’, which should be reflected in the future negotiation while giving due attention to all three Pillars of the Paris Agreement.

Loss and Damage beyond Paris: A misleading attempt to perish the Paris outcome
Though the standalone Article (Article 8) on loss and damage in the Paris Agreement was considered as a big way forward, however disagreement of some developed countries on the key issues of negotiation, especially on loss and damage finance, resulted impasses in the negotiation of subsequent COPs beyond Paris. While the developing countries wanted to institutionalize loss and damage to the Paris doctrine, the developed countries favoured keep it aside meddling with the pre-Paris doctrine such as WIM and its Work Plan.

Referring to ‘Action and Support’ provision as stated in the Paris Agreement and citing the already incurred loss and damages, the developing countries at COP22
proposed to earmark dedicated financial recourses, which was opposed by the developed country group and refused any discussion on loss and damage finance
until the WIM review in 2019 that would elaborate sources of financial support. Debate on loss and damage finance even become more intense at COP 23. Under the presidency of Fiji-that suffered USD 1.4 billion loss by an ever strongest full-on cyclone Winston in early 2016- the COP 23 amplified voices of the small island nations as well as puts a moral weight on loss and damage, especially on the provision of additional finance. Given the context, the COP 23 outcome on loss and damage is just reiteration of earlier issues; knowledge generation, WIM review and its strengthening, development of technical papers etc. Moreover, discussion in the COP 23 surfaced the old debate and suspicion on the ‘theoretical perspective’ of loss and damage and associated financing.

According to COP23 news update by TWN (TWN 2017), the developing countries namely the Bahamas, Cuba, Group of LDCs and AOSIS raised their concern
on the WIM’s budgetary constraints and proposed a financing provision from the Secretariat’s core budget. They also proposed the WIM becoming a permanent
agenda item of the subsidiary bodies. The developed country groups opposed those proposals with their procedural response: such as-budget issues belong in the budget consultations; resources are more than finance; and a WIM standing item might inhibit progress by the ExCom. However the developing country group termed the WIM not a mechanism in true sense, only playing a facilitative role in developing tool for action and financial resources are needed for the WIM to be effective in helping developing countries on the ground.

Again, while the developing countries were arguing for a permanent agenda item under SBI and Paris Agreement, few of the developed countries namely Australia and the USA were found insistent keeping loss and damage under the mandate of Cancun Adaptation Framework and asked developing countries to include approaches for addressing loss and damage to the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) that the developing countries will be preparing by next few years. Such a misleading proposition disregards the theoretical understanding of loss and damage that refers people’s incompatibility to adapt (Warner and van der Geest, 2012), also would perish the Paris outcome that functionally established ‘loss and damage’ as one of the standalone approaches untying with adaptation.

Given those points of disagreement, the COP 23 finally didn’t include any permanent agenda item for loss and damage especially on “action and support. However, requests the Secretariat, under the guidance of the ExCom and the SBI Chair to organize expert dialogue in parallel to SBI meeting in May 2018. The aim of this  expert dialogue would be securing of expertise, and enhancement of support, including finance, technology and capacity building. The COP 23 decision also encourages parties to actively engage in the work of the WIM and its ExCom by establishing a loss and damage contact point through their respective UNFCCC national focal point.

Hence, there was no substantive outcome on loss and damage, the same talks on knowledge generation and continuation of routine work. The bottom line is:
there is no guarantee of financial support for those affected by catastrophic disasters or even for the body (WIM) tasked to identify the sources of finance (Don
Lehr, Lili Fuhr, Liane Schalatek 2017).

Loss and Damage Negotiation: recommendations for establishing ‘climate justice’
While a standalone ‘loss and damage’ Article (Article 8) in the Paris Agreement was considered a major victory for developing countries, however the concurrent policy debate and disagreement denoted that ‘victory’ as the staring of a new phase of struggle towards climate justice. As discussed above, since the adoption of Paris Agreement in COP21, many of the previously debated issues were also being raised in the subsequent COPs. Yet there are some achievements; some are procedural while less significant, and some are political while more significant. Decision for holding an expert dialogue during the COP intersessional in May 2018 and establishing a Loss and Damage Contact Point are procedural, but the more significant achievement was the strong political coherence of the LDCs and AOSIS established in the process of negotiation. The other significant dynamics of the COP process, especially found at COP 23, is the strong presence of ‘non-state actors’
who just not chases the government’s delegates but also challenged them with new research findings, solutions and commitments for establishing climate
justice. Those achievements might not so noticeable, yet achieving such progress in the procedural miniature of multilateral climate policy should not be underestimated as these could be referenced from now on in the future rounds of negotiations (Steffen Bauer, 2017).

Based on the achievements so far and considering the global urgency for addressing climate induced loss and damage this chapter recommends a few aspects to be
considered in the upcoming negotiations. A standalone agenda item on loss and damage Though in the COP process, loss and damage was first anchored to the Enhanced Adaptation Action with a decision to establish a work programme to identify feasible approaches to address climate induced loss and damage (Decision 1/CP.16 para 26, 27, 28), however the subsequent COP decisions made it clear that loss and damage is something beyond of adaptation. Finally the Paris Agreement made a clear distinction between ‘Adaptation’ and “Loss and Damage’ placing them in separate Articles; Article 7 for adaptation and Article 8 for loss and damage.
Such emergence of loss and damage as a focus area of the international climate policy arena is caused by the realization that existing mitigation commitments
and actions will not prevent dangerous climate change induced impacts. Moreover, not all climate change impacts can be successfully adapted to, be it due to financial, technical or physical constraints (Künzel Vera, Laura Schäfer, Roxana Baldrich, Sabine Minninger, 2017). Again the substantial loss and damage incidents, even at 1 degree warmer world from the pre-industrial era, seems to be unmanageable by most of the developing countries, let alone the 1.5 degree Centigrade of warming (so far unrealistically ambitious) and the 3-4 degree Centigrade of warming the world is heading towards as far as the current mitigation pledges are concerned. Given the context of ‘moral obligation’ for ensuring climate justice as sated above, as also enshrined in the  Framework Convention, the global policy stakeholders should give immediate attention in addressing loss and damage unless the situation become irreversible with increasingly feeble attention to both mitigation and adaptation. Similar to mitigation and adaptation approaches, addressing loss and damage also requires very specific national and international measures guided by policy and pragmatic directives of the COP process. And this only be possible if country parties include loss and damage as a standalone and regular agenda item in the COP process, include this in the Paris rulebook, establish a dedicated funding mechanism and facilitate capacity building and strengthening of national institutions and mechanisms.

Let alone loss and damage, the other two approaches e.g. mitigation and adaptation have already been streamlined or so with their global goals, required national strategies with identified measures and targets, funding mechanisms etc. Understandably, the effective implementation of emission reduction and adaptation strategies essentially also will reduce potential risks of loss and damage and vice-versa. Even though loss and damage specific strategies and measures are required to address incurred and future loss and damage, particularly for the climate vulnerable developing countries. Figure 1 shows the approaches for all three pillars that would contribute implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement in a comprehensive and justifiable manner.

A standalone financing mechanism: new and  additional, not aligned to other humanitarian  assistance The COP 23 showed an intense debate on loss and damage financing, which might become more intense in the following COPs. Despite having the decision (Decision 2/ CP.19) for mobilizing loss and damage finances by the WIM, and reinforcing the same i.e. enhance action and support in the Paris Agreement, currently there is no recognized funding mechanism or entity to minimize
and avert the risk of potential loss, and offset the incurred loss and damages. As stated earlier, being one of the most victims of climate induced loss and damages
Fiji’s Presidency at COP23 gave a particular dimension and moral weight for demanding a separate finding mechanism. However COP 23 failed to raise any hope
for establishing loss and damage funding mechanism, also failed to mainstream loss and damage discussion to the COP process.

Studies indicate that by mid-century global loss and damage costs may exceed USD1 trillion per year, with developing countries shouldering the majority of the burden. Baarsch et al. (2015) estimated loss and damage costs for developing countries of around USD 400 bn a year by 2030, rising to USD 1.1-1.7 trillion a year by 2050. Given the context of meagre finance flow, primarily through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Adaptation Fund (AF), earmarked only for mitigation and adaptation activities, a separate financing entity is essentially required to address the loss and damage on the ground.

Loss Damage Vs Humanitarian Finance
Another debate that emerged at COP 23 is around the additionally of loss and damage finance. As argued by the developed countries, they are already supporting
countries in need through humanitarian assistance, which is in other way loss and damage financing. In fact Humanitarian Assistance (as it is called) is completely different from any climate related finance, not only from their differentiated nature but also from the moral context. By nature, humanitarian assistance is voluntary relief (mostly goods and services) support provided to the people in crisis e.g. disaster. A country in dire humanitarian crisis may request for support, on the other hand any country/party may not be obliged to respond to the request. Hence, from the climate justice perspective ‘climate finance’ should not be considered mere as assistance or aid, rather it’s an obligation of the rich countries. Again, counting humanitarian assistance as loss and damage finance essentially will undermine the principles of climate finance e.g. new, addition to ODA, not tying with any conditionalities etc.

It is also important to keep loss and damage funding mechanism separated from the GCF, AF and ECHO. At COP 23, developed country group proposed ECHO, the Humanitarian Aid Services of the European Commission, to channel loss and damage funds. Mandate of ECHO is just not addressing climate change rather to provide aid during core humanitarian and civil crises. On the other hand, GCF already turned similar to a traditional multilateral bank; less amount of grants, mandatory co-financing from the recipient countries, senior loans, subordinate loans etc. Such complexity of GCF’s funding mechanisms may not helpful meeting urgent and need based funding requirements for addressing loss and damage.

Concluding Remarks
Compared to mitigation and adaptation, loss and damage is the very lately inclusion to the COP negotiations. With the growing evidences of ‘climate injustice’ to the developing countries- as discussed in the previous chapter-loss and damage attracted outmost priority and finally got the status of a standalone agenda item in the Paris Agreement. However the impasses of loss and damage negotiation beyond Paris symbolizes that the inclusion of loss and damage in Paris Agreement was not to correct the ‘manifest injustice’ rather to appease collective argument of the developing countries-supported by global CSOs. Again with the incurred loss and
damage scenario and ‘proliferation of climate injustice’ to the developing countries reinforces the argument for ensuring ‘climate justice’, which should not be overlooked only from the conservative and nationalistic standpoint of the rich countries.

Selected references;
Eckstein, David, Künzel, Vera and Schäfer, Laura (2018): Global Climate Index 2018:
Who Suffers Most From Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2016 and 1997 to 2016
IDMC (2017): Global Report on Internal Displacement. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDMC. http://www.internaldisplacement.org/global-report/grid2017/
NCEI (2018): U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters; National Centers for Environmental Information, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/
World Economic Forum (2018): The Global Risks Report 2018, 13th Edition, available at; http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf

About the Author
Md Shamsuddoha
Md Shamsuddoha is the chief Executive of Center for Participatory Research and Development –CPRD  (www.cprdbd.org), a research based non-government
organization in Bangladesh. He has been consistent in following climate negotiation, and wrote numbers of articles on core climate change politics and diplomacy,
displacement and migration etc.

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